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'He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the
beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly
perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our
former toils)—a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying,
or waxing and waning; secondly, not lovely from one point of view and ugly from
another, or at one time or place lovely, at another time or place polluted, or in the
likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech
or knowledge, or existing in any other being, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other
place; but beauty absolute, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and
without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties
of all other things. He who from these ascending under the influence of true love, begins
to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going, or being led
by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount
upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going
on to two, and from two to all beautiful forms, and from beautiful forms until he arrives
at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my
dear Socrates,' said the stranger, 'is that life above all others which man should live, in
the contemplation of beauty absolute; …But what if one had eyes to see the true beauty—
the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not congested with the
pollutions of mortality and all the vanities of human life? …Would that be an ignoble
life?'
~ Plato,
The Symposium

…if the idea of goodness presupposes the simpler, more absolute and universal notion of
being; …if the intellect alone can receive being into itself, completely possess it, become
one with it; …If the will, on the contrary, cannot receive being into itself in this manner,
completely possess it and become one with it, but can only tend towards it when it is
absent, and take delight in it when it is made present by an act of the intellect; …then the
dialectic of love engenders a certitude which is objectively adequate and absolute, and
this by reason of the dialectic of the intellect which it implies.
~ Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange,
God: His Existence and His Nature
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ABSTRACT

This work gives attention to a trajectory that attempts to chart a course from the
human quest for happiness and ultimately arrives at a transcendent, universal terminus or
summum bonum as the natural end of this quest. This trajectory of ascent has given rise to
a specific kind of project in natural theology; namely, the Eudaimonological Argument.
Herein I set out to defend the analysis and development of the thought of Thomas
Aquinas on this ascent by the 20th century Neoscholastic, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange
(1877–1964). The central thesis contends that Garrigou’s Eudaimonological Argument
represents a viable project in natural theology within the Thomist tradition when properly
understood in light of its underlying metaphysical principles, specifically formal and final
causality. To support this contention, attention is first given to Augustine’s account of
happiness and its potential as an argument for God’s existence. However, while he
provides criteria which entail God as humanity’s natural end, his account cannot be
properly construed along the lines of traditional natural theology. Next, this work turns to
Aquinas in order to explore such a project. Although Aquinas provides an extended
analysis of happiness and its relation to God, he still left much of the work for a natural
theological project along these lines implicit and in need of further development.
However, in the work of Garrigou-Lagrange extending Aquinas’ thought, the
Eudaimonological Argument comes to full expression. What analysis of Garrigou’s
account makes evident is the necessary role of formal and final causality for the
argument’s articulation and defense. While Garrigou’s argument is subject to potential
defeaters, this work considers and seeks to defend it against these objections. Lastly, the

vi

Eudaimonological Argument’s dependence on formal and final causality is further
demonstrated by the failure of such arguments which have been attempted apart from
these metaphysical foundations. Although Kant and the Transcendental Thomists offered
their own version of the argument, it was found that in so doing the argument either
moved beyond the critical philosophy or failed to establish its theological conclusions.

vii

INTRODUCTION

1. Tracing the Ascent to God
Reflection in the history of Western philosophy on humanity’s appetitive nature
has yielded a certain trajectory. This trajectory attempts to chart a course from the quest
for happiness, sought initially in lower goods, moving to yet higher goods, and ultimately
arriving at a transcendent, universal terminus or highest good (summum bonum) as the
proper fulfillment of this quest. Further analysis of the trajectory of ascent, which can be
traced back beginning with Plato in the ancient period, through figureheads such as
Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas in medieval thought, in Immanuel Kant in the
modern period, and Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange in the 20th century, has given rise to
specific kind of project in natural theology. Augustine identified a number of conditions
necessary to provide happiness and concluded that the only suitable candidate was God.
Similarly, Aquinas analyzed human agency and concluded that there must be a single,
ultimate end for human beings, God identified as the universal Good. Réginald GarrigouLagrange built upon this previous tradition and attempted to explicitly formalize and
extended this ascent as a proof of God’s existence. Though Immanuel Kant’s
assumptions and methods differed significantly, he also argued that the necessity of
achieving happiness proportioned to virtue could only be realized if God was postulated.
This dissertation seeks to explore the prospects of interpreting the ascent beginning in the
quest for happiness in each of these figures as a type of natural-theological exercise.
However, before turning to the specific aims of this study, a brief overview of the general
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ascent from the desire for happiness in a hierarchy of goods leading to a highest good is
in order. A survey of the general features of this ascent will help to locate these figures in
this broader tradition and see where a natural theological project might fit within it.
In Plato’s Symposium, the character Diotima leads Socrates up the “ladder of
love,” which begins with consideration of beautiful bodies, progressing to the beauty of
souls, and on to the allure of the underlying principles of beauty, until arriving at the
“goal of all loving.”1 This ultimate goal is characterized as the vision of:
Something wonderfully beautiful in its nature … it always is and neither comes to
be nor passes away, neither waxes nor wanes … it is not beautiful this way and
ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another.… It is not anywhere
in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but
itself by itself with itself, it is always one in form; and all other beautiful things
share in that, in such a way that when those others come to be or pass away, this
does not become the least bit small or greater nor suffer any change.… [O]ne goes
always upwards for the sake of this Beauty.2
Read against the backdrop of Platonic metaphysical realism—that is, Plato’s view that
the species of material objects is determined by an ideal Archetype or Form of which the
material object is an imperfect copy3—this ascent begins in the material realm, gazing on
material objects, and then rises to the Forms against which these objects are measured,
until culminating in Plato’s ultimate, namely the Good itself, the cause of all truth,
beauty, and being.4 This movement is reflective of the ascending nature of thought

1

Plato, Symposium, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, 1989 edition. (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co, 1989), 210e.
2

Plato, Symposium, 210e-211c.

3

Plato’s Theory of the Forms is given in The Republic, 506d-521b. See also James I Conway,
“The Meaning of Moderate Realism,” The New Scholasticism 36, no. 2 (1962): 141–179; Larry Lee
Blackman, “Why Every Realist Should Be A Platonist,” Auslegung: a Journal of Philosophy (1980): 144–
162.
4

Plato, The Republic 477a; 508c; 509b; Phaedo 97b-99d; Parmenides, 137c ff.
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discussed in Plato’s Republic, in which thought of shadows is lower than that of the
material objects that cast them; reflection on the connection between material objects and
Form is higher still; and higher than both of these is reflection on pure Form.5 Yet, here
Plato introduces the Good as higher than the Forms themselves and the ultimate goal of
this rational ascent.6 In so doing, Plato set out a course that was to be followed in
distinctive ways by a host of others.
We see a similar ascent in Plato’s famed student, Aristotle. Perhaps the two most
obvious occurrences are in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Nichomachean Ethics,
respectively. Aristotle, in Book I of his Metaphysics, begins with the natural human
desire for knowledge. Within the Aristotelian corpus, there are two points at issue here.
The first is that the proper end (telos) of a species is located in the specific difference of
that species—that is, what makes it unique relative to others within in its genus.7 In the
case of humanity, the species is a rational (specific difference) animal (genus); hence,
rationality is central to the proper end of the human person. The second is that any
faculty, or power (dynamis), has corresponding operations (energeiai), and these
operations contribute to the actuality of the thing—or it becoming more fully what it is.8
Bringing these points together, it is no surprise that Aristotle argues that the highest
operation of a thing is the chief end of the whole, and thus the locus of it becoming most

5

Plato, The Republic 80d-86c.

6

Plato, The Republic 477a; 508c; 509b; Phaedo 97b-99d.

7

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2.13.

8

On the development from Plato to Aristotle on this point, see David Bradshaw, Aristotle East
and West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3-5.
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fully itself.9 In the case of the soul of a human person, the highest operation is thinking
and reasoning, and thus, “the man who is exercising his mental capacity ‘lives more’ than
the man who merely possesses it.”10 In this light, Aristotle’s Metaphysics does not offer a
general observation that humans are generally curious; rather, it is a look at the appetite
that is most central to a human person becoming fully human, namely the rational
appetite. Aristotle traces this desire from the faculty of sensation to the sciences.
Identifying scientific knowledge with a discovery of causes, Aristotle argues that the
investigation of causes must terminate in the First Cause, which is the crown of
metaphysics.11 Hence, the chief end of the rational soul is to know the First Cause, or
Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover (God); only then is a human person most fully human.
Likewise in his Nichomachean Ethics, having moved beyond various kinds of pleasure,
friendship, and family, Aristotle arrives at the very same end as the proper end of a
human person. To wit, the contemplation of the divine is not only the proper end of the
rational soul but also the height of happiness, which is the aim of all human pursuits.12
In Plotinus’ Enneads, we find the Neoplatonic account of ascent, first introduced
by Plato. Unsurprisingly, Plotinus follows a pattern similar to Plato. As the soul is
awakened, it is driven by desire from the perishable material realm to the intelligible
realm, beginning with the recognition of beautiful bodies and only later discovering
beautiful principles, until ascending up to the three Hypostases of Plotinus’ metaphysical

9

Aristotle, Protrepticus, B79-80, B82-83, and B86.

10

Aristotle, Protrepticus, B86.

11

Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072a15-1072b10.

12

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, chs. 6-8..
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hierarchy, namely the World Soul, the Nous, and the One.13 Plotinus’ description calls to
mind both Plato’s Symposium and his allegory of the cave, in which among those
confined to the shadows one is led with difficulty into the brightness of illuminated
objects and finally the sun as the ultimate source of light. Plotinus writes, “Like anyone
just awakened, the soul cannot look at bright objects. It must be persuaded to look first at
beautiful habits, then the works of beauty produced not by craftsman’s skill but by the
virtue of men known for their goodness, then the souls of those who achieve beautiful
deeds.”14 According to Plotinus, the soul is entombed and clouded by the body, which
assails it with all manner of passions that lead to vice.15 The soul’s focus on the
perishable, on lust, on fear, and on envy—in short, on all that leads to vice—is what
clouds the vision of the soul and produces an ugliness of the spirit.16 Yet, by pursuing the
cardinal virtues—temperance, courage, prudence, and justice—the soul is purified, and in
so doing, a desire awakens in it for the beautiful itself and it correspondingly becomes
more beautiful.17 This purification and desire is the beginning of the soul’s ascent to the
Good, and the height of this ascent is the obtaining of a vision, as described in Plato, of
the Beauty (which is also the Good, for Plotinus), and herein alone is found human
happiness.18

13

Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.6.

14

Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.9. Cf. Plato, Symposium, 210a-e; and Plato, The Republic, 506d-21b.

15

Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.5; and I.6.9.

16

Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.5.

17

Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.6.

18

Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.7.

5

In the generations after Plotinus, there would emerge a divide within the
Neoplatonist school over precisely how the soul ascends and what this looks like. The
dispute centered specifically on theurgy, or the belief that one might be energized by
deities through ritualistic practices. David Bradshaw summarizes:
[Porphyry] brought into the orbit of Neoplatonism the system of ritualized
interaction with the gods known as theurgy. Porphyry himself had strong doubts
about theurgy; he regarded it as at best a useful way of cleansing the soul, one
merely preparatory for the only true salvation, which is achieved through
philosophy. But his student Iamblichus rose to its defense, and this quarrel
between Porphyry and Iamblichus marked the major parting of the ways in the
early history of the school. Iamblichus’ writings ultimately became definitive for
Neoplatonism in the eastern half of the Empire, whereas they remained virtually
unknown in the West.19
Thus, Neoplatonism would continue to advocate the ascent of the soul as the main source
of happiness, but whether this ascent was to be achieved through asceticism and virtue or
also through religious ritual and theurgy became a point of contention.
During the patristic period, the trajectory of ascent to the highest good and its
connection with happiness continues amongst Christian writers, and, as with the
Neoplatonists, can roughly be divided East and West. Amongst Western Christian
writers, the primary figurehead is Augustine of Hippo. Throughout his extensive body of
work, Augustine follows in suit and begins with the universal human quest for happiness.
He identifies the conditions necessary to secure this happiness.20 Namely, the object of

19

Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West, 97. See also R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, 2nd ed.
(Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), 105-10, 120-23.
20

Augustine, De Beata Vita (On the Happy Life), trans. Ruth Allison Brown (Washington, DC:
The Catholic University of America, 1944); Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. Edward
B. Pusey (Collier-Macmillan, 1961); Saint Augustine, The City of God, trans. D. D. Marcus Dods (Modern
Library, 1977); Augustine, “On The Morals of the Catholic Church,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers:
First Series, Volume IV St. Augustine: The Writings Against the Manichaeans, and Against the Donatists,
ed. Philip Schaff (New York, NY: Cosimo, Inc., 2007); Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (Hayes Barton
Press, n.d.).
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happiness must be a genuine good, permanently possessed and not subject to loss or
corruption, superior in nature to man, able to satisfy his desires, and sought as an end in
itself. After considering and rejecting putative objects and states of affairs, such as goods
of the home, community, friendship, or supernatural experiences, Augustine finds that the
requisite conditions for happiness can only be satisfied by God as the summum bonum.21
This conclusion is eloquently summarized in Augustine’s Confessions, prompted by his
recounting of the devastating loss of a dear friend. Augustine writes:
For wherever the human soul turns itself, other than to you, it is fixed in sorrows,
even if it is fixed upon beautiful things external to you and external to itself,
which would nevertheless be nothing if they did not have their being from you.
Things rise and set: in their emerging they begin as it were to be, and grow to
perfection; having reached perfection, they grow old and die…. That is the law
limiting their being…. Let these transient things be the ground on which my soul
praises you (Ps. 145:2), “God creator of all.” But let it not become stuck in them
and glued to them with love through the physical senses. For these things pass
along the path of things that move towards non-existence. They rend the soul with
pestilential desires; for the soul loves to be in them and take its repose among the
objects of its love. But in these things there is no point of rest: they lack
permanence…. Do not be vain, my soul. Do not deafen your heart’s ear with the
tumult of your vanity…. The Word himself cries to you to return. There is the
place of undisturbed quietness where love is not deserted if it does not itself
depart…. Fix your dwelling there… [F]ar superior to these things is he who made
all things, and he is our God. He does not pass away; nothing succeeds him….
Rest in him and you will be at rest.22
In the 6th century, under an unjust arrest and awaiting execution, Boethius penned
The Consolations of Philosophy in which he too poses questions concerning the
achievement of true happiness, about man’s nature and ultimate end, all of which he

21

Augustine, The City of God, Book XIX, Ch. 5–9.

22

Augustine, Confessions, Book V, 10-12. Quotation from Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans.
Henry Chadwick (Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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gives to Lady Philosophy to answer.23 Her reply directs Boethius away from false,
ornamental goods—such as riches, status, and political power—to true but transitory and
limited goods that still are only fractured and diversified combinations.24 She continues
by directing him from these limited goods to a monolithic and perfect good, in which
resides all the others found in perfect unity. It is this good, Boethius argues (via Lady
Philosophy), which alone can deliver true happiness. With Augustine before him,
Boethius concludes that this highest good is properly identified with God.25
In the Eastern Church fathers, this same trajectory is perhaps most evident in the
works of Gregory of Nyssa and John Climacus, respectively. Gregory traces the
movement of eros as the mind’s desire striving in perpetual motion towards the
transcendent.26 The mind is depicted as a river running towards the open sea, as it “will
somehow be taken up by the nature of the movement to a desire for what is above.”27
This pattern appears throughout his writings, but Gregory’s treatise On Virginity suffices
to illustrate his claim. Gregory employs the metaphor of marriage and virginity to picture
the difference between the soul that is trapped in a cycle of attachment to lower goods
(marriage) with the soul that is untethered (virginity) and is free to successfully make its

23

Boethius, Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K.
Rand, and S. J. Tester (Loeb Classical Library, 1973), Book I.
24

Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book II–III.8.

25

Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book III.9–12.

26

St Gregory of Nyssa, Saint Gregory of Nyssa Ascetical Works, trans. Virginia Woods Callahan
(Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999), passim; Gregory of Nyssa and John
Meyendorff, Gregory of Nyssa: The Life of Moses, trans. Abraham Malherbe and Everett Ferguson (New
York: Paulist Press, 1978), passim; Aidan Nichols, A Grammar of Consent: The Existence of God in
Christian Tradition (University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), chap. 2.
27

Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity in Saint Gregory of Nyssa Ascetical Works, VI; Nichols, A
Grammar of Consent, 45.
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ascent toward God. The latter is not virginity according to lack of sexual intercourse but
according to reason (kata logon partheneuousās).28 As in the Neoplatonists, Gregory
presumes that the rational spirit, despite its desire for what is above, is assailed by bodily
passions that threaten to drag it into vice. The soul that is bound by the passions is
attached (or, married) to these worldly goods. Following a Stoic line, Gregory suggests
that only the soul that purges itself, cultivating dispassion, can “have immunity
[ateleian]” from vice and ascend to God.29 As Mark Hart explains, Gregory sees the
danger of “marriage” not as mere pleasure in another, but a complete welding of the soul
to another for the sake of happiness. He writes,
…[the] greatest danger for the health of the soul is that bittersweet pleasure of
companionship (symbiōsis). Symbiōsis is seen in the mother who feels her
children’s injuries as her own. The desire for it leads some people to find life
intolerable and to commit suicide upon the death of a spouse. In these cases we
are dealing with more than the simple desire for companionship, and instead are
dealing with a certain tendency of human beings to join their very life and soul
with another, particular human being so that they not only suffer with the other
but even “die” in spirit when the other dies.30
Gregory identifies the limitation of lower goods as two. First, they are mixed, involving a
cycle of desire and pain that is followed by satisfaction of desire, only to repeat the cycle.
If this cycle had an identifiable terminus of satisfaction then continued pursuit would be
28

Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity, 2.2.21. Gregory’s work, On Virginity, has been deeply
misunderstood for years, being misread by many as a treatise on sexuality—that is, on physical virginity
and marriage—as opposed to its proper meaning as a spiritual metaphor of attachment and detachment.
See, e.g., Michel Aubineau, Grégoire de Nysse: Traité de la virginité (SC 119; Paris: Cerf, 1966), 294-95,
n. 2; 83-96; J. Gribomont, “Le panégyrique de la virginité, oeuvre de jeunesse de Grégoire de Nysse,”
Reuue d’ascétique et de myustique 43 (1967), 258; J. Kirchmeyer, “Le De virginitate de Grégoire de Nysse:
Notes de lecture,” Science et esprit 21 (1969), 143; Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and
Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University, 1988), 296-304. The work of
Mark D. Hart has been important in reversing this misreading. See Mark D. Hart, “Reconciliation of Body
and Soul: Gregory of Nyssa’s Deeper Theology of Marriage,” Theological Studies 51 (1990), 450-78; and
Mark D. Hart, “Gregory of Nyssa’s Ironic Praise of the Celibate Life,” Heythrop Journal 33 (1992), 1-19.
29

Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity, 4.1.18.

30

Hart, “Reconciliation of Body and Soul,” 455.
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rightly motivated. However, as Gregory points out, appetite and its satisfaction does not
satisfy but brings further “greed” (pleonexia) with it. Thus, the cycle is vicious, moving
the subject into vice and further away from satisfaction, increasing its wants.31 Second,
every lower good is located in an object that is perishable and thus its enjoyment is
mingled with fear of loss.32 Gregory does not suggest that the soul should abandon lower
goods; rather, he suggests that only the ‘virgin’ who clings to God can truly enjoy lower
goods, since the virgin alone does not fear their loss; her happiness is in God.33 Only the
virgin can actualize the indwelling of God, transcend attachment, and participate in the
incorruptible community, thereby attaining true happiness.34
John Climacus also catalogues a ladder that stretches from lower earthly goods to
the divine.35 John’s ladder draws on the picture of the ladder stretching from earth to
heaven in the biblical patriarch Jacob’s dream (Gen 28:12). This picture had already been
used by earlier Eastern writers to illustrate the soul’s ascent from the passionate life to
God through divine grace.36 In John Climacus’ work, however, this ascent is
systematically worked through in an effort to instruct spiritual pilgrims—specifically
monks—on how such ascent is to be achieved.37 Similar to what we see in Gregory of

31

Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity, 4.5.12-35.

32

Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity, 3.3.2-8; 3.5.10-6.34; 3.7.2-7.

33

Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity, 2.2.21; 3.4.16-18.

34

Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity, 2.1.

35

John Climacus, John Climacus: The Ladder of Divine Ascent, trans. Colm Luibheid and
Norman Russell (New York: Paulist Pr, 1982).
36

E.g., Gregory of Nazianzen, Oration 43, 71 (PG 36.529d); John Chrysostom, Homilies on John
83, 5 (PG 59.454); and Theodoret of Cyrrhus, History of Monks in Syria 27 (PG 82.1484c).
37

The fact that John’s target audience is monastics is evident from his remarks in the first step on
detachment: see John Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, step 1 passim, but esp. 78 (PG 88.640d).
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Nyssa, the ladder begins with the basic pursuit of detachment from earthly goods, to
which the soul naturally clings, in order that the soul might begin its approach to God.
The first three rungs of John’s thirty-three rung ladder focus on letting go of lower
goods—through renunciation, detachment, and exile—followed by the pursuit of virtue
and the corresponding mortification of the passions over the next twenty six steps. The
final four steps focus on the contemplative life, which turns the soul toward God in
stillness, prayer, dispassion (apatheia), and love.
In the medieval period, the trajectory of ascent continues in both Eastern and
Western Christianity. In the East, it is evident in the dispute between Gregory Palamas
and Barlaam in the 14th century.38 Barlaam argued that the divine essence is both
completely knowable and that it can be successfully exposited through natural theology.
In reply, Palamas reiterates the Eastern patristic insistence that God is hyperousios
(‘super-essential’ or ‘beyond being’) and thus beyond the grasp of human knowledge
within its inherent capacities.39 He then distinguishes the natural knowing about God as
possessed by the philosophers from the Christian knowledge of God by spiritual ascent.
Palamas employs the distinction of the Eastern Church fathers (originally established by
Aristotle)40 between the nature (ousia) of a thing and its operative powers (energeiai).41

38

For a synopsis of the Palamas-Barlaam dispute, see John Meyendorff, “Introduction,” passim in
Gregory Palamas: The Triads, ed. John Meyendorff, trans. Nicholas Gendle (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press,
183). See also Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West, ch. 9.
39

Anastasius Sinaita, Hodegus sive viae dux, 2 (PG 89:53b); Arethas of Caesarea, Commentarius
in apocalypsin, 1.8 (PG 106:512c); John Damascene, Homiliae 8.1 (PG 96:700b); De fide orthodoxa, 1.4,
1.8 (PG 94:797b-801c, 807b-34b); Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, 1.1, 1.4 (PG 3:588b,
592a); Epistula, 4 (PG 3:1072b); Gregory of Agregentius, Explanatio supra Ecclesiasten, 4.5 (PG
98.936d); Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua, 5.5, 71.3 (PG 91:1049a, 1409d); Capita theologica, 1.4, 1.6,
2.1 (PG 90:1083c-6a, 1085a-6b, 1123d-6c); Opuscula theologica et polemica (PG 91.128c); Modestus
Hierosolymitanus, In dormitionem BMV, 8 (PG 86:3297b); Synesius of Cyrene, Hymni 1.62 (PG 66:1589).
40

Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West, ch. 1.

11

Palamas insists that while the divine essence is beyond our conceptual grasp, we can
come to know God by participation in his operative powers, just as metal comes to
participate in fire when its heating and lighting properties are communicated to it.42 So,
with creatures, while the divine essence is beyond our mental grasp, the divine operative
powers (or energies) are given for utilization.43 In this utilization, the soul is transformed
and comes to apprehend God by transcending its own limitations and being itself
transformed by participation in God. The anthropological assumption is that man can
transcend his own nature,44 and in this transcending, the soul finds union with God and
the only possible rest from its pursuits. The persistence of this Eastern Christian theme of
the lifting of the soul to God and finding rest in union with—or partaking of—God is
testified to in the collection of the Philokolia. The work is a collection of writings from
the patristic period. The texts show this thematic element of the soul’s need to quiet itself,
tame the passions, raise itself up to God through prayer, and do so in the aim of partaking
of God by way of the divine energies.45
In the medieval West, we see this emphasis on the soul’s ascent to God in two
notable figures of the period; the first is Bonaventure. In his The Soul’s Journey into God,
the illumination of the soul is accomplished through reflection in successive stages,
41
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beginning with the sensible world, proceeding to reflection on the mind’s own powers,
and arriving last at contemplation of the divine essence as pure being. Bonaventure is
clear that the aim of this ascent is happiness. He writes, “Since happiness is nothing other
than the enjoyment of the highest good and since the highest good is above, no one can
be made happy unless he rise above himself, not by the ascent of the body but of the
heart.”46 Like the Platonists, the lowest contemplation focuses on the world as presented
to us by the senses. Here we observe the order of creation, and through this contemplate
divine power, wisdom, goodness.47 Yet, like the Platonists, Bonaventure suggests that the
soul is able to ascend beyond this order to eternal principles, and, as Bonaventure notes,
“Everything that is eternal is either God or in God.”48 Hence, in these eternal principles,
the soul discovers those eternal Ideas, or Forms, that are in God.49 From this point
forward, however, Bonaventure’s rendition of the soul’s journey takes a uniquely
Christian turn. He argues that the mind, turning back on itself as an image of God,
discovers in itself a picture of the Holy Trinity. Drawing on Augustine’s psychological
analogy for the Trinity, Bonaventure writes, “your soul loves itself most fervently; that it
could not love itself unless it knew itself, nor know itself unless it remembered itself,
because our intellects grasp only what is present to our memory.”50 This threefold
psychological pattern offers to the mind an inner picture of the Holy Trinity. Yet, the soul
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must still purge itself. Like other Christian writers, Bonaventure understands this purging
to be more than the mere taming of vice, for “Christ … is our Ladder: bodily, spiritual
and divine.”51 Thus, the soul requires illuminating grace through the redemptive work of
Christ. Only through grace is
…the inner sense restored to see the highest beauty, to hear the highest harmony,
to smell the highest fragrance, to taste the highest sweetness, to apprehend the
highest delight, the soul is prepared for spiritual ecstasy through devotion,
admiration and exultation according to the three exclamations in the Canticle of
Canticles.52
Through illuminating grace, the soul recognizes the difference between that which is
subject to becoming and corruption and that which is eternal, and in this the soul
discovers the divine nature shared by the persons of the Trinity.53 Yet, having been
awakened to the Holy Trinity through its self-reflection, there is a further stage of ascent
in realizing that this nature is shared, undivided amongst the Persons of the Holy
Trinity.54 All of this culminates in spiritual ecstasy in which our affections pass into God,
finding rest for its desire in the highest Good.
The second notable figure of the medieval West to dedicate significant attention
to this ascent is Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas addresses this ascent in various places
including the Summa Contra Gentiles (Book III, q. 2-44) and The Compendium of
Theology (ch. 102-108), but his most concentrated and comprehensive account is
provided in questions 1-5 in the prima secundae of his Summa Theologiae, often entitled
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“The Treatise on Happiness.”55 In this treatise Aquinas draws on much of the
aforementioned western tradition, pulling mostly from Augustine, Aristotle, and
Boethius. The point of departure for Aquinas is in consideration of human agency. In the
first question,56 he seeks to establish that there is only one single and ultimate end for
human beings, which is their completion or perfection, which Aquinas terms their
“beatitude.”57 Yet this only identifies man’s formal end, leaving the material end—the
states of affairs in which happiness consists—unresolved. It is the second question,58
which takes up the subsequent task of resolving the material end. Here Aquinas proceeds
initially by a type of via negativa, successively surveying external goods,59 bodily
goods,60 and lastly goods of the soul,61 each of which he determines to be deficient. He
concludes in the final article that, in principle, no finite good provides the necessary
conditions for human completion or perfection.62 Yet he also offers positive consideration
in defense of the movement from finite goods to a transcendent one. According to
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Aquinas, human completion or perfection entails that the will is completely satiated;
nothing remains to be desired. However, since the appetitive power of the will is
responsive to the ends presented by the intellect, which is able to grasp the universal, the
will remains insatiate apart from a universal good. But because the universal good is not
found in any particular, finite good, it can only be found in God. The remaining questions
in the treatise on happiness are given primarily to exploring the nature of the union or
relation between man and God.63
In the modern period, one of the most notable revisitations of the quest for the
summum bonum after Aquinas is that of Immanuel Kant. Despite the Copernican
revolution in Kant’s system of philosophy—that is, his turn from metaphysics to the
thinking subject himself—Kant nevertheless offers his own account from human nature
and its aspirations to a case for the existence of God (at least as a postulate of
knowledge). Kant extends the provocative and somewhat surprising claim for those with
a strictly agnostic or theological non-realist reading of his work, that “morality …
inevitably leads to religion.”64 Kant’s explication of this relationship centers on his
particular construal of the notion of the summum bonum. Throughout and after his critical
period, Kant addresses this notion and does so in a way that connects it with his moral
philosophy and gives rational grounds for the moral agent’s need of God. As we have
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seen, Kant is not exhibiting an innovative trajectory but flowing within a long-running
stream of ancient and medieval philosophers. In the hands of Kant’s critical philosophy,
however, this course takes a unique route and is intimately connected with a range of key
Kantian doctrines and positions, which depart substantially from the presuppositions
uniting the tradition he succeeded. Kant presents his notion of the highest good and the
grounds for ascending to God principally in The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of
Practical Reason, The Critique of Judgment, and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere
Reason.65 Although his arguments have been construed in a variety of ways, a common
and summary presentation often proceeds along the following lines. Practical reason
designates that the ultimate end of rational finite beings is found in the highest good. This
highest good is to be understood as a synthesis of two distinct elements, happiness in
proportion to virtue. Since we are required to pursue or promote the highest good, it must
be regarded as capable of realization. Our awareness of the sensible world makes evident
that this end is not achieved therein. Thus, in order to provide for the realizability of the
highest good, two critical conditions must be maintained: God and immortality.66 Thus,
Kant begins with human nature and its imminent desires and moral duties and then rises
in his own way to the transcendent terminus.
The aforementioned history of this ascent is replete with dissimilarities and
disagreements. The differences include differences between Plato and Aristotle, between
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Eastern and Western Neoplatonists, between Eastern and Western Christians, and even
differences amongst Western Christians, not to mention the philosophical innovations of
Kant. However, what can be said is that each of these aforementioned accounts share in
common a movement from human appetitive nature and its attendant desires concentrated
in an aspiration for happiness, often through a hierarchy of goods, culminating in the
prospects of a union with a universal, transcendent, or absolute, divine Good.

2. The Aims of This Study
Given this history of various ways of tracing this movement in the Western
philosophical and theological tradition, we can profitably distinguish two distinct phases
when analyzing this ascent. The first phase addresses the movement beginning with
natural desires, culminating in God as man’s ultimate end and source of perfection. The
second phase, however, seeks to address the nature of the union with God.67 These two
phases can be understood by distinguishing the object and mode of our ultimate end,
where the first phase focuses on the nature of the ascent and concludes that the ultimate
object is God68 and second phase is concerned to analyze the mode of union with God.
Each of these two phases generates their own distinct sets of questions.
The questions generated by the second phase are concerned with issues such as
the possibility of post-mortem re-embodiment, libertarian freedom in heaven, the form of
the beatific vision, etc., and will not be the concern on of this study. The questions
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generated by the first phase however bring us closer to the purpose of this dissertation.
Should this ascent, surveyed at the outset of this introduction, be understood along the
lines of a practical, spiritual discipline and exercise? Or should this ascent be interpreted
as providing something of a descriptive phenomenology of religious experience? Perhaps
it should be considered a guide to moral action and an account of practical reason with an
arrangement of hierarchically ordered obligatory ends. Alternatively, this ascent might
best be understood as a potential rebuttal to the existential, evidential, and logical
problem(s) of reconciling evil with the existence of God. Even further, it might be
interpreted as a type of explanatory metaphysics, offering an ontology delineating the
hierarchical structure of the universe.
Each of these would be valid avenues for further analysis of the ascent. However,
there is one additional way of characterizing this phase of ascent, which will be the focus
of this work. Can this ascent be construed as an intellectual ascent? That is to ask, can the
movement of the desire for happiness from lower goods upwards be traced by the mind in
discursive analysis to arrive via inference to the supreme good? Even more specifically,
can this ascent be construed as a project in natural theology?69 Might the ascent from
humanity’s appetitive nature and the aspiration for happiness provide grounds for
inference(s) to the existence and reality of a transcendent or universal terminus? In short,
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can we construct a Eudaimonological Argument for God’s existence (hereafter, ‘EA’)?70
It is this last, but very possible, characterization of this phase of ascent that will be the
focus of this study.
Given the history of ideas on this ascent outlined above, this investigation could
cover a wide range of thinkers. For our purposes, I will narrow this investigation to the
Thomist version of ascent. First, however, I will argue that Augustine’s account of the
ascent provides the initial groundwork for formulating an EA. However, what becomes
evident is that Augustine’s groundwork is incomplete in this regard. Thomas Aquinas
takes the argument further, developing much of what is needed to flesh out Augustine’s
initial reflections. However, even Aquinas leaves much of the work for a natural
theological project along these lines implicit and in need of further explication. Herein
enters the work of the 20th century French Dominican Thomist, Réginald GarrigouLagrange (hereafter, “Garrigou”). In Le Realisme du Principe de Finalite, Garrigou
rhetorically asks, “Is there not here, in the natural desire for happiness, proof of the
existence of God as the supreme good?”71 In God, His Existence and His Nature, during
his exposé of proofs for the existence of God, Garrigou reports that “St. Thomas … also
rises to the maxime bonum … with the argument that concludes that there is a first and
sovereign good, … by which we rise to the primary object of desire, … the source of all
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happiness.”72 Reflecting on this, Garrigou affirms his assessment “in the absolute validity
of this proof for the existence of God.”73 Moreover, Garrigou saw much value in
advancing this natural theological argument, as evidenced by the fact that it occurs
throughout his corpus and does so more than any other of the arguments for God’s
existence he considers.74 Garrigou’s work represents the most sustained, developed, and
rigorous attempt to develop an EA for God’s existence, not only in the Thomistic
tradition, but in the broader philosophical and theological tradition as well. So
exceptional was his attention to and development of this project in natural theology—
both in his analysis of Aquinas and his attempt to reformulate his own version of the
argument—that this dissertation could be considered as a development of the EA in the
line of Garrigou-Lagrange.
This work aims to fill critical lacunae and address some conceptual challenges
pertaining to the EA. Exploring and developing the Augustinian-Thomist EA addresses
two important lacunae, one in historical scholarship and one in contemporary analytic
philosophy of religion. The first lacuna is evident when surveying historical scholarship
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that considers this ascent. While ample literature exists on talk of spiritual ascent in the
history of ideas, even the most notable surveys focus exclusively on the second phase of
this ascent, ignoring entirely its role and prospects in natural theology.75 For example,
Lawrence Feingold’s The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His
Interpreters states, “St. Augustine … develops this Platonic line of reasoning.… St.
Thomas … takes his point of departure in expounding this theme not only from the
Platonic but from the Aristotelian account of the natural desire of the mind to ascend
toward God.”76 Feingold is exclusively set on addressing the history of controversy
surrounding the desire to see God in the beatific vision. These Thomist debates
concentrate on intellectualism, the speculative characterization of Aquinas’ account of
beatitude, and whether such a vision involves a gratuitous gift or a necessary entailment
of created nature—in short, on the second phase.77 Likewise, in K. E. Kirk’s tracing of
the history of the doctrine of the summum bonum from the classical period through the
end of the medieval period in The Vision of God, Kirk gives almost no attention to this
topic as an exercise in natural theology; his only concern is to specify the nature of the
summum bonum for man and its ethical and vocational implications.78 David Bradshaw’s
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Aristotle East and West concerns itself with medieval appropriations of Aristotle and the
resultant impact on the nature of beatitude.79 However, as in Kirk’s work, Bradshaw is
almost exclusively concerned with the nature of the beatification, and whether it should
be construed as a visio Dei, as per much of the Latin West, or as a deification, as
characterized primarily in the Greek East.80 Indeed, one of the foremost attempts to trace
the conception of the summum bonum from the classical period through Augustine to
Aquinas comes in Terence Irwin’s The Development of Ethics.81 Irwin’s work provides
considerable reflection both on the nature of the summum bonum (primarily in
eudaimonistic terms) as well as its metaphysical implications and associations. However,
even in this comprehensive sweep, Irwin does not exhibit any consideration of this area
as a type of natural theology.
The second lacuna pertinent to this study is found in contemporary analytic
philosophy of religion, as practiced in recent Anglophone work. In this vein, there is also
a noticeable absence of attention and neglect given to Eudaimonological Arguments.
Although work in natural theology has seen a resurgence in recent Anglophone
scholarship, little attention has been paid to arguments that begin with natural human
goods, happiness, and final causality in practical reason. That there exists a potential
79
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natural theological project in this vein is made evident in two recent works. Linda
Zagzebski’s essay, “Morality and Religion,” considers the species of moral arguments
which hold that there is a goal or point to morality.82 Zagaebski’s example is Kant’s case
from the need to correlate happiness and virtue, and she classifies all such attempts as
transcendental arguments. Even further, she ties the Kantian argument to Aquinas’
treatise on happiness.83 However, she determines that Aquinas’ account necessarily
presupposes the existence of God and only implicitly contains a natural theological
argument, and only when combined with a transcendental-type Kantian inference.
The second work that makes evident the potential for developing the EA is found
in William Schweiker’s survey of “Morality and Natural Theology” in The Oxford
Handbook of Natural Theology. He identifies a kind of EA project as aspirational natural
theology with a long tradition, and as part of a broader moral argument.84 Nevertheless,
Schweiker only cites Robert Merrihew Adams’s Finite and Infinite Goods as a
contemporary example. While Adams does offer a type of generalized argument for
theism from natural goods, the thrust of the work is not a natural theology project but a
metaethical account of morality.85 Moreover, Adams does not develop his argument
along the lines nor in recognition of the classical EA project; he gives no particular
attention to the traditional starting points from human nature as mentioned above; and he
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does not utilize the traditional criteria and metaphysical principles which have
traditionally served to further the inference. Thus, Adam’s work can be considered in the
general family of natural theology developed from the summum bonum, but one with
little similarities to this tradition.
The closest parallel in contemporary literature comes in recent attempts to
rehabilitate the work of C. S. Lewis and his argument from desire, which shows true
affinities with the EA Argument but lacks the philosophical sophistication and
development of its predecessors.86 Authors such as Peter Kreeft, Adam Barkman, and Joe
Jr. Puckett engage Lewis on this topic. Unfortunately, these works are almost entirely
aimed at a popular level, lacking the requisite academic rigor.87 Thus, it can be said
almost without exception that in Anglophone scholarship generally and analytic
philosophy in particular, anything along the lines of the Eudaimonological Argument has
almost entirely vanished. There is no consideration of or even mention of it in the
representative and recent volumes, anthologies, and introductions to philosophy of
religion.88 And perhaps most telling, consideration of the EA is entirely absent even in
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the works of two prominent and contemporary Analytic Thomists, Eleonore Stump and
the Dominican philosopher Brian Davies.89
This dissertation addresses the Augustinian-Thomist EA, which comes to a
fulcrum in Garrigou, as an exercise in natural theology. I will explore the relationship
between formal and final causality in philosophical anthropology and the attending
metaphysical implications of this relationship for natural theology. The specific naturaltheology project I analyze begins with observations concerning human nature (e.g.,
human goods, human teleology, the structure of practical reason, and the desire for
happiness) and arrives at the metaphysical entailment of a single Supreme Good
(summum bonum) and Final End. The central thesis of this dissertation is as follows:
Garrigou’s Eudaimonological Argument represents a viable project in natural theology
within the Thomist tradition when properly understood in light of its underlying
metaphysical principles, specifically formal and final causality. My analysis of the
Eudaimonological Argument and defense of this thesis will consist of four chapters.
In chapter 1, I will examine Augustine’s contribution to the Eudaimonological
Argument. We will see that Augustine supplies the initial and very crucial building
blocks for an EA project in natural theology. However, his work doesn’t provide the
components needed to make a final inference to God, namely the requisite resources in
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formal and final causality. In short, what we see in Augustine is promising but ultimately
inchoate. In chapter 2, I turn my attention to Aquinas’ development of the Augustinian
EA project. In Aquinas, we see the same building blocks first established by Augustine,
but Aquinas combines these with all of the requisite material for a natural theology
argument. Yet, as we will also see, Aquinas’ combination of the requisite materials leaves
the Eudaimonological Argument implicitly stated; no explicit articulation of the project
occurs in Aquinas’ work. To find this, we look to the work of Garrigou for the full
development and explicit expression of the Thomist EA. Thus, the main thrust of this
study will come in considering the EA advanced in the Thomist, Neo-Scholastic tradition
as it appears in the work of Garrigou. Chapter 3 takes up problems confronting
Garrigou’s presentation of the Eudaimonological Argument and brings into further relief
the role of formal and final causality. Addressing these potential problems requires
attention to the Via Quarta, universals, and immanent teleology. Chapter 4 represents a
negative demonstration of my main thesis. Because I contend that the Thomist EA
requires a realist understanding of formal and final causality for its success, I look at a
test case of a fully EA in natural theology that lacks realist formal and final causality,
namely that of Kant. In Kant, we see the a modern example of the attempt to turn the
ascent into an argument for God’s existence, but because of the philosophical shift in
first-principles and methods that his philosophy represents, his argument has no recourse
to realist formal and final causality. For this very reason, Kant’s argument (and Thomist
attempts to appropriate it) face substantive difficulties. The difficulties of Kantian
Eudaimonological Arguments, therefore, will demonstrate that the realist accounts of
formal and final causality are indispensable to the success of the project.
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CHAPTER 1
THE AUGUSTINIAN ASCENT

The first step to fleshing out the Augustinian-Thomist account of ascent is to look
at its fountainhead, Augustine of Hippo.1 Two reasons for attending specifically to
Augustine when considering the trajectory of ascent and the Eudaimonological Argument
(EA) are evident upon reflection. First, Augustine’s prominence and influence in the
history of western theological and philosophical thought makes his treatments of these
matters a locus classicus. Second, Augustine is one of the first figures after the ancient
Hellenistic philosophical period to provide inferential criteria in constructing an argument
for a theological terminus to the human desire for happiness. Therefore, in concentrating
on Augustine we can begin an inquiry into assessing the potential and prospects of
building a natural theology rooted in human nature and its appetitive quest.

1
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De Beata Vita (On the Happy Life), trans. Ruth Allison Brown (Washington, DC: The Catholic University
of America, 1944); Augustine, “On The Morals of the Catholic Church,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene
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ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (Vienna, 1866-). PL indicates Patrologiae Latina, followed by the volume and
column number(s) in which the given reference appears. CSEL indicates Corpus scriptorium
ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, followed by the volume and page number.
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In this chapter, I will seek to (a) provide a reconstruction of the Augustinian
ascent, uncovering the specific movements of his attempt to trace the desire for happiness
to God, and (b) demonstrate both the resources and limitations of this Augustinian ascent
as a project in natural theology. Toward this end, I will attempt to recapitulate and
formulate Augustine’s understanding of, and argument for, the supreme good of
humanity. I will do so in three stages. First, I will address the importance of the summum
bonum in Augustine’s thought. Second, I will outline his argument for the nature of the
supreme good by grouping it into several major steps. Lastly, I will consider whether or
not Augustine’s work has the necessary resources, particularly given his more general
epistemology, to construct an Augustinian Eudaimonological Argument.

1. The Ascent in Augustine
A primary concern in Augustine’s thought, running in consonance with classic
Greek thought before him, is the task of identifying the summum bonum, or supreme
good, of life. For Augustine the summum bonum is closely connected but not identical
with the Hellenistic concept of eudaimonia, or the Latin equivalent, beatitudo (hereafter,
“happiness”). While I will use the translation “happiness” throughout this work, it is
crucial to understand that happiness in the way Augustine uses the term (as well as
Aquinas and Garrigou-Lagrange) is different than contemporary academic and folk
usage. Though in our contemporary context (both academic and popular) ‘happiness’
tends to indicate a generally pleasant state of existence (characterized by pleasure or a
positive emotional condition), happiness in the more classical sense has less to do with
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pleasure—or pleasantness—and more to do with the well being of the subject.2 One may
experience pleasure and be far from well being. In this sense, happiness for Augustine is
closer to health than hedonism. Yet, as we will see, this is not to say that Augustine
believes happiness can be had without any enjoyment.
Though Augustine draws a close connection between the supreme good and
happiness, the supreme good is not identical with happiness, on Augustine’s view. The
supreme good is the source of happiness, but the source of happiness and the happiness it
delivers must be distinguished. Now, admittedly Augustine is not always clear on the
distinction between happiness and the source or object of happiness, since he will
sometimes refers to happiness itself as the chief good.3 Yet, as Bonnie Kent observes,
“Augustine himself sees no serious conflict between declaring happiness our supreme
good and declaring God our supreme good, for love itself works to overcome the
distinction.”4 As we will see, the supreme good, according to Augustine, is God; yet,
because in loving an object a person becomes relationally intimate, the distinction
between subject and object often becomes blurred in Augustine’s language about the two.
Nonetheless, this distinction between happiness and its source is crucial for a proper
tracking of Augustine’s argument.

2

For more on this distinction in the contemporary literature, see Dan Haybron, “Happiness,” ed.
Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011, accessed July 18, 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/happiness/; Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of
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chap. 3.
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Bonnie Kent, “Augustine’s Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore
Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 216.
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Although there are significant ways in which Augustine parts from the Greek
philosophical tradition in answering the question of the highest good, he affirms that
addressing it is in fact the very task of philosophy generally and of ethics in particular. As
Kent notes, “the supreme good is that which makes us happy, and the only purpose of
philosophizing is the attainment of happiness.”5 The pursuit and aim of these disciplines,
on Augustine’s view, is the achieving of happiness, which can only come by recognizing
the summum bonum. For this reason, Augustine submits that the various schools of
philosophy can be, and indeed should be, properly categorized by how they each answer
the question of the supreme good. And perhaps more provocative, Augustine suggests
that no school of thought should be considered distinct from another unless it provides a
different answer as to what constitutes the supreme good.6
In De civitate Dei, Augustine concurs with the Roman philosopher Marcus Varro,
and observes:
Varro … rejects, as a first step, all those differences which have multiplied the
number of sects; and the ground on which he does so is that they are not
differences about the supreme good. He maintains that in philosophy a sect is
created only by its having an opinion of its own different from other schools on
the point of the ends-in-chief. For man has no other reason for philosophizing
than that he may be happy; but that which makes him happy is itself the supreme
good. In other words, the supreme good is the reason of philosophizing; and
therefore that cannot be called a sect of philosophy which pursues no way of its
own towards the supreme good.7
The centrality of this topic for philosophy (viz., the identification of the supreme good for
the goal of achieving happiness) is thus for Augustine not a “distinctively Christian view,
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Bonnie Kent, “Augustine’s Ethics,” 218.
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Augustine, De civitate Dei, VIII, 9; XIX, 1 (PL 41:233-24; 621-24).

7
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much less as an innovation of his own; he reports it as an opinion common among
pagans.”8 In this way, Augustine does not see himself as representing the exception but
the general pattern of ancient philosophers—so far as he understands them—who saw
their responsibility as to reflect upon, share, and live by a proper understanding of
happiness and its source in the summum bonum.9 Hence, Augustine begins his
voluminous literary contributions with his reflection on happiness, De beata vita (On the
Happy Life), and continues to address, develop, and refine his understanding on this topic
throughout his long and productive literary life.
Consistent with this philosophical tradition, Augustine maintains that he will
establish his position on the summum bonum in the method of the philosophers. He
begins his argument concerning the supreme good in De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae by
distinguishing two sources of truth: authority (auctoritatis) and reason (rationis).
Augustine admits that authority is in fact superior to reason. Yet, we must understand
what Augustine means by authority. As Eugene Portalie explains,
It is not some sort of vague sentiment of the soul which adheres to a doctrine
without rational motives. It is rather an intellectual adherence to truths which are
certified not by an inner vision of these truths but by evidence worthy of
credence…. Thus, according to the great doctor, the essential character of faith is
that the only motive for believing be a witness, but a trustworthy witness….
Before any act of faith, reason has to demonstrate not the instinctive truth of the
statements of the witness, but his right to be believed on his word … But once the
authority and the existence of the divine testimony have been established, it
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would be foolish to wait before believing until all those questions have been
solved …10
Thus, while Augustine maintains that the statement of a reliable witness is far better than
reliance on what one can himself discern through rational processes, there is here a
balancing act, for Augustine: “Authority demands faith and prepares man for
reasoning…. On the other hand, reason does not depart from authority altogether when it
considers whom it should believe.”11 While he will ultimately conclude that certain truths
that come to us from the authority of the Catholic Church are crucial to understanding the
supreme good, his case begins—so he insists—with an investigation of reason.12 What
attention to Augustine’s self-descriptive analysis provides is awareness that the
Augustinian project is not simply one of biblical exposition, but a project that is in
concert in important ways with the philosophical tradition following a rational
investigation.
The first major step in Augustine’s argument for the chief good of man begins
with the particular observation of human nature, central to the Hellenist tradition he
inherited: all people, by nature, desire happiness.13 In De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae,
he writes, “We all certainly desire to live happily; and there is no human being but
assents to this statement almost before it is made.”14 Augustine begins De beata vita by
acknowledging, in agreement with his conversation partners, that, “We wish to be
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happy.”15 He formulates this intrinsic desire in his writings in various ways. For example,
in Confessiones, he acknowledges, “This blessed life all desire: … joy in the truth is the
desire of all men.”16 Here, happiness (or this blessed life) has a particular relationship to
truth, or more specifically, the satisfaction of man’s desire is joy in truth.
Yet, it is not merely in the more pure acts of philosophizing or taking joy in truth
that Augustine sees this desire. In De civitate Dei, Augustine observes how the desire for
happiness manifests itself with respect to war. He writes,
Whoever gives even moderate attention to human affairs and to our common
nature, will recognize that if there is no man who does not wish to be joyful,
neither is there any one who does not wish to have peace. For even they who
make war desire nothing but victory,—desire, that is to say, to attain to peace with
glory. For what else is victory than the conquest of those who resist us? and when
this is done there is peace. It is therefore with the desire for peace that wars are
waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in
command and battle. And hence it is obvious that peace is the end sought for by
war. For every man seeks peace by waging war, but no man seeks war by making
peace.17
Of course, Augustine’s social, political, and ethical reflections provide a classic source
for the just war tradition in the west and demonstrate that he does not see the desire for
peace as a sufficient condition for justifying armed conflict.18 Augustine’s point in this
context, however, is that even the desire for such conflict can be understood as a mediate
goal towards the ultimate end of happiness. The inescapability of this disposition of the
human heart is such that, according to Augustine, our desire for happiness is even made
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evident in evil acts.19 John Harvey explains how Augustine connects the desire for
happiness with participation in sin. Reflecting on the Augustine’s Confessions, Harvey
comments,
When men sin they are seeking the happiness that is found only in God. The
sinner strives for a kind of goodness, the reality of which is found in its perfection
only in God. The proud seeking greatness, the tyrant seeking power, the lazy
seeking peace, the sensual seeking voluptuous pleasures, all are striving for values
found lasting, pure, and perfect only in God.20
All of men’s actions are therefore in some way characterized by the human longing for
happiness rooted deep within the heart. Happiness, then, serves as a fulcrum of all human
action, unifying our diverse ends and representing the superstructure of all human
activities.
The second major step in Augustine’s account of the chief good of man is to
characterize the specific nature of the summum bonum and happiness. If all people seek
happiness, what more can be said by way of an account of it? What, in general form, is
the nature of the good for human beings? To uncover Augustine’s answer to this
question, I will delineate a number of necessary conditions that emerge from Augustine’s
corpus.
To qualify as the chief good for human beings, the summum bonum must satisfy a
number of conditions. The first condition is perhaps the most obvious, since it is writ
large in the very title summum bonum. Amongst those goods that compete for our
attention, we inevitably find that some goods are superior to other goods. Hence emerges
the hierarchy of goods. On the one hand, this presents itself as an ontological fact, but on
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the other hand, the point is exceedingly practical when asking how man can attain
happiness. For, we recognize that not all desires can be satisfied, since the objects of our
desires often come into conflict with one another and many of our desires are, in the end,
incompatible with one another. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate and weigh the
relative merits of the respective values so that we may be properly classify in ascending
order the goods that compete for our attention in order to identify which goods are
superior and thus most likely to deliver on the pursuit of happiness. Once this is done,
one good or at least one set of goods must inevitably emerge as highest in rank. The
object of the highest love, we refer to as the chief good,
that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to be blessed, if only we
make all our actions refer to it, and seek it not for the sake of something else, but
for its own sake. Therefore it is called the end, because we wish other things on
account of it, but itself only for its own sake.21
This first condition, then, is perhaps most obvious, given the title summum bonum. To
quality as the highest good, it must be a good, or set of goods, that is in fact highest or
ranked above all competitors.
The second condition of the summum bonum is closely related to the first, so
much so that is tempting to collapse the two without distinction. However, I take this
second condition to be important enough that it is worth drawing a distinction between
the two. The second condition is this. Whatever good is labeled highest must truly be the
highest good. In other words, the supreme good must be objectively so, not merely
deemed, perceived, or believed to be so. Its preeminence must be so per se, regardless of
whether it is recognized as such. Augustine’s account of the highest good is not a
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subjective account. It is not just a search for my highest good—but the highest good—
that which is in fact a good above all others. The point is crucial to Augustine’s
argument. Augustine argues for a hierarchy amongst goods, not in a subjective sense, but
in an objective sense; in the sense that our world itself is in point of fact an ontological
hierarchy. Nathan Jacobs describes Augustine’s view of creation as follows:
Augustine holds … that God creates matter ex nihilo. Matter, in itself, is neither
good (since goodness is a quality of being) nor evil (since Augustine defines evil
as a privation of goodness or being, which primordial matter has yet to
possess)…. Augustine presumes, with the bulk of early Christian thinkers, that
matter is properly defined as pure potentiality, which, as such, is mutable (it is
capable of taking on any number of forms and continually changes for either
better or worse) … Regarding the forming of matter, we may characterize
Augustine’s vision as a divine act of drawing. Within the Word or Wisdom of
God, there exist the Ideas that serve as archetypes for God’s creation…. God
draws matter toward himself (ontologically speaking), pulling it up from the
lowest possible level of ontology—pure potentiality—toward the highest pole of
ontology—the pure actuality that is God. In this drawing process, matter
manifests the once-foreign properties of being … in a way that mirrors the Ideas
in God. Matter takes on ontic qualities in increasing measure as it moves from the
most humble modes of being toward its divine source…. [A]s matter moves
toward God it becomes ontologically more like God, taking on order, manifesting
actuality, and displaying numerous perfections. Creation images the various
ontological perfections stretching between the nothingness from whence it came
and the God toward whom it is drawn.22
Because the world itself is a hierarchy of ascending ontological goods, the search for the
highest good is not an exploration of taste; it is an investigation of the cosmos itself:
What is the highest good?
This second condition raises a much-needed aside. For this condition entails an
indispensible principle of praxis in the pursuit of happiness to which Augustine calls
attention. This praxis is not a condition of the highest good as much as condition of
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reciprocity on our part in light of condition 2. The praxis to which I refer is the reshaping
of our loves or affections to match reality. In other words, because the highest good is not
a subjective pursuit but an objective one, it is crucial to the attaining of happiness that the
one pursuing happiness adjusts their affections to reality. If one esteems a lower good
that cannot deliver happiness too highly—perhaps highest of all—this very fact will
perpetually keep such a person from happiness. As Augustine observes, “if we set
ourselves to enjoy those which we ought to use, are hindered in our course, and
sometimes even led away from it; so that, getting entangled in the love of lower
gratifications, we lag behind in, or even altogether turn back from, the pursuit of the real
and proper objects of enjoyment.”23 Our pursuits, in order to be carried out effectively,
must track with this hierarchical nature of goods, esteeming each good according to its
actual goodness—no more nor less—and the highest good above all others.
Now, returning to the highest good itself, Augustine assists in narrowing the
candidates for the supreme good through a consideration of human nature, and in so
doing, he uncovers a third condition of the supreme good.24 He begins by stating that the
chief good cannot be anything inferior to man himself. Augustine allows the logical
possibility that man’s chief good may be found in something similar to himself—equal in
dignity or goodness. However, this possibility would become plausible if and only if
there were no possible goods superior to man. For, as the previous condition makes clear,
the search for the summum bonum is a search for that which is in fact highest. If there is a
good superior to man, then neither man nor any of his hypothetical equals are valid
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candidates for the supreme good. Therefore, Augustine asks, “if we find something which
is both superior to man … who can doubt that in seeking for happiness man should
endeavor to reach that which is more excellent than the being who makes the
endeavor?”25 This leads Augustine to consider human nature itself, and specifically the
body-soul relationship.26 Augustine’s turn to the body-soul relationship follows the
rationale of Varro. Varro argues that to identify the supreme good of man, “first of all, we
must define man. He is of opinion that there are two parts in human nature, body and
soul, and makes no doubt that of these two the soul is the better and by far the more
worthy part.”27 Human beings consist of both body and soul, however one may construe
this arrangement.28 And as Augustine notes in De moribus ecclesiae Cathlicae,
[T]he chief good of the body is that which is better than the body, and from
which the body receives vigor and life, so whether the soul itself is man, or soul
and body both, we must discover whether there is anything which goes before the
soul itself, in following which the soul comes to the perfection of good of which it
is capable in its own kind.”29
The argument is that soul should be considered of a higher or more important nature,
since it is fundamental to the body in a non-reciprocal way; the soul, for example, gives
life to the body and not vice versa. The supreme good of man must therefore be directed
towards the higher aspect of the human person, the soul, and not toward the lower aspects
of his animal nature. Etienne Gilson recounts Augustine’s reasoning this way,
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Man is composed of body and soul brought together in such wise that the soul
confers life and movement on the body it animates. Thus the soul is superior to
the body. If, then, there is sovereign good above man, it cannot be a mere good of
the body, but rather a good of the soul, for the soul is man’s highest part.30
Augustine, accordingly, begins his analysis of happiness in De Beata Vita by asking,
“Does it seem obvious to you that we are composed of soul and body?”31 He then
proceeds to offer a simple defense of this dualistic conception of the human person.32
From these considerations, the arguments seeks to demonstrate not only that the chief
good must be something higher than human nature, but something that can satisfy or in
some way nourish the soul. Such is the third condition of the supreme good of man—it
must be a good that can satisfy or nourish the soul.
The fourth condition of the summum bonum is that the chief good must be the
object of man’s ultimate enjoyment. Augustine provides a crucial elaboration of this
condition by way of a distinction between use and enjoyment, a distinction that appears in
both De doctrina christiana and De civitate Dei.33 He notes that there are some things we
enjoy and enjoy in themselves—that is, as ends in themselves. Such objects of enjoyment
are a source of happiness and the object of our affection in the very act of enjoyment. In
contrast, there are other things that we use in order to bring about enjoyment. In the case
of such use, however, the thing used for enjoyment is only an instrument of happiness
and, as such, is an assistant or support to us in our efforts to attain happiness. Now, two
additional points are crucial to the distinction. First, an instrument points beyond itself to
30
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something more desirable, a good higher than itself. Second, Augustine insists that there
is something mutually exclusive in the distinction between objects of enjoyment and
objects of use: Our loves or affections must not be placed in those things that we use, and
we must not use those things in which we place our love. Combining these points, the
application to the highest good is evident. Because Augustine sees a strict dichotomy
between that which we enjoy and that which we use, the highest good must be either an
object of enjoyment or an instrument of enjoyment. But because the highest good is
highest, it cannot be an instrument, lest it point beyond itself to a good higher still.
Therefore, the summum bonum must be an object of enjoyment and enjoyment of such a
kind that no higher good can be found. In short, the summum bonum must be the object of
man’s ultimate enjoyment.
The fifth condition that the summum bonum must satisfy is that it must have
permanence such that it cannot be lost or taken away from the enjoyer against his will.34
In De beata vita, Augustine explains that the source of happiness “must always be
enduring, not depending upon chance, not subject to any misfortunes, for whatever is
mortal and transitory we cannot have whenever we wish and as long as we wish.”35 Or, as
Augustine writes in Confessiones:
Things rise and set: in their emerging they begin as it were to be, and grow to
perfection; having reached perfection, they grow old and die…. That is the law
limiting their being…. But let it [the soul] not become stuck in them and glued to
them with love through the physical senses. For these things pass along the path
of things that move towards non-existence. They rend the soul with pestilential
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desires … But in these things there is no point of rest: they lack permanence….
[F]ar superior to these things is he who made all things, and he is our God. He
does not pass away; nothing succeeds him…. Rest in him and you will be at
rest.36
In defense of this condition, Augustine asks his readers to consider a person who was in
possession of an object, or even several objects, which bring happiness but lack
permanence.37 We might wonder, Is not the person happy who has an abundant and
lavish possession of all that he wishes, even though those possessions may not
permanently endure? Should not such a person be said to truly possess happiness?
Augustine argues that the possession of a contingent object, or objects, cannot yield true
happiness. For, he states, “no one can feel confident regarding a good which he knows
can be taken from him, although he wishes to keep and cherish it. But if a man feels no
confidence regarding the good which he enjoys, how can he be happy while in such fear
of losing it?”38 Elsewhere Augustine asks, if someone can lose that which brings them
happiness, should that person be afraid? And further, can a person who is afraid be
considered truly happy? The rhetorical implication is that one should rightly fear losing
that which brings happiness if it can in fact be lost, and whoever is afraid cannot be truly
happy. Thus, a person whose happiness is tied to an object that can be lost cannot be said
to be truly or completely happy.39 For this reason, concludes Augustine, the object of true
happiness must have permanence and offer some type of security for the person, such that
he may rightly rest assured that it cannot be lost.

36

Augustine, Confessiones, IV, 10-12 (PL 32:699-701).

37

Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae, I, 3 (PL 32:1312); Augustine, De beata vita, I, 11
(CSEL 63:142-44).
38

Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae, I, 3 (PL 32:1312).

39

Augustine, De beata vita, I, 11 (CSEL 63:142-44).

42

The requirement of permanence leads Augustine to identify a sixth condition of
the summum bonum, one that is strictly negative, namely the highest good cannot be had
in this life. The connection with the previous condition is clear enough: If permanence is
required to assuage fear of losing the object of happiness, then no object in this life—
including this life itself—can present itself as a suitable candidate for the highest good.
However, Augustine is aware that not all would so easily grant this conclusion. The
Stoics in particular build their ethics on the assumption that all things external to us are
outside of our control; we cannot protect our possessions, our loved ones, even our own
bodies from the evils of this world. In fact, the Stoics are committed to the view that we
are bound by fate, a power against we cannot win.40 Hence, Stoics writers commend
focus on what we can control, inner virtue and dispassion (apatheia) in the face of the
desire, fear, and the like. This inner virtue, so the Stoics argue, cannot be taken from the
soul, even by God. For, as Epictetus puts it, “like a good prince and true father, [God] has
placed [the] exercise [of our free faculties] above restraint, compulsion, or hindrance, and
wholly within our own control; nor has he reserved a power even to himself, of hindering
or restraining them.”41 In direct contention of the Stoic conception of happiness,
Augustine ridicules the suggested rebuttal:
But such is the stupid pride of these men who fancy that the supreme good can be
found in this life, and that they can become happy by their own resources, that
their wise man, or at least the man whom they fancifully depict as such, is always
happy, even though he become blind, deaf, dumb, mutilated, racked with pains, or
suffer any conceivable calamity such as may compel him to make away with
himself; and they are not ashamed to call the life that is beset with these evils
happy. O happy life, which seeks the aid of death to end it? If it is happy, let the
40
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wise man remain in it; but if these ills drive him out of it, in what sense is it
happy?42
Augustine continues, “these philosophers refuse to believe in, because they do not see it,
and attempt to fabricate for themselves happiness in this life, based upon a virtue which is
as deceitful as it is proud.”43 Augustine plainly thinks the Stoic dream of attaining inner
dispassion of such a kind that it can withstand the evils that assail us in this world is pure
fantasy. If Augustine is correct in his pessimism, there remains little hope for the
attaining of happiness in this life. For the sorts of deleterious states of affairs described in
his rebuttal occur throughout this life. And even if the more tragic can be avoided, the
very nature of things in this world is characterized by a common trait, namely, “Things
rise and set: in their emerging they begin as it were to be, and grow to perfection; having
reached perfection, they grow old and die.”44 Thus, on Augustine’s account, the supreme
good must be had, if at all, in a “world to come.” What precisely this world might look
like remains to be seen, but at the very least, it would seem that, as far as the highest good
is concerned, it must be permanent and allow for the assurance of the permanent
enjoyment of the summum bonum.
In addition to these positive conditions of the summum bonum, Augustine offers
insights into different ways in which we can fail to secure happiness. He delineates three
main roads that can be delineated into three forms of unhappiness.45 The first form of
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unhappiness is instanced in the case of a person failing to possess what they love. As
Augustine puts it, “no one can be happy who does not have what he wishes.”46 If we form
an affection or desire for some particular object (irrespective of its inherent worth), and
then fail to satisfy this desire by possession of the corresponding object, then we can be
properly characterized as in a state of unhappiness. Of this form of unhappiness,
Augustine explains, “no one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves. For even
they who love things which ought not to be loved do not count themselves blessed by
loving merely, but by enjoying them.”47 A probative illustration that Augustine gives of
this first form of unhappiness is found in his response to the Academics, delivered in the
form of a reductio ad absurdum.48 Augustine notes that the Academics take pride in their
constant search and persistent desire for the truth. However, the very act of seeking for
some particular thing is indicative of the fact that one does not possess it. Thus, given
what he has observed concerning this first form of unhappiness—namely that no one is
happy who does not have the object of his desire—the Academics must not be happy.
Augustine presses the point a step further in the case of the Academics for the sake of an
ironic conclusion. To wit, a person is not wise unless he is happy; hence, there must be no
wise Academic.
The second form of unhappiness is brought about in the case of a person that has
what is loved or wished for; yet, the object of their love is unworthy or even hurtful. This
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goes to the point about praxis noted above in reply to the second condition, namely that it
is crucial, on Augustine’s view, that our affections align with reality if we are to attain
happiness. Augustine remarks, “[H]e is not necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he
loves (for many are miserable by loving that which ought not to be loved, and still more
miserable when they enjoy it).”49 Augustine takes it as self-evident that the person who
forms a love or desire for that which is inherently evil cannot be considered a happy
person, even if such a person finds pleasure in possessing such an object. So, for
example, a person who desires to dehumanize or enslave another cannot be rightly
considered happy upon satiating this desire (even if, for the sake of the thought
experiment, the enslaver possessed no other desires and was deeply satisfied in this act).
This may perhaps seem paradoxical for those who operate with a modern notion of
“happiness,” according to which securing a generally pleasurable state of existence is the
very meaning of the word. Yet, it is particularly important here to remember what was
said above about happiness in the more traditional sense, namely happiness is not
reducible to pleasure but concerns the well being, or proper good, of the subject. Thus, all
desires must be properly ordered, and to find ultimate satisfaction in something lower
than one’s proper good is contrary to happiness by metaphysical necessity given human
nature. In taking note of this form of unhappiness, Augustine refers to Cicero’s
Hortensius, in which Cicero affirms that the only people who would say a person is
happy if they are able to live as they wish, are those who are prone to argue for
arguments sake.50 Concerning this position Augustine opines, “to wish for what is not
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fitting, that is in itself most pitiable. It is not so lamentable not to gain what you wish as
to wish to gain what one ought not, for depravity of will brings everyone more evil than
good fortune brings good.”51 Thus, we should consider merely possessing one’s desires
an insufficient condition for happiness; one must also desire that which is worthy of such
desire, lest they find themselves unhappy.
The third form of unhappiness to which Augustine draws attention is brought
about when a person does not desire what he possesses, especially if it is a proper object
of love.52 In this case Augustine states that this person “does not love what he has,
although it is good in perfection” and thus they are “diseased” for they “do not seek for
what is worth seeking.”53 In these three forms, therefore, Augustine has provided a
taxonomy of unhappiness. He succinctly states of each of these instances,
the title happy cannot, in my opinion, belong either to him who has not what he
loves, whatever it may be, or to him who has what he loves if it is hurtful or to
him who does not love what he has, although it is good in perfection. For one who
seeks what he cannot obtain suffers torture, and one who has got what is not
desirable is cheated, and one who does not seek for what is worth seeking for is
diseased. Now in all these cases the mind cannot but be unhappy, and happiness
and unhappiness cannot reside at the same time in one man; so in none of these
cases can the man be happy.54
Adding force to the abstract analysis of unhappiness Augustine provides a penetrating
overview of unhappiness in De civitate, book XIX. Here, he catalogues a litany of
specific examples of things that cannot bring happiness and the particular reasons why
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they fail.55 He considers various alternatives one might offer to the highest good as the
source of happiness, such as: the home (ch. 5), the city or state (chs. 5-7), the larger
human community (chs. 5-7), friendship (ch. 8), or supernatural experiences (ch. 9). Of
these things, Augustine asks rhetorically, “who can enumerate all the great grievances
with which human society abounds in the misery of this mortal state?”56
Now that the conditions for the summum bonum have been enumerated and the
forms of unhappiness catalogued, we can attempt to delineate a set of necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions for happiness, based on Augustine’s work. Beginning with
the object of happiness, Augustine tells us that the object that can alone bring happiness
is as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

It must be a good higher than all others.
Its goodness must be higher in fact and not merely in perception.
It must bring nourishment to man’s soul.
It must be an object of enjoyment, not an instrument of enjoyment.
It must be permanent such the enjoyment of it is free from fear of loss.
It must be had in a world to come, free from corruption and death.

These six conditions constitute Augustine’s conditions for the supreme good, but, as we
have seen, there are additional conditions that must obtain in the seeker of happiness.
These additional conditions are illustrated negatively in Augustine’s various modes of
unhappiness.
(7) The seeker of happiness must possess the object of love.
(8) Their loves must be directed at a worthy object, loving each good according to
its degree of goodness and the supreme good above all.
(9) If possessing that which is worthy of love, the seeker must love it according.
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Having identified the necessary conditions for the highest good of man and
having identified the additional conditions for the subject to properly enjoy the supreme
good, Augustine has supplied the basic contours for the pursuit of happiness. As noted at
the beginning of this chapter, such is the task of philosophy in general and ethics in
particular. Hence, Augustine has sought to participate in the task of the philosopher,
following the lead of reason in an effort to discern how man might attain happiness. Yet,
it should not be missed that Augustine has yet to identify what this supreme good in fact
is; he has only identified the necessary conditions that any worthy candidate must meet. It
may be obvious given his conditions what the only remaining candidate is for the
summum bonum. Be that as it may, the task of identifying the true object of human
happiness constitutes the third and final step of Augustine’s case.
The third step in Augustine’s argument is to unite the conditions identified for
happiness with their proper object. On Augustine’s view, the summum bonum—to little
surprise—is identified as God, and Him alone. God is the only possible consideration that
properly meets the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the supreme good and
happiness of man. In consideration of conditions 1 and 2, Augustine is clear that God is
the highest good not merely in his subjective assessment but in an undisputable
ontological sense. In fact, In De Trinitate and De doctrina christiana, Augustine makes
explicit the numerical identity between God and the Good itself.57 In De Trinitate, Book
VIII, Augustine writes,
This thing is good and that good, but take away this and that, and regard good
itself if thou canst; so wilt thou see God, not good by a good that is other than
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Himself, but the good of all good. For in all these good things, whether those
which I have mentioned, or any else that are to be discerned or thought, we could
not say that one was better than another, when we judge truly, unless a conception
of the good itself had been impressed upon us, such that according to it we might
both approve some things as good, and prefer one good to another. …if, then, I
say thou canst remove these things, and canst discern the good in itself, then thou
wilt have discerned God.58
God is the supreme source of goodness and all existent things possess their goodness
derivatively from him. And he is supremely good independently of whether or not people
recognize him as such.
As for the condition of permanence, the attributes of divine immutability,
eternality, and aseity ensure that he possesses the requisite permanence for the highest
good, and no finite object posses such properties. In the Confessiones, Augustine
prayerfully observes,
And I beheld all other things that are beneath thee, and I saw that they had neither
any absolute being, nor had they absolutely no being at all. They have a being
because they are of thee; and they have no being, because they be not that which
thou art. For that truly is, which doth unchangeably remain.59
Thus, as John Harvey notes, “in considering the qualities of the object of happiness St.
Augustine stresses the immutability of God in contrast to the transient nature of
creatures.”60
As for the condition of the highest good being had in a life to come, Augustine
refers to the final peace that the righteous will experience in the City of God.61 In this
state, the nature of the righteous will be immortal and incorruptible, lacking any deterring
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vices, and experiencing no resistance to the supreme good. This condition, Augustine
observes, shall be eternal and we shall be assured of its eternity, thus precluding any fear
of loss and securing peace of confidence and assurance. In this way, not only is the
condition of the life to come met, but the assurance of permanence and the absence of
fear of loss of this highest good are also met. Moreover, insofar as the world to come
brings a completion and permanence to the righteous themselves, their affections,
dispositions, and desires are rightly ordered and directed in love towards God as the
supreme source of enjoyment. Hence, not only are the conditions for the highest good
met, but the conditions for the enjoyment of the highest good by man are also met in the
righteous. In his work De doctrina christiana, Augustine remarks, “the true objects of
enjoyment, then, are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are at the same time
the Trinity, one Being, supreme above all, and common to all who enjoy Him.”62
Explaining the completion of the necessary conditions for happiness, Augustine
illustrates how the heart is drawn towards God.63 Just as the various elements of creation
are attracted to their respective ends, such as fires that tend upwards and rocks tend
downwards, the human heart finds its gravitation and attraction in its proper end in God
himself. Again, Augustine writes,
My weight, is my love; thereby am I borne, whithersoever I am borne. We are
inflamed, by Thy Gift we are kindled; and are carried upwards; we glow
inwardly, and go forwards. We ascend Thy ways that be in our heart, and sing a
song of degrees; we glow inwardly with Thy fire, with Thy good fire, and we go;
because we go upwards to the peace of Jerusalem: for gladdened was I in those
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who said unto me, We will go up to the house of the Lord. There hath Thy good
pleasure placed us, that we may desire nothing else, but to abide there for ever.”64
Thus, we see in outline form the completion of Augustine’s account of, and argument for,
the summum bonum and man’s source of true happiness. In the first step, he contends that
all people by nature seek happiness. In the second step, he specifies the nature of the
supreme good and the possession of this happiness by identifying at least six necessary
conditions, as well as conditions for the pursuers of happiness to find it. And lastly, in the
third step, Augustine maintains that only in God are the required conditions for happiness
and the supreme good able to be met. And, in order for God to satisfy these conditions,
God must in fact exist.

2. An Augustinian Eudaimonological Argument? Sic et Non
Has Augustine provided the resources to make an inference to God’s existence?
The Augustinian ascent is often read along experiential and cognitive-perceptual lines.
That is to say, it is often read as an existential account of Augustine’s own personal
experience of moving from lower goods to an understanding of the highest good rather
than as an exercise in natural theology, meant to offer an analytic assessment of the
inferential steps emerging from the requisite conditions for happiness to the existence of
a supreme Good. The reasons why Augustine’s account of ascent is typically read in the
former, rather than the latter way, are three. First, because Augustine’s views are filtered
through the narrative of the Confessiones, which readily admits—as a biographical
account of conversion—that’s Augustine’s ascent in this context is delivered through
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first-person, direct awareness of God that comes through in his successive experiences.
The second, and closely related, reason for reading the Augustinian ascent in this way is
due to his Neoplatonic heritage. In Plotinus account, man’s return to the One does not
come via a path of inferential reasoning, but through a direct awareness of the One’s
operative power.65 Hence, when Augustine is read against the backdrop of Neoplatonism,
an existential or perceptual interpretation of his account is easy enough to infer. Third,
the existential-perceptual reading is bolstered when considering his doctrine of faith and
reason as expressed in the maxim “believe in order that you may understand” (crede, ut
intelligas).66 Some understand this mantra to preclude any sort of natural philosophy, as
if the movement from belief to understanding indicates a dismissal of natural theology in
favor of a blind existential leap of faith. When interpreted in this way, as the exclusive
paradigm through which to understand Augustinian philosophy of religion, the result is
an overt resistance to natural theology that might move from understanding to belief.
Given these interpretive lenses, some have concluded that there is no place for natural
theology in the work of Augustine.67
So what are we to make of this? Does Augustine’s theology preclude the very
possibility of natural theology? Or at the very least, does it lend itself more easily to an
65
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existential interpretation of his account of ascent? What is clear is that Augustine does
not believe that natural theology is necessary to warrant theistic knowledge.68 Moreover,
his general epistemology, governed by his doctrine of divine illumination, clearly seems
to advance the experiential-perceptual ascent.69 The doctrine of divine illumination in
Augustine, adopted from the Platonic tradition, uses the analog of visual perception as a
model characterizing the intellectual apprehension of supra-sensible objects (such as the
eternal Forms and God).70 He writes,
God, of course, belongs to the realm of intelligible things, and so do these
mathematical symbols, though there is a great difference. Similarly the earth and
light are visible, but the earth cannot be seen unless it is illumined. Anyone who
knows the mathematical symbols admits that they are true without the shadow of
a doubt. But he must also believe that they cannot be known unless they are
illumined by something else corresponding to the sun. About this corporeal light
notice three things. It exits. It shines. It Illumines. So in knowing the hidden God
you must observe three things. He exits. He is known. He causes other things to
be known.71
On Augustine’s view, this illumination does not include perception of sensible
particulars, which are discovered through the typical faculties of sensation. However, we
can use such sensible items as signs that direct the mind beyond themselves, but do not
constitute facts meant to serve as premises in a demonstration.72

68

Dewey J. Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed
Epistemology (SUNY Press, 1991), ch. 3.
69

Cf. Augustine, Confessiones, IV, 15 (PL 32:703-04).

70

For an overview of Augustine’s model of divine illumination, see Frederick Copleston, History
of Philosophy Volume 2: Medieval Philosophy (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2003), ch. 4; For a study of its
interpretive and dialectic tradition, see Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of
Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge, 1st ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
71

Augustine, Soliloquia, I, 15 (PL 32:608-12). Other loci classici include, De Trinitate VIII, 3;
XIII, 15 (PL 42:949-51; 1027-29); De Ordine II, 3 (PL 32:997-99), 10; Soliloquia I, 6; 12 (PL 32:591;
602); Confessiones VII, passim (PL 32:733-48); De civitate Dei, XI, 2 (PL 41:317-18).
72

Smith, “Prospects for Natural Theology,” 417.

54

We can read the Augustinian account of happiness, provided above, as an ascent
in light of this theory of knowledge. The search for happiness, viewed through the
doctrine of divine illumination, is viewed as the experience of the soul turning from
lower, outward goods, to inner resources, advancing to the divine ideas and ultimately to
the supreme good, all by way of successive and ascending instances of direct intellectual
awareness. On such a view, the process does not involve discursive inferences to move
the mind from one level to the next. Instead the process is facilitated by the
dissatisfaction attendant to lower goods catalyzing the mind’s movement upward. We
need not enter here into the longstanding debate over the specific nature of illumination
in Augustine’s thought according to Thomists, Franciscans, Ontologists, and others.
Though Gilson, for example, restricts Augustinian illumination purely to formal
awareness of the certainty of forms and not their content, he nevertheless allows for a
type of mystical knowledge. Other participants in the debate could each adopt versions of
the experiential ascent from lower goods into their respective accounts of Augustine’s
divine illumination.73 For our purposes, however, the crucial point is that this union
between the ascent of happiness and divine illumination in Augustine’ thought is further
strengthened when considering the role of a virtuous disposition, directed by love, as a
requisite of arriving at genuine theological knowledge.74 An awareness of the finitude
and inadequacies of lower goods might direct not only the mind, but the will, upward as
well. The human person, in Augustine’s view, cannot be neutrally or indifferently
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disposed in order to ascend the chain of goods. Rather, the will must be rightly oriented
by love towards the supreme good as it ascends to it.75
However, it would be a too restrictive reading of Augustinian epistemology to
conclude that theistic arguments are epistemically impermissible or prohibited. We need
not draw the further non-sequitur conclusion that these three interpretive principles
preclude such projects.76 To allow room for both avenues, we can follow Gilson in seeing
gradations in Augustine’s account of divine illumination that allows for the distinction
between a natural knowledge and a mystical knowledge.77 A mystical knowledge is a
direct vision achieved through contemplation of the divine ideas and of those ideas in
God.78 Whereas, natural knowledge is achieved when our intellect apprehends the truth
through reflection, including discursive acts of reasoning. On this distinction, we can
grant that a mystical ascent does not exclude and is compatible with an Augustinian
discursive, rational ascent, even if the discursive-rational ascent only reaches a

75

For a presentation of this view of Augustinian rationality, which emphasizes the role of love in
knowledge acquisition, see James R Peters, The Logic of the Heart: Augustine, Pascal, and the Rationality
Of (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009); John Rist, “Faith and Reason,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Augustine, Stump, Eleonore (ed), 2005, 31ff.
76

This seems to be the way that Hoitenga reads Augustine’s epistemology; to wit, that natural
theology is permitted but not the characteristic or paradigmatic approach to ground knowledge of God.
Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga, 92–97.
77

Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 92ff.

78

Although not considering whether or not his Augustine’s account of happiness can be
constructed as an argument for God’s existence, Gilson arrives at a similar conditional. He recognizes that
“If…there is a sovereign good above man, it can only be God Himself,” concluding ultimately that
therefore, “Happiness consists in the possession of God.” Ibid., 94.

56

penultimate stage affirming God’s existence and nature, prior to the ultimate end of direct
perception of the divine.79
In fact, theologia naturalis was coined by Augustine for subsequent western
Christian theology, and most medieval theologians and philosophers were familiar with
this expression from Augustine’s discussion of Varro’s Antiquities in Book VI of De
civitate Dei.80 Thus, it is not surprising to find interpreters of Augustine have read him as
offering the very discursive, rational arguments for God’s existence that such a ‘natural
knowledge’ would permit.81 These can be found in his undeveloped gestures and
references to cosmological and teleological arguments in De civitate Dei,82 as well as
elsewhere, such as in his account of goodness in De Trinitate,83 and most prominently in
his argument from eternal truth in De libero arbitrio.84 This last argument is one
Augustine developed most thoroughly and represents the best candidate for an explicit
natural theological argument in his body of work.85 As Garret Matthews notes, it “is the
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first in a long line of such proofs offered by Christian and Muslim philosophers
throughout the Middle Ages into the seventeenth century…[and] that continues right up
to the present time.”86 There are anticipations of the argument in the De diversis
quaestionibus,87 a brief outline of it in the De vera religione,88 and the essential elements
are present in the Soliloquia.89 There is, of course, a minority report of mystical and
experiential readings of this “argument,” which seek to avoid construing it as a natural
theology project.90 Others, however, see Book II of De libero arbitrio as an example
where Augustine “transforms his intellectual ascent into an elaborate argument for the
existence of God.”91
Since my purpose is not to defend this argument, but to consider it as a framework
to structure a potential EA from Augustine’s account of happiness, a brief overview of
the main contours of the argument from De libero arbitrio will suffice. In the first two
chapters of book II, Augustine provides a number of statements that serve as interpretive
markers for the nature of the task they are going to undertake. At the outset, Augustine’s
main interlocutor Evodius asserts that “we have our existence from God, and it is from
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him that we deserve punishment for doing wrong and reward for doing good.”92
Augustine responds to Evodius’ assertion, asking, “I want to know whether you know
this for certain, or whether you willingly believe it on the urging of some authority,
without actually knowing it.”93 Further probing Evodius, he asks, “how do you know that
we have our existence from God?”94 To which Evodius responds that this is something he
holds by faith, but not something he can see for himself. After raising the contentions of a
potential skeptic, Augustine urges them to seek knowledge of what they had already
come to believe. To do this, they must seek to answer the question, which begins chapter
3, “how is it manifest that God exists?”95 Although Copleston and others have claimed
that the starting-point of this proof is the mind’s apprehension of necessary and
immutable truths, this seems to move too quickly and forgoes a critical conceptual
foundation to the case Augustine is attempting to make.96 Although the argument starts
with the first lines of chapter 3, we are not introduced to these necessary and immutable
truths until chapter 8. Prior to this, Augustine seeks to establish two critical
presuppositions to his argument: an ontology of beings, and a principle for ordering. In
chapters 3-5, he is establishing the bare outlines of a conception of reality as a
hierarchically constituted universe; one which exists as a chain of beings beginning with
material/corporeal objects, through living entities, to beings endowed with understanding
and reason. What is crucial at this stage is not the details, nor the precision, but
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establishing a hierarchical structure as inherent to reality. Having done this with external
reality in the first section of chapter 3, he moves to recapitulate this same ascending
structure as it pertains to the inner reality of the human soul. Here he delineates the
bodily senses (which perceive material objects), the inner sense (which perceives the
sense-datum as well as the senses themselves), and lastly reason (which perceived
everything below it, as well as itself). In the latter part of chapter 4 through chapter 6, this
ontology is developed in parallel with a principle for categorizing and prioritizing the
hierarchy. Although Augustine states it a few times with some variety, he maintains what
I will call the principle of judgment: to wit, that “the judge is superior to the thing
judged.”97 Thus, given that the inner sense is a kind of controller and judge over the
bodily senses, and that reason is a controller and judge over the inner sense, he concludes
that reason and understanding are to be placed at the highest level within the inner
hierarchy of the soul. And so, he concludes by asking Evodius rhetorically, “Can you
think of anything in human nature more exalted than reason?”98
This moves the argument into what might be better characterized as its central
premises, though the ontological hierarchy and the principle of judgment as a criterion of
excellence remain central throughout. Augustine will seek to establish two general theses:
first, that there exists necessary, eternal truths; second, that such truths, given the already
established ontological hierarchy from corporeal objects to human reason, represent
another higher tier of reality, which is either identical with or implies God’s existence.
We can first approach the argument in this way,
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(1) If anything is superior to human reason, then God exists.
(2) Truth is superior to human reason.
Therefore, (3) God exits.
This initial formulation raises a number of difficulties, which Augustine anticipates.
Regarding premise (1), Evodius recognizes that this identifies a necessary but not
sufficient condition for divinity. Perhaps, as some commentators have suggested, we
might postulate an angelic mind, or a whole host thereof.99 This would undercut the
necessity of the consequent in the conditional of premise (1). Augustine, however,
anticipated this counter, and included additional criteria to strengthen this premise. First,
Augustine (on Evodius’ prodding) acknowledges that in addition to being ontologically
superior to human reason, in order to be divine it would have to rest on the top of the
chain of being. But a close reading of the text also elicits another criterion; that this
putative object also possesses the transcendental properties of necessity, immutability,
and by entailment, eternality. Thus, we can refine premise (1) to state:
(1*) If something exists which is (i) superior to reason, (ii) inferior to nothing
else, and (iii) necessary, immutable, & eternal, then God exists.
This then forestalls objections from tiers of imagined or logically possible objects which
might reside just one level above human reason but below the supreme, divine good.
The focus now turns to affirming the antecedent, expressed in premise (2). Here
Augustine appeals to reason’s capacity for apprehending a priori, necessary truths as
objects of pure thought. In so doing, he raises a range of putative examples of these
intelligible objects for consideration. Following Evodius’ lead, he begins with numerical
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objects and mathematical laws. He then turns to considering a range of normative
epistemic and moral truths. These candidates include items and propositions such as:
(a) numbers (ch. 8);
(b) mathematical laws and relationships;
(c) unity or oneness;
(d) one ought to live justly (ch. 10);
(e) inferior things should be subjected to superior things;
(f) like should be compared with like;
(g) everyone should be given what is rightly his;
(h) the uncorrupted is better than the corrupt;
(i) the invulnerable is better than the vulnerable;
(j) one should turn one’s soul from corruption to incorruption;
(k) a life that cannot be swayed by any adversity from its fixed and upright
resolve is better than one that is easily weakened and overthrown by transitory
misfortunes; etc.
What Augustine further infers is that each of these items and propositions have a
universal property in common: truth.100 Truth then serves as the trans-categorical feature
of all these candidates, unifying them into a single class of one transcendental property.
Given this listing, Augustine still needs to demonstrate that these candidates (or
candidate, ‘truth’) are superior to human reason to establish premise (2). To do this,
Augustine invokes two types of arguments. First, Augustine returns to the principle of
judgment criterion as identified in the conceptual foundations of this argument, above. If
one thing by nature judges another, then the thing that judges is superior to the thing that
is judged.101 But now, in considering the list of putative examples, and truth itself,
Augustine is able to affirm that there is in fact something that by nature judges reason:
truth.102 Thus, as Scott MacDonald observes of these items, “They are the normative
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standard against which our minds are measured. In virtue of their normative relation to
reason, he argues that these intelligible objects must be higher than it.”103
The second argument Augustine utilizes to establish the truth’s superiority to
reason is an argument from transcendent properties.104 That which is eternal, immutable,
and necessary cannot be regarded either as created by the human mind or as existing
innately within the mind alone. But of course, Augustine notes that the mathematical and
moral truths just delineated inherently possess the essential characteristics of being
eternal, immutable, and necessary. This entails that such truths are objective, intelligible
realities, transcendent to or "above" the human mind. With this, Augustine concludes that
if there are objective intelligible realities which transcend the human mind, then either
they are dependent upon God or in some sense can be identified with the divine nature.105
Given this overview of the demonstration in book II of De libero arbitrio, we can
ask: Do we have here the material to adapt in formulating a similar argument from the
human desire for happiness and its necessary conditions for fulfillment? There is some
reason to think so given Evodius’ jubilant response to the argument’s culmination in the
reality of a God who “exists truly and in the highest degree.”106 Evodius exclaims, “I
accept what you say…For I recognize that it is not merely one good among others; it is
the highest good, the good that makes us happy”. However, this construal of the
conclusion comes entirely tangentially and is more of Evodius’ interpretive overlay than
anything that emerges from the argument itself. Having established, via the argument in
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Book II, the existence of the highest being, Evodius then draws the implication about
God as the summum bonum and thus as the true source for happiness. The existence of
God would have to be independently established, and thus presupposed to draw the
connection Evodius does here. Moreover, Augustine did not utilize the search for goods
or happiness in this argument from eternal ideas nor did he not attempt to connect or
apply the inferential steps of the argument to his analysis of happiness which led to the
necessary conditions to qualify as the summum bonum. And, as can be seen from the
layout of the argument above, the natural desire for happiness would be entirely
superfluous to his case in De libero arbitrio.
Could there be, nevertheless, an EA argument implicit in the Augustinian corpus?
To see this option, consider Gilson’s view of an Augustinian efficient cause argument,
one similar to the first three ways of Aquinas, and other forms of ‘sensible evidence’ for
God’s existence.107 As Gilson notes, Augustine offers no sort of inference from the
existence of particulars then proceeding by way of efficient causality, to infer the First
Efficient Cause.108 Nevertheless, there is room for a causal argument since his views
contain all the elements necessary to formulate this type of demonstration and thus, “such
a proof is consistent with the most authentic Augustinianism.”109 Can the same be said
for an EA argument? Frederick Copleston appears to have briefly considered envisioning
the Augustinian ascent in this way, commenting, “the soul seeks happiness and many are
inclined to seek it outside themselves: St. Augustine tries to show that creation cannot
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give the soul the perfect happiness it seeks, but points upwards to the living God who
must be sought within.” What isn’t clear, or rather what isn’t explored by Copleston, is
whether the upwards trajectory and its theological implications is established
independently of the search for happiness, or if such a search can itself be the avenue for
arriving at theological conclusions.
Returning to Augustine’s analysis of the necessary conditions for happiness and
its ultimate source in the Supreme Good, we can attempt to formalize the argument in this
way:
(I) All people by nature desire happiness
(II) Happiness is achieved iff conditions (1) through (6) obtain.
(III) Conditions (1) through (6) obtain iff God exists.
Therefore, (IV) God exists.
Unfortunately, the argument is simply a non-sequitur; the conclusion (IV) nowhere
follows from premises (I)-(III). All we can conclude from premises (I) and (II) is, all
people desire conditions (1)-(6) to be satisfied. If we then invoke premise (III), the most
the inference can yield is the conditional: if God exists, then conditions (1)-(6) can be
satisfied.110 From this it would follow that all people by nature desire that God exists (at
least by implicit extensional desire, not necessarily by explicit intentional desire). Yet we
are not given here grounds to move from the universal natural desire for God to the
actuality of God’s existence. These considerations offered by Augustine provide no
grounds to assume that our appetitive nature tracks with reality. Further, when
considering the wildly discordant nature of contingent desires (e.g., desires to fly like
superman, say), we have further grounds to question whether the aspirations of our nature
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have any necessary purchase on reality. It may be the case, given these considerations
alone, that humanity has been condemned to ultimate unhappiness. But as Eugène
Portalié observes, “Augustine could never pretend that his happiness was a chimera and
that nature, a cruel stepmother, plays a barbaric game by deluding us with yearning
impossible of fulfillment.”111 Yet, if a theistic argument were to be developed, such an
assumption about the intelligibility of nature would have to be defended, otherwise the
argument would only beg the question. Perhaps Augustine could justify this assumption
on other grounds, but to do so he would appeal to (i) our knowledge of God acquired via
inward illumination, or (ii) an alternative argument for God’s existence. But in so doing,
although he may in the end successfully defend his thesis concerning the intelligibility of
nature, he would have shifted the question to the plausibility of (i) or (ii) and entirely
away from the quest for happiness as a datum from which to begin.
To attempt a theistic argument from happiness in Augustine would not only
represent a totally innovative and implausible interpretation, it would, at best, strain the
resources of his thought. Thus, Gilson and others who have read the Augustinian ascent
through the natural desire for happiness as necessarily presupposing God are not only
interpretively but analytically correct. That God is presupposed in this ascent seems to be
not only the best reading of Augustine’s own views, but the only way of ascending given
his conceptual resources. What Augustine needs is to further exposit human nature along
the lines of formal causality and final causality. Although both are present in his work,
the EA cannot be birthed in his writing since he does not sufficiently developed these two
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causal modes with respect to an analysis of human appetitive and intellectual capacities
in the search for happiness.

3. Conclusions
In conclusion, what can be gleamed from Augustine’s account of happiness and
the summum bonum for projects in natural theology? Augustinian happiness is
characterized by its close attention to a classical analysis of human nature. In this regard,
he contends that all people by nature seek happiness. His account of happiness is also
deeply teleological, as it seeks to specify the conditions for human well-being in the
fulfillment of essential dispositions. Further, he specifies the nature of the supreme good
and the possession of this happiness by identifying at least six necessary conditions of its
realization. And Augustine maintains that only in God as the ultimate end are the
required conditions for happiness and the supreme good able to be met. Therefore, his
view provides some impetus and inferential criteria for undermining finite goods as a
source for happiness given human nature. Along this line, he also vividly captures the
phenomenology of restlessness, characterizing the experience of dissatisfaction with
lower goods. Moreover, Augustine highlights the directionality of natural desires and our
natural propensity towards the supreme good. Nevertheless, he does not give any further
inferential grounds to move from this dissatisfaction to inferring God’s existence. He
does have the material to make such an inference (e.g., the argument from eternal truths),
but it is not applied nor does it require the inferential criteria developed from the search
for happiness. What is needed to formulate an EA is to take a developed account of
formal and final causality and apply these to the human aspiration for happiness.
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Therefore, it must be concluded here that although Augustine allows for projects in
natural theology and although he has some of the preliminary resources in his thought to
construct an EA, he does not in fact do so. It would be premature to read such an
argument into his work and also conceptually insufficient to try and construct such an
argument from the material he provides. What this analysis makes clear is that to develop
a viable Eudaimonological Argument and thus advance the thesis of this dissertation, we
must find grounds for inferring not only that finite goods are inadequate sources of
happiness but also find grounds that entail that an infinite and transcendent good exists as
the proper source of happiness and ultimate end of human nature. To do so, we must look
to connect an analysis of human nature along the lines of formal and final causality in the
realist tradition. To see the development of such a project and its potential as a natural
theological argument we must turn in the next chapter to Thomas Aquinas.
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CHAPTER 2
AQUINAS, GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE,
AND THE EUDAIMONOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Aquinas provides his own account of the
ascent from human nature to a supreme good, drawing on the work of Aristotle,
Augustine, Boethius, and others.1 Though an analysis of Augustine’s account of this
ascent found some grounds and initial inferential criteria for mounting a natural
theological argument, it was concluded that he did not develop the ascent in this way and
that such a project could not be constructed from within his thought alone. Should the
same judgment be rendered for Aquinas’ work on human desire and the quest for
happiness? The reasons for attending to Aquinas’ answer to this question are many. First,
his prominence in western theological and philosophical history is distinctively
influential. Second, Thomistic arguments for the existence of God have remained an
integral part of natural theological investigation since they were first propounded by
Aquinas. The third reason for attending to Aquinas when considering whether a viable
Eudaimonological Argument can be formulated is that he gave prolonged and systematic
attention to the nature of happiness and its theological implications. The central passage
relevant for grasping Aquinas’ account of the ascent to God and for considering whether
or not a Eudaimonological Argument (EA) can be developed is found in his ‘Treatise on
1
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Happiness’ in Summa Theologiae, prima secundae, questions 1-5.2 This section has been
lauded by some as “the most finely-structured and complete treatise on happiness ever
written in theology or in philosophy.”3 In this treatise Aquinas begins with lower goods
and concludes to an infinite good and ultimate end for humanity. It was left however to
Garrigou-Lagrange to exposit and develop Aquinas’ ideas into the form most relevant to
this dissertation. Garrigou maintained that a Eudaimonological Argument in the form of
traditional, Thomistic natural theology could plausibly be constructed from the resources
provided by Aquinas.
This chapter will argue that Garrigou’s development of the EA rightly falls within
the Thomistic tradition, particularly by utilizing the metaphysical principles of Aquinas.
To advance this position, I will seek to (i) address concerns with Garrigou’s EA as
regards its continuity and fidelity to the thought of Thomas Aquinas; (ii) provide an
exposition and analytic reconstruction of the argument within Garrigou’s corpus,
identifying its structure, operative assumptions, and underlying metaphysics; and (iii) set
Garrigou’s construal of the argument in light of and in comparison with the NeoScholastic and broader Thomistic tradition. Since part of the aim of this chapter is to
identify and locate the EA within the Neo-Scholastic-Thomist tradition, and to surface
the underlying metaphysics and operative principles as they pertain to this argument, it
will not attempt a comprehensive presentation or defense of this broader philosophical
2
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framework itself. Thus, I will not attempt to provide a full exploration of Thomistic
action theory, nor enter debates concerning Aquinas’ (and thus Garrigou’s)
intellectualism over and against voluntarism. Neither will there be an attempt at a
wholesale defense of positions such as a substance metaphysic, a moderate realist
account of formal causality, or the reality of natural teleology. This constraint then
precludes addressing various objections to the EA that arise outside this tradition. For
example, objections which might be lodged by evolutionary psychology and naturalistic
accounts of religious experience, hedonic accounts of happiness, or moral non-realist
views of obligation must be relegated to another project. Before these objections could be
addressed, one would need a carefully formulated and philosophical substantive
presentation of the EA; and this precisely is the burden of this work.
Before considering the interpretive options of Aquinas’ EA, it will help to provide
a précis of the ascent as he presents it in the ‘Treatise on Happiness.’ The treatise begins
in question one with the end-oriented character of human actions (I-II, 1, 1) and arrives in
question two at the pinnacle of the ascent with the conclusion that happiness is only
found in possessing God (I-II, 2, 8). The subsequent questions are primarily given to
explicating the way or mode in which God is possessed.4 Van Dyke & Williams aptly
summarize the overall thrust of this section,
the central purpose of the Treatise on Happiness is to first establish that there is an
ultimate end of human life and then to identify what that ultimate end is. The
secondary goal is to clarify the mechanic of the actions by which human beings
achieve this ultimate end.5
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Aquinas begins his detailed analysis with a consideration of the natural teleology inherent
in human agency. In the first question (ST I-II, 1) he seeks to establish that there is only
one single and ultimate end for human beings, which is their perfection or completion,
which Aquinas terms their ‘beatitudo’ (cf. articles 6 and 7). To establish this, he first
contends that every agent (rational and nonrational) necessarily acts for an end, because
the end as a final cause is the cause of all other causes. That is, formal, material, and
efficient causes are all only brought about in virtue of the final cause, which inaugurates
these other ontological structures. And since agents (personal and non-personal) act as
causes, they must therefore act for ends (art. 2). Further, any individual series of human
actions necessarily involves a final end, a goal intended for its own sake (art. 4). For, in
an essentially ordered series (i.e., of per se causes), if the first member is removed, then
all other members ordered to the first must also be removed. And, Aquinas maintains,
human actions are an essentially ordered series, of means-ends. Thus in human action
there must be something first. But, he continues, the first principle in human action is the
intention which moves the appetite. If this principle is removed, nothing remains to move
the appetite, and if nothing moves the appetite, then nothing is desired; hence no activity
would be engaged in. Therefore, there must be a first principle in human action, the
intention or end, for the sake of which all subordinated activities in the series are
generated. However, this conclusion only establishes that in any given series of human
action, something must be sought as an end in itself; it does not establish that there is a
single ultimate end for all human activity.6
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In order to demonstrate that there is such a single, ultimate end for all of
humanity, Aquinas employs three independent arguments in article 5. First, Aquinas
maintains that a thing’s ultimate end is its own perfection; and a thing’s perfection
satisfies all its desires. Thus, a things ultimate end satisfies all its desires. Now, he
continues, if all desires of a thing are satisfied, then it cannot desire something else. Thus,
a thing cannot desire something else beyond its ultimate end. This then entails that the
species humanity is intended to have all of its desires rest in its perfection; and this, it
follows, is humanity’s ultimate end. This argument trades off the assumption that all
natural substances have an ultimate end; an assumption that naturally entails a final
purpose for the nature human, but would itself carry little force standing alone without
further justification. The second argument in article 5 argues from analogy with the
nature of the rational process, understood as a type of foundationalism. Aquinas observes
a parallel between our rational and appetitive natures. Just as there are first principles in
reasoning, Aquinas argues, so there are first principles in desire; and the first principle in
desire is the ultimate end (cf. art. 4). Now, Aquinas invokes a principle concerning the
structure of formal causality: natura non tendit nisi ad unum (which Gilby's interpretive
translation renders, ‘nature has a unifying tendency’).7 Thus, the will tends to one thing
as its ultimate end. Formal causes unify, coordinate, and subordinate final causes, so as to
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arrange them under a single ultimate end. There is another expression which begs for
further justification, and entails his conclusion: the operative assumption in the previous
argument. The third argument which Aquinas advances is from a genus-species
explication of action theory. He argues, since voluntary actions receive their species from
their end, they receive their genus from their ultimate end. Since voluntary actions have
one genus (e.g., human), they have one ultimate end. Again, Aquinas’s justification for
concluding to an ultimate end for humanity is tied to the broader assumption about the
role of ultimate ends of formal causes more generally. Just as there is one ultimate end
for all humanity by their nature, so also should an individual’s will be set on one ultimate
end.
Yet this only identifies humanity’s formal end, leaving the material end – the
objects or states of affairs in which happiness consists – unresolved. It is the second
question (ST I-II, 2) which takes up this subsequent task. To identify the object and state
of affairs which constitute the ultimate end, Aquinas initially proceeds by a type of via
negativa, successively surveying external goods (art. 1-4), bodily goods (art. 5 and 6),
and lastly goods of the soul (art. 7), determining that each is deficient. He concludes in
the final article that in principle no finite good provides the necessary conditions for
human completion and/or perfection (art. 7). Aquinas considers each good individually
and offers reasons for rejecting it as well as providing additional general arguments
against these types of goods as a whole (cf. art. 5, art. 7). These, however, can here be
ignored, because his argument culminates in his case which gives further reason to reject
such lower goods, and also offers positive argumentation of the movement from a
plurality of finite goods to a single, transcendent one. First, in article 7 (ad 1), Aquinas
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argues implicitly and enthymematically that happiness must consist in some external
object. The form of dynamic substances includes its power/faculty (potentia),
habit/disposition (habitus), act/activity (actus); thus the good will constitutes the
perfection of each of these. Yet, each of these is inherently related and ordered to the
next. Faculties are ordered to developing habits (reliable ways of exhibiting the latent
power), and habits are ordered towards acts. However, all acts aim at objects. Given that
man is a dynamic substance, constituted by faculty (or, faculties), habit(s), and act(s),
then the perfection of each ultimate is directed toward an object as the final good. That is,
as Aquinas writes, “the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the
object of these, which is something outside” (ST I-II, 2, 7). Next, and most crucially in
his ascent to God, Aquinas develops a second consideration in article 8 that was
mentioned in the previous one. According to Aquinas, human perfection or completion
entails that the will is completely satiated; nothing remains to be desired. The appetitive
power of the will is responsive to the ends presented by the intellect. Now, as Aquinas
observes, our intellectual faculties are able to grasp the universal. What this cognitive
power for universals entails, however, is that the will remains insatiate apart from
possessing a universal good. But since the universal good is not found in any particular,
finite good, it can only be found in the supreme good, God. He concisely states,
For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether… Now the
object of the will…is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the
universal true. Hence it is evident that nothing can lull man's will, save the
universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone (ST I-II,
2, 8).
The remaining questions in the treatise on happiness are given primarily to exploring the
nature of the union or relation between man and God (ST I-II, 3-5).

75

Although this brief outline of the ascent from ends in human actions to God is
informative and suggestive, further work and important questions remain before
determining whether or not it has the potential for a project in natural theology in the
form of a Eudaimonological Argument (EA). It is to that end, that the work of GarrigouLagrange comes to the forefront. As noted in chapter one, Garrigou’s exposé of proofs
for the existence of God maintains that “St. Thomas…also rises to the maxime
bonum…with the argument that concludes that there is a first and sovereign good, …by
which we rise to the primary object of desire, …the source of all happiness.”8 Although
Garrigou formulates the argument in a variety of different ways and cites numerous
passages in Aquinas, he principally references the ‘treatise on happiness’ (ST I-II,
question 2, articles 7 and 8) and identifies it as one possible expansion of the Via
Quarta.9 This judgment about the prospects for the EA, however, has not been widely
recognized in the Thomistic and Neoscholastic tradition. Moreover, since Garrigou
addressed this question in a variety of contexts over several decades, and with diverse
objectives, his characterization of the topic admits of various construals and formulations
into many different possible arguments.

1. Interpretive Options in the Thomistic Tradition
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Prior to attempting to exposit and analytically reconstruct the Eudaimonological
Argument in Garrigou’s hands, we must investigate its place in the Thomistic tradition
and inquire as to whether it represents a genuine elucidation or extension of the work of
Aquinas. Perhaps an account of happiness should not be viewed as any kind of project in
natural theology, but located and confined to some other area of Thomistic philosophy or
theology. This section will first offer a taxonomy of interpretive options on the EA in the
Thomistic tradition, noting representative figures in each. Secondly, it will offer a
number of reasons for deeming as feasible Garrigou’s use of the EA as a committed
Thomist.
Three distinct (though not always explicit) positions have been taken on the
question of whether or not one can plausibly construct the EA within the Thomist
tradition: (i) affirmative readings, which see this argument as faithfully continuing in the
thought of Aquinas; (ii) negative readings, which deny that the EA represents a legitimate
expression of Aquinas; and (iii) absent readings, which though directly attending to the
respective passages and topics within Aquinas nevertheless fail to acknowledge or
recognize the EA.10
The affirmative reading of the EA as a genuinely Thomistic project is not without
representatives. As we have seen, Aquinas presents his own account of the ascent from
the desire for happiness, through a hierarchy of goods, to God as the universal good (ST
I-II, 1-2), and Garrigou repeatedly makes explicit reference to ST I-II, 2, 7-8 as the
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textual source for his reading of Aquinas as providing a type of proof.11 Further, Garrigou
also directly identifies this argument with Aquinas’ Quinque Viae, most often with the
Via Quarta (ST I, 2, 3). He notes, “St. Thomas by the via quarta also rises to the maxime
bonum” and that “this demonstration [i.e., the argument from natural desire for an infinite
good] does not differ from the via quarta of St. Thomas.”12 Indeed, in his extended
survey and exposition of the Quinque Viae in both God, His Existence and His Nature
and The One God, he addresses the argument from natural desire under the Via Quarta.
Moreover, Garrigou is not alone in this affirmative reading. Throughout his works
Garrigou makes reference to a few immediate Dominican precursors to his own
presentation of the argument. He begins his serious study of Aquinas under the direction
of Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931), the regent of studies during Garrigou’s time at the
Dominican stadium at Le Saulchoir.13 Gardeil offered his own account of the EA in his
1898 article “L’Action, ses Exigences et ses Resources Subjectives.”14 And Garrigou
notes his indebtedness to Gardeil on this front writing that this proof “was explained in a
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profound manner by Father Gardeil.”15 Garrigou also notes that Roland-Gosseling
defended this proof in the 1924 article, “Le désir naturel du bonheur et l’existence de
Dieu”.16 The last Dominican to propound the argument that Garrigou referenced was the
French philosopher Antonin-Dalmace Sertillanges (1863-1948), in his 1905 work Les
Sources de Notre Croyance en Dieu.17 Although Garrigou only tangentially referenced
these works, his citation of these Dominican theologians and philosophers demonstrates
that in constructing his own version of the EA, he was neither operating in a vacuum nor
engaging in a purely innovative use of the Thomistic tradition.
Besides these tangential references, a few recent recognitions of the EA in the
Thomist tradition are noteworthy. The contemporary Dominican Servais-Théodore
Pinckaers recognized the possibility of reading the ‘treatise on happiness’ as an exercise
in natural theology.18 Although his concern with the treatise was to address the
relationship between happiness and morality, he suggested that “Thomas traces for us,
beginning with the desire for happiness, a path which rises toward God, a path
comparable to the ways of demonstrating the existence of God.”19 The second more
recent example of the affirmative reading of the EA in the Thomistic tradition is made
evident by the Jesuit philosopher, George Hayward Joyce (1864-1943). Joyce offered one
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of the most detailed treatments of the argument apart from the work of Garrigou, which
he set down in his 1923 volume, Principles of Natural Theology.20 As Joyce considered
what he designated as a family of ‘moral arguments’, he noted that
[t]he proof of God's existence drawn from man's desire of beatitude resembles
that from conscience in that it considers man in his capacity as a voluntary agent,
and finds in human nature viewed under this aspect, data which suffice to
establish the existence of God.21
Other than these examples, however, the Thomistic tradition has not given much place or
recognition to the ascent from natural human ends and the desire for happiness as an
exercise in natural theology.22
One last recognition of the EA in the Thomist tradition comes from the work by
recent Transcendental Thomists. Transcendental Thomism began in the work of authors
such as Joseph Maréchal (1878-1944), Karl Rahner (1904-84), and Bernard Lonergan
(1904-84), in which they sought to reconcile Thomism with a Cartesian subjectivist
approach to knowledge in general, and with the Kantian epistemic strictures in
particular.23 But it was two authors in particular, W. Norris Clarke and Joseph Donceel
who followed the work of Maréchal, Rahner, and Lonergan, and explicitly adapted a
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form of the Eudaimonological Argument so that it was merged with Kantian
epistemology and methodology.24 They begin from with the ‘dynamism of the will’ and
the structure of human thought as oriented toward Infinite Being, and attempt to argue
either that this establishes the ontological possibility of such a Being, or that it serves as
the necessary a priori condition for all thought. Given the adoption of Kant’s framework,
however, this represents a notable departure from these preceding formulations of the EA
within traditional Thomism. This work will return to Kant and the Transcendental
Thomists in chapter four.
In sharp contrast to the affirmative reading, we can identify a second collection of
interpreters of Aquinas which provide a negative reading; in various ways each
interpreter denies that the EA represents a legitimate expression of the thought of
Aquinas. Most (if not all) of these examples of the negative reading have not read
Aquinas’ work as an attempt to demonstrate God’s existence because it is viewed as an
account that necessarily assumes that God’s existence has already been independently
established. Elders for example, writes, “It appears that wherever [Aquinas] speaks of
man’s happiness, God’s existence is presupposed.” And Elders acknowledges and is
mindful of the fact that Garrigou views it as a natural theological argument.25 Russell
Pannier considers this question at the close of his article, "Aquinas on the Ultimate End
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of Human Existence."26 Here he concedes and defends Aquinas’ argument that only God
meets the requisite conditions for happiness; but then he suggests that God's existence is
a logically prior issue that must be established independently, and implicitly suggests we
need to look to Aquinas separate treatments of God’s existence.27 This assessment is
reflected in earlier Scholastics, notably, Désiré-Joseph Mercier and Charles Reinhard
Baschab, who both considered the EA inadequate and inconclusive because it depends on
assumptions which are unjustified apart from a theological grounding.28
Basing the negative reading on the view that knowledge of God is presupposed in
accounting for human happiness is not surprising given Aquinas’ comments in three
pertinent passages: ST I, 2, 1; ST I-II, 2, 5; and SCG III, 25, 12. In the first passage (ST I,
2, 1), Aquinas observes,
To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by
nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness,
and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This,
however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone
is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though
it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect
good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in
something else.
Thus, the desire for happiness, at best only results in this obscured awareness and is not
capable of providing a demonstration. In the second passage (ST I-II, 2, 5, objection and
reply 3), Aquinas is addressing an argument meant to establish that the health of the body
is what happiness consists in. However, the argument makes the ultimate final cause
26
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necessarily conditioned upon the first efficient cause. The objection contends that the
more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends, because the
higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power. Now, just as the causality of the
efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end consists
in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into all
things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. On these grounds, the last
ultimate end (which, in context, is the object of happiness) is premised upon the
assumption of the first cause as the efficient source of being; recognition of the former
depends upon demonstration of the former. In the third passage (SCG III, 25, 12),
Aquinas writes,
Moreover, for each effect that he knows, man naturally desires to know the cause.
Now, the human intellect knows universal being. So, he naturally desires to know
its cause, which is God alone…. Now, a person has not attained his ultimate end
until natural desire comes to rest. Therefore, for human happiness which is the
ultimate end it is not enough to have merely any kind of intelligible knowledge;
there must be divine knowledge, as an ultimate end, to terminate the natural
desire. So, the ultimate end of man is the knowledge of God.
It is the desire to know the efficient causes behind effects, which causes the mind to
retrace backwards, and this desire remains unsatiated until one can arrive at the ultimate
first cause.
The interpretive force of these passages as supporting the negative reading is
strengthened when considering the contextual placement of Aquinas’ extended treatments
of happiness in his work. The Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars has as its structure the
exitus of things from God and is where he places his demonstrations for God’s existence;
but the Prima Secundae opens with the ‘treatise on happiness’ and marks the reditus of
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all things toward God.29 In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I (ch. 13) is given to
arguing for God’s existence, and it is not until well into Book III (chs. 16-63) that
Aquinas takes up the topic of human happiness as an ultimate end.30 In one of his last
works, The Compendium of Theology, Aquinas offers a brief summary of the First Way
in only the third chapter of the first treatise, but does not address questions concerning
happiness until chapters 163-166. This interpretation based on contextual placement is
illustrated by the analytic Thomist John Haldane’s negative reading. Haldane notes that
“Aquinas is in a position to use the fact of a natural desire for God to argue for the
existence of God. But this he does not seem to do, or at least not directly in the way one
might now imagine.”31 His reason for seeing Aquinas in this way is that “by that point in
the Summa, however, Aquinas has already presented the ‘five ways’…and so is not
arguing for, but presuming the existence of, God.”32 Thus, although Haldane advances his
own version of the EA, he doesn’t see it as a representing the thought of Aquinas.
The negative reading on the possibility of locating the EA in Aquinas can be
divided into two groups. First, there are those that hold that God’s existence must be
established through natural reason prior to utilizing the idea in any role explicating
human perfection. Jan Aertsen argues that Aquinas presupposes a first efficient cause that
has already been established and independently demonstrated via natural reason, which
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then prompts the innate natural desire to know this ultimate cause of things.33 Also,
authors such as Copleston, Kretzmann, and Pasnau & Shields, all concur in this reading
on Aquinas’ account of humanity’s summum bonum.34 In addition, Alan Donagan claims
that Aquinas’ account of the summum bonum is only a central piece of his moral
philosophy, not his natural theology. Besides, his demonstration of God’s existence is
independent of his reflections in this area.35 In the second group are those who hold that
God must be known supernaturally before giving him a role with respect to human
happiness. Charles Covell contends that “the first principles of the natural law were selfevident to human reason, whereas the knowledge that union with God ranked as the final
human end could be acquired only through revelation.”36 Henri de Lubac levels a similar
charge in his attacks on the possibility of a state of pure nature, writing, “It remains
necessary therefore to show how the supernatural is a free gift not only in relation to a
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given hypothetical human nature…but [as] mankind created by God [in order] to see
him.”37 This leads him to reject a natural apprehension of a final end and happiness as
this would, on de Lubac’s view, circumvents and mitigates the gratuitous work of God.38
The last interpretive stance on the prospects of the EA in the work of Aquinas is
the Absent Reading, which identifies interpreters who do not acknowledge or recognize a
Eudaimonological Argument, despite directly attending to the respective passages and
topics within Aquinas. Identifying this interpretive option is the most tenuous, as a failure
of an author to make reference to or recognize an EA does not entail that they would
reject it as an exercise in natural theology. To make this further inference would be to
construct a fallacious argument from silence. Nevertheless, the absence of any
consideration of the EA in interpreters who are working with the principal texts and are
aware of the broader tradition of Thomistic natural theology is noteworthy; if, for no
other reason, than to demonstrate the neglect of the EA in the Thomist tradition. Two of
the leading NeoThomists in the twentieth century, Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain,
both engage the topic(s), passages, and issues, which (on Garrigou’s view) naturally give
rise to the Eudaimonological Argument, but nevertheless fall short of doing so
themselves or even explicitly recognizing the argument. Etienne Gilson, for example,
traces the main steps of the EA (see next section) but since he offers no second order
reflections on the nature of this ascent, and his presentation is ambiguous as to whether
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he considers it a natural theological argument.39 However, this comes in the final chapter
of The Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, well after having surveyed his natural
theology with no mention of this ascent.40 Moreover, any such argument resembling the
EA is absent from his other surveys of natural theology.41 In his own survey and
presentation of natural theology, Approaches to God, Jacques Maritain considers the Via
Quarta, the natural desire to see God, along with final causality, and recognizes the
human desire for the infinite, but does not provide a formulation of references to any type
of Eudaimonological Argument.42 Maritain’s analysis of the natural desire to see God is
indeed a focus of his, but addresses the second phase of the ascent (cf. the phases noted in
the introduction to this dissertation). This second phase seeks to address the nature of the
union with God.43
Contemporary writers also exhibit this same neglect of the argument. Christopher
Martin, in his analysis and assessment of the Fifth Way, considers a ‘parallel argument’
from human well-being that is still in the realm of ‘natural theology’.44 However, he
remains uncommitted and expressly skeptical about mounting such an argument. John F.
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Wippel, in his detailed inquiry and examination into the Via Quarta, actually connects it
with Boethius’ ascent in the Consolation of Philosophy and also references Aquinas’
‘treatise on happiness’, but never recognizes any possible formulation of a type of
Eudaimonological Argument.45 Other omissions of the arguments are plentiful and are
summarily illustrated by (i) commentaries on the ‘treatise on happiness’ which fail to
mentioned a natural theological argument,46 (ii) the train of classic and recent NeoScholastic writers such as Thomas Harper, Peter Coffey, Maurice Holloway, Charles
Hart, and John Peterson, which leave no mention of anything resembling the
Eudaimonological Argument, and (iii) contemporary Thomists who leave out mention of
the EA, including Ralph McInerny and Eleonore Stump.47
Given the negative and absent readings of the EA in Aquinas, the affirmative
interpretations of Garrigou and others face two central interpretive problems. First, as
made evident by the absent reading, the EA is not obviously present in the Quinque Viae
nor is it included in the most standard exposés of Thomistic natural theology. Even Jesuit
philosopher R. P. Phillips, who is aware of and provides a summary for “the argument
from natural desire for perfect good” in the second volume of his Modern Thomistic
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Philosophy, judges that it and similar arguments “have nothing distinctly Thomist about
them.”48 The second interpretive problem, made evident by the negative reading, is that
the contextual placement of Aquinas’ treatment of the ascent seems to preclude it as an
argument for God’s existence and makes it most plausibly read as an explication of
Thomistic anthropology, eudemonistic ethics, natural law, or even a mere development of
his philosophical theology. As Thomas Williams notes of Aquinas’ account of happiness
in the Summa Theologiae I-II, “The placement of this argument is no accident, since the
notion of an end is of fundamental importance not only in Aquinas’s theory of human
action but in his accounts of practical reasoning, law, and the virtues.”49 Do these
considerations undercut the claim of Garrigou and others to be working in line with the
angelic doctor?
Since Garrigou never addressed these concerns, answering this challenge requires
marshaling considerations implicit in his writings as well as constructing plausible
responses which go beyond his work. In this vein, there are three plausible hermeneutical
considerations which make Garrigou’s interpretation and development of the EA a
legitimate expression and extension of the work of Aquinas. The first hermeneutical
consideration is the methodological distinction, raised only briefly in passing in a few
places by Garrigou, between the via inventionis and the via judicii. After his exposé of
the Quinque Viae, Garrigou describes their method as “ascending metaphysics, which
rises from sensible things up to God (via inventionis)” and then contrasts this with “the
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metaphysics of the descending order, which judges everything by the ultimate reasons of
things (via judicii).”50 The recognition of these two inverse methods, Garrigou maintains,
is derived from Aquinas himself in ST I, 79, 9:
Now these two—namely, eternal and temporal —are related to our knowledge in
this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of
discovery [viam inventionis], we come through knowledge of temporal things to
that of things eternal…while by way of judgment [via vero iudicii], from eternal
things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of
things eternal we dispose of temporal things.
Their reciprocity demonstrates the mind’s freedom to trace the ontological relationship in
either direction when considering particular, finite features and substances in the world
and their proper cause. In the via inventionis, “the intellect proceeds from initial, selfevident principles to scientific conclusions,” while in the via judicii “the intellect judges
in light of its more ultimate discoveries.”51 Given that Aquinas is operating within the
exitus-reditus metaphysical scheme developed from Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius, it is
not surprising to uncover a corresponding epistemological scheme.52 Elsewhere, Garrigou
writes,
Theological speculation follows the reverse order of philosophical speculation; it
argues from God to created things, and discusses the great metaphysical problems
concerning God and the world, not with reference to the existence of God, but as
presented by creation, conservation, and divine movement.53
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This distinction provides a key interpretive principle to working with various sections of
Aquinas’ material. In any given treatise or section where Aquinas’ intention may be
primarily concerned with elucidating a topic via judicii, this same topic can nevertheless
be considered via inventionis. In fact, this same inverse relationship considered by these
two methods is exhibited elsewhere by Aquinas; a few examples should suffice. Aquinas
considers the doctrine of participation from different directions in passages such as the
Via Quarta, as well as the Summa Theologiae I question 44, and De Potentia question 3
article 5. In each of these he is analyzing the essential natures of creatures, which merely
share in esse, and their relationship to the ipsum esse subsistens. However, in the Via
Quarta Aquinas is utilizing the via inventionis, arguing from limited participations of
perfections to a maxime ens. While in places such as ST question 44 and De Potentia
question 3, he is tracing the via judicii, considering the nature of participation given the
existence of God as the ultimate exemplar and as the source of all being. Both passages
address the same topic, but do so in a different conceptual directions than the Via Quarta.
Another example occurs regarding to the work of efficient causation in conserving being.
In the Via Secunda, he argues from the need of creatures for sustaining efficient causes,
while in ST I, question 104, and question 3, Aquinas is working in the via judicii,
maintaining that given God’s nature and work, he must sustain creatures immediately in
existence.54 As a last example, in De Veritate question 5 article 2, Aquinas’ stated
purpose is to show how the world is governed by divine providence. However, in so
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doing he also presents a natural theological argument from final causality akin to the fifth
way.55
With this distinction in place, we can understand how Garrigou makes use of
Aquinas’ ideas in various passages, including the treatise on happiness and as it relates to
the EA. An affirmative reading on the EA in the line of Garrigou can concede that in the
‘treatise on happiness’ Aquinas is conducting ‘theological speculation’, working from the
assumption of God’s existence in the manner of the via judicii, but this does not preclude
the possibility of working in the inverse direction, considering happiness in an ascending
metaphysics which leads to God as the terminus. Although not considering the prospects
of natural theology, John Oesterle in his introduction and commentary to the treatise,
notes that Aquinas approached the question as “a theologian…operating in the
framework of revealed truths.”56 Yet, Oesterle cautions, “the discussion and
argumentation draw largely on philosophical knowledge” so that “even those who are not
aware of God’s revelation of a supernatural end for man…can gather much understanding
and benefit from these pages on man’s quest for happiness.”57 Garrigou himself
recognizes and presents the Thomistic account of happiness as presupposing the reality of
God and delineating its implications for moral theology in Beatitude: A Commentary, and
for theological anthropology in Life Everlasting.58 But this, of course, does not prevent
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him from engaging in ‘philosophical speculation’ on happiness, considering the
movement from features of human nature to the supreme good.
A second crucial hermeneutical consideration, which makes Garrigou’s
interpretation and development of the EA a legitimate expression and extension of the
work of Aquinas, is found in examining the interpretive assumptions surrounding the
locus classicus for Thomistic natural theology, the Quinque Viae (ST I, 2, 3). There are
two, often unrecognized assumptions about the role of this article in Aquinas’ corpus and
that lead to a restrictive construal of the arguments: first, that these five arguments
exhaust Aquinas’ natural theology; second, that Aquinas’ presentation of these five
arguments in question 2, article 3 is complete and unabridged (or, at least substantially
so). This restrictive construal is illustrated by critiques of interpreters who find them
insufficiently developed or opaque, without seeking recourse to parallel treatments or
related discussions in Aquinas’ works. Christopher Martin, for example, admits to
complete perplexity concerning the Via Quarta, describing it as a ‘mystery’, and is even
pessimistic at the prospects of formulating it as an argument for God’s existence.59 Yet,
Martin finds almost no recourse to material throughout Aquinas’ works which might help
elucidate its structure, principles, grounds, and implications.60 Another illustration of the
restrictive construal of the arguments in this article is provided by John F. Wippel’s
comments on the Via Prima.61 Wippel asks, “is the argument based exclusively on
motion as caused in the order of efficient causality, or does it ultimately shift to the order
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of final causality?”62 He answers the question negatively because the argument does not
make explicit reference to the order of desire or final causality and because the examples
mentioned only illustrate efficient causality.
Closer investigation however reveals that both of the assumptions which motivate
the restrictive construal of the arguments in the Quinque Viae are misguided and
unnecessarily constricting. First, as John Peterson reminds, Aquinas “was a theist who
thought that theism could be proved by metaphysical arguments. These include but are
not confined to the celebrated ‘five ways’.”63 Thus, it does little to circumvent the
possibility of developing an authentic Thomistic EA by citing its absence in the Quinque
Viae. But more importantly, and reflecting an interpretive assumption that runs
throughout Garrigou’s presentation of natural theology, the Quinque Viae are only
summative outlines suited to the novice audience of the Summa Theologiae. Garrigou
notes that “the schematic outlining of the five proofs was designed, not to satisfy the
critical minds of mature philosophers, but as introductory material for ‘novices’ in the
study of theology.”64 Garrigou thus opens the potential of these arguments for
explication, application, and development beyond the text in ST I, 2, 3. He understands
Aquinas in these arguments to be characterizing the genera of natural theology, with their
respective species to develop with further elaboration. Garrigou conveys this view of
Aquinas’ intent: “Examining these five ways, the saint finds in them generic types under
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which all other proofs may be arranged.”65 Considering the examples above, Martin’s
analysis of the Via Quarta and Wippel’s interpretation of the Via Prima, Garrigou’s
expansive interpretation is made evident by the extensive use of Aquinas’ corpus and his
recognition of developments, supplements, and applications of the arguments provided in
the locus classicus. With respect to the Via Quarta, in addition to the numerous passages
from Aquinas, Garrigou seeks to supplement an understanding of the argument; he sees it
further explicated and developed in Aquinas’ argument from graded truths to a First
Truth in ST I, Q2, A3, and from first principles of the moral law to the Sovereign Good in
ST I-II, Q91, A2; Q93, A1-2.66 With respect to the Via Prima, Garrigou notes, in direct
contrast to Wippel, that Aquinas does in fact apply the principle to the will’s movement
towards goodness and thus implicating final causality in passages such as ST I, 79, 4; I-II,
9, 4.67
This broader construal of the intentions, function, and scope of the Quinque Viae
is not restricted to Garrigou alone. Charles Hart refers to the ‘elliptical character’ of the
arguments in his analysis of the Prima Via.68 And Frederick Copleston notes that “the
proofs are given only in very bare outline,” and that therefore it is the role of the modern
follower of St. Thomas “to develop the proofs in far greater detail…[and] to justify the
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principles on which the general life of proof rests.”69 So, for example, the Via Prima as
summarized in the Summa Theologiae, is elsewhere amplified and discussed by Aquinas
in passages such as Summa Contra Gentiles I, chapter 13; Commentary on Aristotle’s
Physics, Books I and II; and his Commentary on the Metaphysics, Book II. Providing this
interpretive latitude allows then for the plausibility of reading in the ascent from human
appetitive nature and the desire for happiness, and Aquinas’ account thereof, as one of
many specifications of Thomistic natural theology.
A third hermeneutical consideration, which makes Garrigou’s interpretation and
development of the EA a legitimate expression and extension of the work of Aquinas, is
traceable to his participation in the tradition of ‘Strict Observance Thomism.’ The ways
that Thomists approached the textual corpus of Aquinas during the 20th century varied
significantly. Although not an exhaustive list of interpretive methods, mention of a few
approaches can help to locate what came be known as Strict Observance Thomism. Some
scholars, such as Frederick Copleston, treated Aquinas as any other figure in the history
of philosophy, attempting a mostly objective and indifferent placing of Aquinas in the
history of ideas, not explicitly seeking to advance or advocate for his positions.70 Others,
such as the French medievalist Marie-Dominique Chenu, attempted to provide an
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appreciative, but historically and contextually focused treatment of Aquinas.71 Some
sought to wed the thought of Aquinas with other philosophical systems, as is evident in
the attempted merger between him and Immanuel Kant in the hands of the
Transcendental Thomists such as Joseph Maréchal.72 Still others such as Michel
Labourdette viewed Aquinas’ use of Aristotle as simply adopting the avant-garde system
of the time, and therefore permitting the syncretization of Thomistic doctrines with the
prevailing modes of thought from any milieu.73 This position became dominant in the
post-Vatican II era, and was characterized by a philosophical pluralism.74 However,
between the historicism of Chenu and the accomodationism of Maréchal falls the
approach of Garrigou and the Strict Observance Thomists. This movement sought to
avoid the merging of Catholic theology with any other philosophical or theological
system than Aquinas’ but also focused their interest and commitment to the commentarial
tradition as much as Thomas himself.75 Aidan Nichols, in characterizing this ‘Thomism
of Strict Observance’, writes that one might assume that this
denotes Thomist thinkers who were concerned to remain utterly faithful to the
message…of the historical Saint Thomas. …[and] to be sticklers for such matters
as establishing the meaning of Thomas’s texts in their historical context…[but]
little could be further from the truth.76
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Instead, as Nichols describes them, their commitment to the later commentators and
expositors of Aquinas could outweigh consideration of the original sources. Thus, if they
“explained some matter better than had Thomas himself – that is, more coherently, or
with greater precision, or with more manifest attachment to fundamental principles
educed from Thomas’ writing, then one should prefer the commentators.”77 Garrigou is
among the most prominent representatives of this Strict Observance Thomism.78
Returning to the question of Garrigou’s development of the EA within the
Thomistic tradition, it becomes clear why its explicit absence in the work of Aquinas
would not prove problematic for Garrigou. If the EA could ultimately be developed
utilizing the principles, metaphysical categories, and methodology of Aquinas, then given
the approach of the Strict Observance Thomists, it would represent an authentic extension
of his work. If Garrigou could find within Aquinas all the resources to develop a natural
theological argument from human ends and the desire for happiness, the finitude of lower
goods, and the principles developed from formal and final causality, then to do so would
only make explicit what Aquinas had left as implicit, leaving later commentators to work
out philosophical and theological implications which he had left undeveloped.

2. Formulating Garrigou’s Eudaimonological Argument
Having cleared the textual and hermeneutical obstacles to developing a
Eudaimonological Argument in the Thomist tradition, the burden of this section is to
provide an exposition and analytic reconstruction of the argument in the work of
77
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Garrigou. This will allow us to consider the precise steps, principles, and starting points
of the EA. In so doing, we will be able to determine its essential contours and
metaphysical presuppositions. As previously mentioned, Garrigou gives different
presentations of the argument in almost all of his major works, and does so with a variety
of contextually different aims. In some places, such as in The One God and God, His
Existence and His Nature, he is seeking to closely exposit and comment on Aquinas’
Quinque Viae;79 in other places, such as Life Everlasting, his aim is a theologically
informed but devotionally focused treatment on last things.80 While in Providence,
Garrigou attempts to provide the theological resources for a contemplative and spiritual
life rooted in an understanding of divine governance, he presents the EA as part of the
foundation for divine action in the world. In Reality, his objective is to provide a
comprehensive philosophical and theological synthesis of Thomistic thought, and he
presents the argument under the section dealing with ‘Moral Theology and Spirituality’.81
And, in Le Realisme Du Principe de Finalite, his purpose is to defend traditional realism
generally and the principle of finality more specifically; considering their implications for
a wide range of philosophical topics.82 But in chapter 5, “La finalité de la volonté: le
désir naturel du bonheur prouve-t-il l'existence de Dieu?” Garrigou provides his most
extensive treatment of the EA. With this wide and varied swath, delineating the essential
structure and features of the Eudaimonological Argument(s) in Garrigou can prove
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difficult. However, before beginning this task, it is important to provide a very brief
historical situating of Garrigou in order to make his assumptions and motivations more
transparent.
Marie-Aubin-Gontran Garrigou-Lagrange (1877-1964), though noted by some as
“the leading Thomist theologian of his time”83 as well as having served as a doctoral
director to countless students including Pope John Paul II, has been given very little
attention in Anglophone scholarship.84 Garrigou forsook studies in medicine to enter the
priesthood and the Dominican Order as a novitiate in 1897. He was later assigned to the
Paris stadium where he began his first serious study of Aquinas under Ambroise Gardeil.
After his ordination and because of the academic promise he demonstrated, he was sent
to study philosophy at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he was to attend lectures by Émile
Durkheim and Henri Bergson, and begin his friendship with Jacques Maritain. He began
teaching on the history of philosophy for Dominicans in France in 1905 but soon after
was abruptly moved to teaching theology and became Chair of Dogmatic Theology in
1906. It was during this time that he dedicated intense study and focus both to Aquinas
and additionally, to pivotally important Thomists. Garrigou began his longtime
appointment teaching at the Angelicum in Rome in 1909, where he was to teach for five
decades, ending in 1959. Philosophy always remained a central focus of his teaching and

83

Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason, and Hugh Pyper, eds., The Oxford Companion to Christian
Thought, 1st ed. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 176.
84

Two recent introductions and surveys of the life and thought of Garrigiou include: Peddicord,
Sacred Monster Of Thomism; Nichols, Reason with Piety: Garrigou-Lagrange in the Service of Catholic
Thought; for an online publication of collected essays reflecting on Garrigou, see Meng and Crean,
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange OP: Teacher of Thomism; A brief entry entirely dedicated to Garrigou is
provided by Ralph McInerny, “Garrigou-LaGrange, Reginald,” ed. Edward Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (London; New York: Routledge, May 26, 1998); mention of Garrigou in surveys of 20 th
century theology can be found in Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, Volume I; and Hastings, Mason,
and Pyper, The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought.

100

writing, having lectured weekly on the metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas through his
decades at the Angelicum, though his earlier appointment as Chair of Dogmatic Theology
and his subsequent appointment as first chair in Ascetical-Mystical Theology brought
about a rich diversity in his scholarship.
It is true that Garrigou had notable involvements in political disputes, served as a
key figure in the Thomists retreats, and produced work in mystical theology of
considerable impact, each of which are worthy of study in their own right. However,
since the focus of this work concerns his natural theology, Garrigou’s understanding of
engagement with Modernism will be our concern for understanding his historical and
conceptual milieu. It was the directives of two Papal encyclicals, Aeterni Patris by Pope
Leo XIII (1879) and especially Pascendi dominici gregis by Pope Pius X (1907), which
provided the direction of and served as the main impetus for his work in natural theology.
While Aeterni Patris set out the thought of Aquinas as the chief source for setting the
foundations for the revival of Catholic thought, Pascendi identified ‘Modernism’ as the
chief target. Thomas Crean, however, mischaracterizes the Modernism to which Garrigou
was opposed as the “confused effort, made sometimes with good intentions and
sometimes with bad, to 'reinterpret' Catholic doctrines in line with prevailing trends in
history, philosophy and the natural sciences.” Although Garrigou was critical of many
such syncretistic attempts, this misidentifies the chief tenet of Modernism and the root
cause to which he was opposed. Garrigou devotes some attention to expositing Pascendi,
and maintains that “Kantian and post-Kantian criticism had almost ruined the foundation
of the traditional proofs for the existence of God, namely, the objectivity of the principles
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of right reasoning.”85 He highlights as central then Pascendi’s diagnosis of Modernism as
“the agnostic denial of the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God.”86 And
Garrigou takes up its rejection of Kantian skepticism in metaphysics as well as its
criticism of the ‘methods of immanence’ which seek “the explanation of religion” solely
“in man himself, in vital immanence and the subconscious self” and “admits divine
reality as [it]…exists only in the soul of the believer” and as an “object of his sentiment
and his affirmations, which are limited to the sphere of phenomena.”87 Thus, the Pope
Pius X encyclical sets in motion the overwhelming thrust of Garrigou’s work in
philosophy and natural theology. It was to address these concerns, using the sources of
Aquinas and the Thomist commentarial tradition, that Garrigou deployed his
concentrated efforts in works such as God: His Existence and Attributes, Le Realisme,
Reality, and others. And within this concentrated effort to respond to Modernism as
characterized by Pascendi and interpreted by Garrigou, he deployed his case from “the
soul’s aspiration towards the absolute and infinite Good.”88 Elsewhere, in what this work
has termed, the Eudaimonological Argument, he describes it as a “proof of God’s
existence by natural desire,”89 or “the proof for the existence of the sovereign good based
on our natural desire for happiness.”90
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In order to disentangle, structure, and reformulate the Eudaimonological
Argument in Garrigou, I will use the Quinque Viae as an interpretive paradigm, since
Garrigou’s work in natural theology sought to closely follow the thought of Aquinas.
Further, Garrigou holds that “These five arguments are typical and universal in range. All
others can be reduced to them.”91 Moreover, that each via represents a plausible
candidate to locate the EA is rooted in the fact that Garrigou understands the Quinque
Viae to be the outworking of a more general proof.92 The underlying principle of this
general proof is that “the greater cannot come from the less”, which can be joined with
any particular instance of finite being to form the inference and establish the theological
conclusion. This, Garrigou admits, will be ineffectively vague, and requires further
specification. According to Garrigou, this general principle can be specified and
delineated into the principles which serve the specific viae:
(i) becoming depends on being which is determined
(ii) conditioned being depends upon unconditioned being
(iii) contingent being depends upon necessary being
(iv) imperfect, composite, multiple being depends upon that which is perfect,
simple, and one
(v) order depends upon an intelligent designer
Thus, on Garrigou’s view, formulations of Thomistic natural theology exist in a nested
hierarchy. The general principle undergirds the respective principles of the five ways,
each of which, when combined with differing instances of finite being, can produce
further and more specific examples of natural theological arguments. This is why, as
mentioned earlier, Garrigou conceives of the Quinque Viae as five genera of natural
theological arguments. So it is possible that the EA can be framed in different ways
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depending of the features of human appetitive nature identified and the principles used to
mount the metaphysical ascent. Thus, in order to understand the EA in Garrigou, we must
attempt to locate it in reference to the 5 ways of Aquinas.
Via Prima. One possible way Garrigou could have for developing a case from the
aspirations of the soul in its search for happiness is along the lines of the principles of
efficient causality and essentially ordered series provided in the Via Prima. He gives
some reason to consider such a formulation along these lines. In his first summary of the
first way, Garrigou addresses the mistaken assumption that it only applies to movements
of the physical order.93 Instead, Garrigou notes, Aquinas’ holds that God moves agents
through their own respective forms and powers to operation (cf. ST I, 105, 5) and that this
includes movements of the intellect and will (cf. ST I, 79, 4; I-II, 9, 4). Although he begs
off developing this argument further in either place, we can attempt to construct the
argument he alludes to using the Via Prima and these correlating passages, in this way:
(1) Everything that is in motion is moved by another
(2) The human will is in motion
Thus, (3) the human will is moved by another
(4) If the human will is moved by another, then either this series proceeds to
infinity, or this series is finite.
(5) It is impossible that this series proceeds to infinity.
Thus, (6) this series is finite.
(7) If the series is finite, there exists an unmoved mover of the human will.
(8) Thus, there exists an unmoved mover.
Though concerns are naturally raised by (3) concerning psychologically determinist
and/or compatabilist notions of human agency, we can forestall these quandaries by
noting two important points. First, granting the concerns raised by (3) does not
undermine the validity of the argument. Second, we may elude these concerns by
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appealing to Aquinas’ claim concerning the nature of God’s activity through agents
which occurs through their own respective forms and powers. We can also leave aside
Aquinas’ defense of the other premises in this article and elsewhere. Later, in God, in his
further analysis of the Via Prima, Garrigou writes that “the proof from motion may be
exemplified…by considering motions of the spiritual order.”94 He reasons,
of itself [the will] does not contain its first act except in potential, and when it
appears, it is something new, a becoming. To find the realizing raison d'etre of
this becoming and of the being of this act itself, we must go back to a mover of a
higher order, to one that is its own activity, determines itself to act, and, therefore,
is self-existent Being itself [emphases in the original].
Aside from considering the soundness of this argument, the pressing question here
concerns whether it is plausible to read it as an ascent from human appetitive nature to
the summum bonum. It seems not; at least not in a way that would distinguish it from any
other Thomistic proof from motion. Given this construal, it is difficult avoid identifying
the argument as simply reducible to a standard and indistinct version of the Via Prima.
Moreover, there is nothing in the argument itself which would ascend to the supreme and
perfect Good. The argument only re-presents the Unmoved Mover argument using
movements of the will and therefore is not substantially distinct from it. Thus, it is
difficult to seriously consider this reworking of the proof from motion and efficient
causality as a plausible candidate for a Eudaimonological Argument.
Perhaps, however, even if the Via Prima cannot ascend by way of efficient
causality, it can trace a path to the summum bonum by way of final causality. It is
premise (2) that gives it the potential as a type of Eudaimonological Argument, especially
once we note that in Aquinas the will’s movement is inherently towards good (e.g., ‘guise
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of the good thesis’), and ultimately the perfect good (cf. see the exposition of ST I-II, 1-2,
above). This would constitute a mirroring of the first efficient cause argument, whereby
instead of working ‘backwards’ through the principle of efficient causality, it would work
‘forwards’ through the principle of final causality. In so doing, it would reflect the exitusreditus model, noted earlier.
(2) [above] The human will is in motion.
(9) If the will moves, then necessarily it moves by its nature towards something
[because of the principle of finality].
(10) If the will must necessarily move towards something by its nature, then that
will constitute a good.
But, given (4) – (6) [above],
(11) This movement towards good must comprise a finite series.
Thus, (12) the will must necessarily move towards a final good.
This attempt to reconstruct Garrigou’s EA using the Via Prima is fraught with problems.
First, it would not at all be clear why the motion of the human will would be required as
opposed to any movement of any creature. Second, as Aquinas notes, the plenitude of
Goodness produces an accidentally ordered series of goods, which can proceed
indefinitely towards infinity (see ST I-II, 1, 4 ad 1). Thus, the argument from (4)-(6)
would not apply towards goods intended by the will, for this series of volitions is ordered
per accidens. It appears as though the attempt to construct the EA along the lines of the
Via Prima either ends unsuccessfully or becomes indistinguishable from any other
version. Since the content and structure of the second and third ways are similar to the
Via Prima, and Garrigou nowhere expressly identifies the EA with either of them, we can
move past them and consider the Via Quinta.
There can be little doubt that Garrigou considered the Eudaimonological
Argument structured with the frame of the Via Quinta. In The One God, which is
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Garrigou’s most direct attempt to strictly exposit the Quinque Viae, he observes of the
Fifth Way,
It takes in anything whatever that denotes design, and from this it rises up to the
supreme Designer. Thus it starts with equal force either from the fact that the eye
is for seeing, and the ear for hearing, or that the intellect is for the understanding
of truth, or the will for the willing of good. Viewed under this aspect, there are
two proofs for God's existence that are referred back to this fifth way. One is the
natural tendency of our will to do what is good and avoid what is evil; the other is
the natural desire of the will for happiness, or for unlimited good, which is found
only in God, who is the essential Good.95
The structure of the argument Garrigou has in mind, might simply be rendered in the
following way:
(1) All order requires an ordainer or intelligent cause
(2) The will is ordered to goods (or to an infinite good)
Thus, (3) the will requires an ordainer or intelligent cause
Premise (2) is what would categorize this as an expression of a Eudaimonological
Argument, while the movement from order to the intelligent cause would make it an
application of the Via Quinta. Here, Garrigou is considering the ordination of the natural
desire to an end, rather than the end of the natural desire itself.96 What gives this
rendering of the EA further strength is that in Garrigou, the EA is never presented
without an appeal to final causality. And this principle of teleology is taken to be the
characteristic feature of the Via Quinta.
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While this version of the EA can be considered a clear interpretive option taken
by Garrigou, it nevertheless faces some difficulties. First, as with the previous attempts to
correlate the EA with the other Viae, the argument would only require a single ordination
towards any good. The inadequacies of finite goods, and the desire for perfect happiness
which requires an infinite good, would be completely unnecessary and superfluous. We
might further press, not the soundness of Garrigou’s argument here, but his interpretive
fidelity to Aquinas. What becomes apparent about the divergence between this version of
the EA and the Quinta Via is not that it expands or supplements the original argument,
but instead that it comes into direct opposition to the text. In Aquinas’ presentation, the
feature of the world which begins the argument are “things which lack intelligence, such
as natural bodies” (ST I, 2, 3). In contrast, Garrigou’s starting point is with intelligences
themselves. Thus, although we can conclude that Garrigou understands the Quinta Via to
represent a genuine framework for developing the EA, this attempt faces interpretive
hurdles and considerations which make the desire for happiness, at best, incidental to the
argument. This negative appraisal of Garrigou’s Quinta Via version of the EA does not,
however, jeopardize the prospects of the argument, for Garrigou only briefly and
secondarily expressed the argument along these lines. Rather, his principal formulations
of the EA are repeatedly expressed as applications of the Via Quarta.
Garrigou repeatedly affirms that the argument for “the primary and sovereign
good, [as] the primary object of desire” is connected with Aquinas’ Via Quarta and his
most detailed statements of the argument are always presented with his exposition and
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analysis of the Via Quarta.97 In Providence, he writes, “This proof for the existence of
God [in the via quarta] contains implicitly another which St. Thomas develops
elsewhere, Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 8.”98 Further, in his commentary on Aquinas’ ‘Treatise on
Happiness’, he characterizes the argument for the perfect good from the object of natural
desires in the following way:
This proof is virtually identified with St. Thomas’ fourth way, which shows the
necessary dependence of imperfect goods on an actual infinite Good, which
makes them one in goodness. Aquinas, like Plato, rises from multitude to unity,
from composition to simplicity, from received good to the Good unreceived.
There can, therefore, be little doubt that the predominant and principal way of conceiving
the Eudaimonological argument in Garrigou is in conjunction with the general structure
and principles embedded in the Via Quarta.99 Though this focuses the inquiry into how to
formulate Garrigou’s version of the argument, it introduces some additional interpretive
ambiguities.
There are two plausible ways of construing the EA in conjunction with the Via
Quarta, though the structure and relationship between the two is opaque in Garrigou’s
work. However, both versions begin with the same feature or dynamic of human nature.
What both versions share in common is the appeal to what Garrigou labels ‘the dialectic
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of the will’, or alternatively, ‘the dialectic of love’.100 This ‘dialectic of the will’
summarizes the experiential and phenomenological dimensions of human appetitive
nature. Garrigou describes it as “our natural desire for happiness that we all feel so
strongly in us. This is the psychological and moral aspect of the argument.”101 It is,
according to Garrigou, described by Plato’s ‘ladder of love’ ascending to the Beautiful in
the Symposium and analyzed by Aquinas in the ‘treatise on Happiness’.102 It consists of a
dialectical method of directing the appetites to particular finite goods, only to experience
the insatiation incumbent upon their inadequacies, thus turning to ever higher goods
seeking satisfaction.
Garrigou is adamant, however, that the dialectic of the will is insufficient to
produce any metaphysical demonstrations or establish and theological conclusions on its
own, however psychologically compelling it may be. His target or criticism in this regard
is the ‘method of immanence’ exhibited in the work of the French philosopher, Maurice
Blondel (1861-1949), particularly in his influential, L'Action.103 Garrigou does not reject
the phenomenological analysis of action and the internal dynamics of the will such as is
characterized by Blondel. In fact, Garrigou concedes that the method of immanence can
engender a ‘practical certitude’ that may even be ‘subjectively adequate.’104 Although
Garrigou does not explain this, what he seems to have in mind is that the experience of
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dissatisfaction with finite goods and introspective analysis of the will’s operations is
sufficient to causally produce belief in the infinite good, and dispose the will towards it.
However, such internal deliverances produced by this process do not yield the type of
justified beliefs which constitute knowledge. Instead, he considers the method of
immanence ‘objectively inadequate’ because it is without grounding in the notion of
being and its attending principles made known by the intellect.105 To concede Blondel’s
method and remain solely within the immanent frame of human experience is to
capitulate to the very tenets of modernism as characterized by the encyclical Pascendi.
This critique of Blondel leads to the question which surfaces the ambiguity of Garrigou’s
formulation of the argument that stems in part from identifying the first principles which
allow the dialectic of the will to rise to the level of a demonstration.
What is clear in Garrigou is that the ‘dialectic of the will’ must be combined with
the ‘dialectic of the intellect’.106 The reflection on the dialectic of the will results in the
awareness that human appetitive nature is not satiated by a finite good and thus seeks an
infinite or perfect good. Garrigou is philosophically careful not to illicitly infer from this
dynamic alone that such a perfect good exists. In order to further the inference, Garrigou
must appeal to some of other desideratum; and the deliverances of the ‘dialectic of the
intellect’ are precisely what fulfill this missing element. What is unclear however is what
Garrigou means to identify with the ‘dialectic of the intellect’. What is this dialectic, how
is it related to the Via Quarta, and what role does it play in Garrigou’s formulation of the
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Eudaimonological Argument? In an interpretively difficult passage, Garrigou suggests
the following after having summarized the ‘dialectic of love’,
…if it is true that the idea of goodness presupposes the simpler, more absolute
and more universal notion of being; if the will and love presuppose the simply and
more absolutely activity of the intellect…; if the intellect alone can receive being
into itself, completely possess it, become one with it…; if the will…cannot
receive being into itself in this manner…but can only tend towards it when it is
absent, and take delight in it when it is made present by an act of the intellect,
then the dialectic of love engenders a certitude which is objectively adequate and
absolute, and this by reason of the dialectic which it implies.107
Since the intellect is concerned with being, and abstracts the underlying structures of
being formulating them into principles, it is the intellect which is required to provide the
conceptual structure to provide an objective ascent from finite goods to the perfect good.
Garrigou further explains that reflection on the dialectic of the will only rises to a
demonstration, “provided we view this method as a simple application of the [Via
Quarta]… and which presupposes the objective and transcendental validity of the first
principles of reason.”108 The ‘dialectic of the intellect’ then is the method whereby the
mind reflecting on reality provides the underlying principles to be used in formulating the
Eudaimonological Argument for God’s existence, and those principles are to be located
in the Via Quarta. Which principle then does Garrigou identify?
This is also unclear, as he notes, “the dialectic of love... [is] based on that of the
intellect, which proceeds either through efficient causality (productive or regulative), or
by way of final causality.”109 And when explicating the Via Quarta, Garrigou identifies
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an additional series of formal principles, which only adds to the list of potential principles
from the dialectic of the intellect.110 Even further exacerbating the interpretive challenge,
Garrigou notes that in his account of the demonstration, “One can rise to the supreme
good, a source of great and unmixed happiness, from imperfect or subordinate goods, or
the natural desire that these goods fail to satisfy.”111 Thus, although we can give some
specificity to his account of the ‘dialectic of the intellect’, doing so yields numerous
facets which allow for the EA to be formulated along various lines.
They key to untangling this interpretive complex in Garrigou’s numerous
presentations of the EA is by identifying and distinguishing (i) the operative rational
principle, and (ii) the specific feature of human appetitive nature to which the principle is
being applied. The operative rational principles he utilizes are derived from either
efficient, formal, or final causality. While the specific feature he appeals to are either the
various kinds of good human nature desires, or the failure of these goods to satisfy human
natural appetites. Given this matrix of options, the two distinct versions of the EA in
Garrigou can be identified, which I will call the ‘Strict 4th Way EA’ and the ‘Expanded
4th Way EA’.112 These can each be formalized as follows. Both of these versions of the
EA start from the various goods that are the object of human nature and rise to the
Supreme Good. First the ‘Strict 4th Way EA’, which represents Garrigou’s general
presentation of the Via Quarta, does so in this way:
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(1) the various kinds of goods that human nature desires are multiple and
imperfect
(2) the multiple presupposes the one and the imperfect presupposes the perfect
(3) thus, there is one and perfect Good
Premise (1) is made evident through a consideration of the ‘dialectic of the will’ but
restricts itself to a consideration of the goods themselves, rather than the inherently
directed tendencies towards those goods. Premise (2) appeals to a combination of both
formal and efficient causality in relation to the transcendental and pure perfections.
Garrigou’s explication and defense of this premise is detailed and complex, and
providing an explanation of his position on these matters first requires uncovering more
basic metaphysical considerations which emerge in consideration of the second
‘Expanded 4th Way EA’. Thus, I will defer analysis of these specific elements and this
version of the argument as a whole until the next chapter of this dissertation. What should
be noted here is that in Garrigou’s works, this version is typically presented first and in a
more summary fashion before he proceeds to the second, ‘Expanded 4th Way EA,’ to
which Garrigou gives most attention. The second ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’ can be
formalized in this way:
(1) Natural desires correspond to real goods.
(2) The human will naturally desires a universal, perfect Good.
Thus, (3) there exists a universal, perfect Good.
This version of the argument can be rightly called Garrigou’s standard Eudaimonological
Argument, though the ‘Strict 4th Way EA’ is still prominent in his work either as an
alternative argument or, as we will see, a supplement to this standard one. Versions of the
‘Expanded 4th Way EA’ are present within the Thomistic tradition, although they are rare,
and when recognized, are only treated briefly. Garrigou’s extended and repeated attention
to the argument make him entirely unique in this regard. However, statements of this
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version of the EA are present in the works of Neoscholastics such as Joyce, Phillips and
the contemporary analytic Thomist, John Haldane.113

3. Analysis of Garrigou’s Standard EA
Having provided a more precise determination of the Eudaimonological
Argument in Garrigou, removing initial ambiguities, and locating it with respect to the
Quinque Viae and the Via Quarta, it is important to focus on his explication of the
premises, and in so doing, to note its comparison and contrast with the few other
formulations of the argument in the Thomistic tradition. To accomplish this, attention to
two areas is critical: first, Garrigou’s underlying metaphysics, and second, his grounds
for affirming the premises. Since Garrigou offers the standard ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’ in
a variety of contexts and for various purposes, clarifying the key terms, metaphysical
assumptions, and detailing the grounds for each of the premises represents an exegetical
challenge. Nevertheless, doing so is vital to seeing the development of the EA from
Augustine, through Aquinas, and then its subsequent deterioration in Kant.
Garrigou identifies premise (1) as the major premise because it contains the
metaphysical principle of the argument, and echoing the traditional theme of ascent,
describes it as “the principle by which we ascend to God.” Most often he simply states
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that “a natural desire cannot be in vain.”114 In Reality, Garrigou expands this and writes,
“This proof rests on the following principle: a natural desire, founded, not on imagination
nor on error, but on the universal amplitude of man’s will, cannot be vain or
chimerical.”115 In Providence, he gives an expanded statement of the premise,
A natural desire, one that has its foundation not in the imagination or the vagaries
of reason but in our very nature, which we have in common with all men, cannot
possibly be ineffective, chimerical, deceptive; this means that it cannot be for a
good that is either unreal or unattainable.116
Garrigou’s statement of premise (1) is recognized and similarly stated by various writers
in the Thomist tradition. It is conceptually equivalent to the expression given by the
Neoscholastic George Joyce in his comparable statement of the EA. Joyce writes, “the
existence of this constitutional tendency [for full happiness] is itself a guarantee that a
satisfaction corresponding to the desire is to be found.”117 The modern Thomist R. P.
Phillips maintains in his brief presentation of the EA, “a [natural] desire cannot be
forever incapable of realization.”118 The contemporary analytic Thomist John Haldane
characterizes the Thomistic premise as “every natural desire has an objective
correlate.”119 What Garrigou’s utilization of the premise makes evident is the
indispensability of a realist view of human nature in Garrigou’s formulation of the
argument. The dependence on this realist metaphysic is further expressed by his reliance
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on two philosophical presuppositions: formal and final causality. These two combined
allow Garrigou to utilize the teleological conception of humanity, inherited from Plato
and Aristotle via Aquinas, to underwrite his natural theological project expressed in both
versions of the Eudaimonological Argument.
When considering premise (2), it becomes evident that it also utilizes these
assumptions. Premise (2) might appear prima facie to be philosophically neutral, as it is a
statement meant to recapitulate the deliverances of the ‘dialectic of the will’, and what
Garrigou calls ‘the fact’ that it is impossible to find true happiness in any limited good.120
But Garrigou inevitably turns to implicit appeals to more philosophical expressions of the
second premise, noting that the universal amplitude of the will is not just a contingent
feature of human experience, but “an innate and natural desire, based immediately on the
nature of our will.”121 Further, Garrigou explains that “Our will has for its object the
universal good, not this or that particular good known by the senses or the conscience,
but the good, according to what is implied by this term and known as such by the
intellect.”122 Since he appeals to the essence of the will and intellect, the will’s proper
‘object’, and the particular-universal good relation, the operation of formal and final
causality is apparent.
By contrast, Joyce appeals to a simple descriptive depiction of human activity,
writing that “the desire for full and unalloyed happiness (beatitude) is common to the
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whole race of man.”123 However, Joyce’s defense of this premise surfaces his use of
philosophical categories. Phillips statement of the premise is almost identical to
Garrigou’s except for one critical distinction: Phillips does not disambiguate the desire
for perfect happiness and the desire for a perfect good, whereas Garrigou argues that the
latter is the only adequate object of the former.124 Both Baschab and Mercier, who
rejected the argument, offer their own statements and affirmations of this premise.
Mercier, for example, writes that “Man has been made for the true and the good; he
yearns for that yet-to-be when virtue will be clasped in the embrace of happiness and its
present divorce forever ended.”125 In addition, Baschab states, “There is in human nature
an irresistible inclination to the enjoyment of perfect happiness.”126 Nevertheless, in
Garrigou’s various expressions of both premises in the EA, he demonstrates a clear
philosophical framing. Therefore, an analysis of the argument requires further work to
surface and unpack this philosophical undercurrent.
Setting the foundation and introducing the EA in Le Realisme Du Principe de
Finalite, Garrigou explains that in the preceding chapter he has explored “the intimate
relationship between the metaphysical realism of intelligence with the principle of
finality” and goes on to emphasize that, “there is no less close a relationship between this
principle and the special realism of the will.”127 The metaphysical realism as employed in
Garrigou’s project refers to a position on the ontological status of universals. The
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question over realism concerns whether or not universal concepts refer to natures or
essences which are objectively real, or whether they are mere nominal devices, not rooted
in anything other than mental constructs.128 As Porphyry suggests, the issue is “(i)
Whether genera or species exist in themselves or reside in mere concepts alone, (ii)
whether, if [the genera or species] exist, they are corporeal or incorporeal, (iii) whether
[the genera or species] exist apart or in sense objects and in dependence on them.”129 Of
course, the metaphysical realist affirms that universals do refer and cannot be reduced to
mere mental constructs.
Garrigou implicitly sets the Eudaimonological Argument against the backdrop of
this debate over metaphysical realism. His intention is to prepare his readers for his
discussion of the standard ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’ by demonstrating the importance he
sees in the metaphysical presuppositions for defending the argument. He writes,
if one does not accept the absolute realism of the ontologists that transforms this
argument into an alleged intellectual intuition of God, we must also avoid falling
into nominalism, which denies the metaphysical value of the principle of finality,
and recognizes no significance to this argument, unless it becomes the religious
experience referred to by the modernists. But between these extreme errors and
above them, there is the moderate realism of Aristotle and St. Thomas, which
shows the ontological and absolutely universal value of the principle of finality,
even before we have proved the existence of God, and that leads us to him.130
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Garrigou here sets moderate realism between absolute realism and nominalism. Absolute
realism, or ‘Exaggerated Realism’ as he sometimes labels it, suggests that the concepts
used to identify and characterize particulars refer to ideal archetypes that exist
independent of particular material objects.131 This is a common portrait of Plato’s theory
of the Forms, one that Garrigou also ascribes to him.132 In connection with this
metaphysic, Garrigou also identifies the ‘ontologists’. Ontologism is an epistemology of
absolute realism connected with Malebranche’s development of earlier Cartesian
philosophy which maintains that God and divine ideas can be known immediately as the
first object of our intelligence and that the intuition of God can thus become the first act
of our intellectual knowledge.133
In contrast and at the other end of the divide stands Nominalism. Garrigou
describes the form of it he is concerned with as “Sensualistic Nominalism” which reduces
universals and first metaphysical principles “to mere composite ideas formed by
association of images and given a general name.”134 This, says Garrigou, is a reduction of
intelligence to the senses, in the line of the Humean empiricists.135 Instead, Garrigou
urges above that to properly formulate the EA (and any argument in natural theology), we
must avoid these three systems of exaggerated realism, ontologism, and nominalism.
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Instead, Garrigou affirms, we must adhere to the moderate realism of Aristotle and
Aquinas.
The traditional construal of Moderate Realism maintains that universals never
exist independently from the particulars of which they are predicated; rather, universals
subsist in objects, only becoming actual when instantiated in a particular object.136 We
will come to see in the following chapter why the initial feasibility of this common
taxonomy of positions on universals is inadequate (particularly with respect to moderate
realism), and must be addressed in order to further and defend the EA. However, for
present purposes, this is sufficient. Additionally, the notion of formal causality is directly
related to realist metaphysics, as articulated by Aristotle and his successors through
Aquinas down to the Neo-scholastic successors, including Garrigou.
Aristotle, developing a structure already present in Plato, provided his students
with the well-known quadra-causal analysis, including formal causality, material
causality, efficient causality, and final causality. A formal cause explains what a thing is,
a material cause explains that out of which a thing is made, the efficient cause explains
how a thing came to be; and the final cause describes why or for what end a thing
exists.137 Garrigou reiterates this analysis in affirming its indispensability for the
possibility of proving the existence of God:
All reality and becoming depend for their existence upon various principles: the
formal cause, which intrinsically specifies them; the material cause, which
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individualizes them; the efficient cause, which brings them into being, and the
final cause, which denotes the end to which they are ordained.138
More specifically, the formal cause refers to the form of the thing, or the internal specific
principle which provides its nature or essence.139 For the absolute realist, this refers to the
ideal substance in the world of the Forms. For the moderate realist, the formal cause often
refers to the imminent form. Yet, regardless of where the form is located (whether
external or internal to the substance), in both cases, the realist is identifying the form that
determines the species of the substance. Garrigou illustrates,
Why does the bird fly? Because it is looking for food (its goal and purpose). To
fly it needs wings (instrumental cause). Its nature requires wings (formal cause). It
dies because it is composed of matter and hence is corruptible. These raisons
d'etre, these sources and causes (final, efficient, formal, material) are accessible to
reason only, not to sense and imagination. Reason alone knows purpose as
purpose. Imagination grasps the thing which is purpose, but it does not grasp the
principle of finality.140
Additionally, Garrigou maintains (in addition to the aforementioned standard
metaphysical offerings of the Realist tradition) the indispensability of the First Concepts
or Notions, the First Principles, and the First Axioms. He upholds under First Concepts
the notion of being; then essence, existence, unity, identity, truth, goodness, and
substance. As a consequence of these, intelligence is essentially related to being, and
volition is essentially related to goodness. Garrigou’s First Principles entail identity,
contradiction, sufficient reason, causality, and finality. Finally, his First Axioms declare
that whatever is a subject of existence is called substance, while the intelligibility of any
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particular thing corresponds to the degree of its participation in being, and only that
which appeals to one as being described as good can be the object of volition.141
The realist presupposition and reliance on formal causality concerning human
nature in the EA is made evident in two important ways. First, there is the way Garrigou
defines the key term ‘natural desire’ (and its various cognates) in both premises. In order
to shore up the argument and forestall on obvious rejoinder, Garrigou must circumscribe
contingent desires, which may be aimed at non-existent goods, demarcating them from
desires which are directly rooted in the human essence. Thus, in contrast to contingent
desires, Garrigou maintains that the argument rests on a notion of desire “based
immediately on nature, without the intermediary of any judgment; it is not conditioned or
vague; it is innate (immediately based on nature), which is something stable, firm, and
occurs in all men, all places, all times.”142 Thus, humanity as the formal cause supplies
the principle from which appetitive faculties and their corresponding natural desires
emerge.
Garrigou, elsewhere drawing on a long, commentarial Thomist tradition, provides
a complex analysis of these desires. First, he distinguishes between supernatural and
natural desires, where the former come from divinely infused charity and hope,143 while
the latter, by contrast, can be further divined into innate and elicited, where an elicited
desire follows upon the apprehension of a particular good. Innate desires are identical
with the natural inclination of the will, and precede any specific forms of awareness
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provided by our rational faculties.144 Because elicited desires are not innate, they are also
not absolute and efficacious in attaining their end; they can be frustrated or aimed at
empty concepts.145
The second way that the realist presupposition and reliance on formal causality is
made evident is by Garrigou’s restriction on the content and specifying object of the
second premise. Certain modern attempts at the EA attempt to ground the argument in the
explicit religious aspirations of humanity. The modern Thomist scholastic Désiré-Joseph
Mercier’s presentation (and rejection) of the EA begins with the human search for
happiness but then immediately designates God as the object and candidate, stating,
“since such happiness can only be found in God alone He must therefore exist.”146 The
German philosopher Max Scheler attempts to argue that “[o]nly a real being with the
essential character of the Divinity can be the cause of man’s religious propensity” or the
“religious act”.147 Some recent works attempt arguments which begin with “humanity’s
desire for God”.148 Even John Haldane castes this premise as a desire “for eternal life in
the company of God.”149 But Garrigou’s formulation prevents rooting the argument with
this theological immediacy. Commenting on Aquinas’ pivotal article 8 in question 2 of
the Prima Secundae, Garrigou insists that the “specifying object of the will” must be
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distinguished from the will’s “natural last end.”150 He grants that the natural last end of
the will is God (or divine goodness), but only because of the attending argumentative
apparatus (including, but not restricted to, the EA). But this is not the specifying of the
object of will, which is instead the universal good. That is, the will is naturally and
inherently directed immediately to goodness simpliciter. So, for the will to be
immediately directed at God is to imply direct divine activity of infused charity, and to
distinguish between these two putative objects of the will, however, requires recognition
of the internal (and inherent) ordering of the will given its nature. We have in this
account, therefore, an appeal to formal causality. What becomes evident then, is that
Garrigou’s EA argument rests on a series of presuppositions concerning desires, which
are integrally explained via formal causality, which in turn is ultimately dependent on a
broader metaphysical realism. Without this golden chain, Garrigou’s articulation and
formulation of the premises becomes impossible.
Having surfaced and addressed the importance of formal causality, we can now
turn briefly to address the vital role of final causality in Garrigou’s EA, especially and
more prominently in the standard ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’. The principle of finality is
conceptually foundational to both premises of this formulation: that, premise (1) natural
desires correspond to real goods; and premise (2) the human will naturally desires a
universal, perfect Good. In Le Realisme Du Principe de Finalite, Garrigou brings this
dependence to the forefront as he notes that “this argument is made explicit by the
principle of finality: every agent acts of an end.”151 In fact, Garrigou’s trenchant critiques
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of Ontologism, Kantianism, and Nominalism in the first part of God, His Existence and
Attributes are given to show the ontological and transcendental validity of the principle of
finality, which plays a pivotal role in both the standard ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’ as well
as his entire account of the Via Quinta.152
Moreover, Garrigou nowhere presents the ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’ without
making its reliance on final causality explicit. Garrigou maintains that “all becoming and
every composite demands an efficient and final cause, the two external reasons for
being.”153 Giving further explication to the principle, he writes that an “End is not only
the terminus or result of an action, but the reason why the action has taken place; it is that
for the sake of which an agent acts.”154 On Garrigou’s view, final causality entails
objective correlates for natural desires. If an object, good, or state of affairs is not actual
or realizable, then the inclination could not be so directed or aimed. In other words, the
principle of finality entails not only that natural desires are inherently directed, but
further, in order to be so directed, there must be an actually existing corresponding
object, good, or state of affairs.
Without the principle of finality then, Garrigou loses the grounds for both
premises in the argument. He can no longer explain why desires should correspond to
real goods, nor can he give an account of the teleology of human nature which aims at
higher and higher goods until reaching out to the summit of the perfect good. What is
more, the intimate ontological relationship between formal and final causality further
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locks the EA into the Realist metaphysic. On this traditional realist ontology, a thing’s
nature is what designates its final ends. Although the final cause is called the cause of the
causes, in a particular substance, the ontological order moves from the imminent form
which then provides the inherent teleology. It is because we have a human nature that we
are directed towards, say, rational goods such as knowledge. Thus, formality and finality
are inextricable in this realist substance metaphysics. What becomes evident then, is that
Garrigou’s EA argument rests on a series of presuppositions concerning desires, which
are integrally explained via formal causality, which implies attending final causes, and
ultimately is dependent on the broader metaphysical realism. Without this golden chain,
Garrigou’s articulation and formulation of both the premises in his standard ‘Expanded
4th Way EA’ becomes impossible.
Having provided an analysis of the underlying metaphysics of the argument, what
is left in this exposition and analytic reconstruction is to attempt to delineate Garrigou’s
arguments in support of its two main premises. Consider again premise (2) the human
will naturally desires a universal, perfect Good. In support of this premise we can include
what might be deemed as an argument from authority. Garrigou notes that the “love of
the absolute above all things is also the basic principle (or at least, the crown) of the great
spiritual and moral systems of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Descartes, Malebranche,
Leibniz, [and Spinoza].”155 Second, in a variety of places Garrigou offers an a posteriori
justification by appeal to personal reflection and the experiential or phenomenological
aspects of dissatisfaction. He cites the celebrated passages from Augustine, “Our heart, O
Lord, is restless, until it finds its rest in Thee (irrequietum est cor nostrum donec
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requiescat in Te, Domine).”156 Garrigou appeals to first-hand, immediate experience
asking, “Which of us has not experienced this fact in his intimate life?” and evokes a
series of common, unrequited experiences with finite goods such as health, wealth,
honors, power, glory, knowledge, friendship, and even the angelic.157 In the
Neoscholastic Charles Baschab’s presentation of the EA (in line with the standard
Expanded 4th Way version), his justification for this premise is reduced solely to this
consideration. He defends the human inclination for a perfect good by claiming that
“history and our own observation and experience [show] that there is no contingent
being, nor any sum of them, which can perfectly satisfy it.”158 For Garrigou, to rest the
argument only on these two considerations would be entirely inadequate.
The third justification for premise (2) is an argument from the nature of the
conjunction between intellect and will. This is the primary way Garrigou seeks to
establish this premise, and is presented in a variety of ways throughout his corpus. It
comes in both negative and positive accounts. The negative account of this justification is
the specific chronicling of the inadequacies of finite goods which Aquinas develops in
detail in question 2 of the Prima Secundae.159 In Garrigou’s exposition of the ‘treatise on
happiness’ he surveys this extended critique, offering his own elaborations and
developments to Aquinas’ case.160 Here, the work of Garrigou closely follows in the long
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line of reflection on happiness tracing back through Aquinas, Boethius, Augustine, and
Aristotle.161 However, the argument comes to a focus as it moves beyond the specific
inadequacies of the kinds of finite goods to consider the inherent limitations of all limited
goods as a source of happiness given the constitution of human nature. In this, Garrigou
develops an argument which Aquinas raises in both articles 7 and 8 of question 2. In
Reality, Garrigou writes,
desire [for complete happiness] cannot be satisfied by any limited and finite good,
because, since our intelligence knows good as universal and unlimited, the natural
amplitude, the embracing capacity of our will, illumined by our intelligence, is
itself universal and unlimited.162
Since happiness obtains only when human nature has been perfected or completed, and
human nature is specified by our rational and volitional faculties, we must look to these
faculties to recognize their proper end. The formal nature of the will is to follow upon the
intellect. Thus, when formalized, the Garrigou-Aquinas argument runs as follows:163
(2a) the will naturally desires that which is conceived by the intellect.
(2b) the intellect conceives of the universal good.
Thus, (2c) the will naturally desires the universal good.
(2d) the will can only find happiness by possessing what it naturally desires.
Thus, (2e) the will can only find happiness by possessing the universal good.
(2f) If (2e), then the will cannot find happiness in any finite good.
Thus, (2g) the will cannot find happiness in any finite good.
Garrigou begins in (2a) and (2b) with the formal natures of the will and intellect and
arrives at the negative thesis in the final conclusion (2g). It is premise (2b) which
identities the universal reach of the intellect, that serves as the critical piece in both this
161
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negative thesis concerning happiness as well as the positive argument for the will
desiring a universal good.
(2h) the nature of the will is derived from the nature of the intellect.
(2i) the intellect is universal in extension by nature [a correlate with 2b, above]
Thus, (2j) the human will is universal in extension.
(2k) If the will is universal in extension by nature, it cannot be satisfied with
anything less than the principle of all goodness [a correlate with 2e, above].
Thus, (2l) the will cannot be satisfied with anything less than the principle of all
goodness.
(2m) The principle of all goodness, is Goodness itself.
Thus, (2n) the will cannot be satisfied with anything less than Goodness itself.
What has occurred in this argument is consideration of the combination of the formal
natures of both humanity and goodness. In the previous argument (2a)-(2g), Garrigou is
developing the implications which follow upon substantial formality, whereas in (2h)(2n) he is combining this with the implications which in turn follow upon the nature of
the transcendental, good. This secondary, formal implication introduces an important
element into the standard ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’. This will come under further
consideration in chapter 3 of this work. What the argument (2h)-(2n) yields is a positive
thesis concerning the satisfying object of the human will and a putative justification for
premise (2).
An investigation and analysis of Garrigou’s works also provides a number of
potential justifications for premise (1) natural desires correspond to real goods. First, as
with the other premise of the argument, Garrigou provides an a posteriori, inductive
consideration to justify the correspondence between desires and goods. Garrigou suggests
that experience shows that the natural desires of lower beings is not in vain.164 An

164

Garrigou-Lagrange, Le Realisme Du Principe de Finalite, 6; Garrigou-Lagrange, Providence,

45.

130

examination of the appetitive natures of beings lower to ourselves (such as herbaceous
and carnivorous appetites in animals) are effectual (i.e., they are directed to an actually
existing good which properly correlates with those desires). Garrigou observes that
throughout the vegetable and animal kingdoms objects (e.g., food) correspond to the
natural desires aimed at them.165 He therefore rhetorically asks, “Could it be that the
natural desire of man be misleading, without purpose, while the natural desire of inferior
beings is not vain?”166 Despite his gestures towards this justification, he maintains that it
is ultimately insufficient, for demonstration of God’s existence is a metaphysical science
and must rest on a more secure foundation.167 After this justification for premise (1), we
see in Garrigou a series of considerations that all center around the principle of finality,
discussed above. This principle serves as the main pillar of the argument and therefore
receives various specific defenses in conjunction with the argument, in addition to other
places in his corpus, an example of which is seen in the entire first part of God, His
Existence and His Nature. This section is given to establishing and defending the first
principles, and included in this is the principle of finality.168
In support of the principle of finality, Garrigou claims in numerous places that it
is a necessary and self-evident principle. He explains, “[n]ow the end is precisely that
determinate good to which the act of the agent or the motion of the mobile object is
directed. This principle [is] self-evident to one who understands the meaning of the words
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agent and end….”169 In Le Realisme, he explains that its self-evidency is demonstrated by
a consideration of the terms, in that “every agent… tends to something specific that suits
it. The end is that towards which an agent moves.”170 This justification is difficult to
assess however, as Garrigou does not offer an explanation of how the terms ‘agent’ or
‘movement’ analytically require ‘end’ in the full sense given by final causality. The next
consideration in support of the principle of finality is his primary way of defending the
principle of finality and is developed from an argument by Aquinas which seeks to
metaphysically link efficient and final causality. Garrigou explains, “whoever recognizes
the principle of efficient causality, must also recognize the principle of finality, because
there can be no efficiency, tendency, action, or passion without purpose.”171 The reason
for this connection follows the argument given by Aquinas in ‘the Treatise on
Happiness’, question 1, article 2. Here Aquinas is concerned to demonstrate the
pervasiveness of final causes in all agents (rational and nonrational) acting as efficient
causes.172 To do so, he relies on the notion that the final cause is the ‘first of all causes.’
Specifically, all other causes (formal, material, and efficient) must ultimately be
explained by final causality, even as his focus is on efficient causality. In order to
establish the metaphysically necessary dependence of efficient causality on finality, he
argues in this way:
(1a) If an agent-cause were not determined to some effect, then it would not have
a definite effect (i.e., it wouldn’t produce this particular effect rather than any
other).
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(1b) agent-causes do have definite effects.
Thus, (1c) agent-causes are determined to some effect.
(1d) to be determined to some effect, an agent-cause must intend173 a definite
effect.
Thus, (1e) agent-causes must intend definite effects.
(1f) to intend a definite effect is the nature of an end
Thus, (1g) agent-causes have the nature of an end.
Producing a determined effect comes about by the formal nature acting in its dynamic
capacity. And this dynamic capacity’s being directed towards the determined effect is the
result of finality.174 Thus, what Aquinas has sought to establish here is that wherever
there is a definite effect, it can only be explained by final causality operating through
formal causality.
Garrigou sometimes formulates this argument in the form of a reductio ad
absurdum which essentially entails that if there are no final causes, then there can be no
efficient causes. Hence, to maintain that there are no efficient causes would be absurd.
If there were no finality in nature, if no natural agent acted for some end, there
would be no reason why the eye should see and not hear or taste, no reason why
the wings of the bird should be for flying and not for walking or swimming, no
reason for the intellect to know rather than desire. …There would be no reason
why the stone should fall instead of rising, no reason why bodies should attract
rather than repel one another and be dispersed.175
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This is why Garrigou’s development of this justification for final causality ultimately
appeals to the principle of sufficient reason.176 The principle of finality is, on Garrigou’s
view, implicitly contained in the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). To deny it leads to
the absurdity of denying the PSR. If every agent produces a determined effect without
being ordered to this effect, then there is no way of ultimately explaining how it is that
the particular effect is produced. And to deny the ordering is to deny the raison d'être of
the determination and inherent goodness or essential appropriateness of the effect
produced. In sum, an action of any agent (personal and non-personal) is essentially
intentional (ordained towards some end); without this tendency, the effect and the
producing activity would be without a sufficient explanation. What his justification for
premise (1) demonstrates, whatever its plausibility, is the indispensability of formal—and
preeminently—of final causality, in Garrigou’s defense of the EA.
In the standard ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’, having set out and defended that (1)
natural desires correspond to real goods, and that (2) the human will naturally desires a
universal, perfect Good, Garrigou concludes that there must exist a universal, perfect
Good. In Le Realisme, he comes to the conclusion that “there must be a limitless Good,
pure Good, a good unmixed with imperfection, because it alone is truly the universal
good that satisfies our will.”177 In Providence, he determines that “The natural desire for
true happiness must be possible of attainment and, since it is to be found only in the
knowledge and love of the sovereign good, and this is God, then God must exist.”178
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Garrigou has taken the rising ascent through the ladder of human desires in terms of
ascending goods to their ultimate end, as addressed through a long, historical tradition
from Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Boethius, and culminating in Aquinas. From this, he has
constructed a formal demonstration for God’s existence. As Aidan Nichols comments on
this project, Garrigou sought
to re-express in more philosophically cogent terms…the mystical notion of ascent
to the supremely desirable. That notion becomes at his hands an argument from
the ‘erotic’ – in the widest sense of desiring – nature of the human being,
rationally tightened form of the kind of spiritual approach we find in the ancient
Church in, for example, Saint Gregory of Nyssa.179
Establishing the conclusion of the argument required reliance on critical, metaphysical
assumptions applied to humanity and its appetitive tendencies. Clarifying, formalizing,
and detailing the argument sheds light on these operative assumptions and makes both
Garrigou’s critical dependence on, and developments of, formal and final causation.

4. Conclusions
Considering rational appetites for particular goods has provided grounds for
thinkers from Plato onward to describe an ascent which rises to a universal Good. This
ascent has been variously characterized by different figures in the Western philosophical
tradition. In the previous chapter Augustine’s account of the desire for happiness yielded
certain conditions which suggested (but did not detail) a type of inferential ascent. In this
chapter, Aquinas’ analysis of happiness provides further explication and philosophically
motivated grounds for inferring a transcendent terminus for this quest. However, as
addressed in the first section, it was seen that Aquinas’ interpreters have not all agreed
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that his project can be characterized in terms of natural theology. Reginald GarrigouLagrange, however, maintained that a Eudaimonological Argument in the form of
traditional, Thomistic natural theology could plausibly be constructed. Although various
concerns about Garrigou’s interpretation and development of Aquinas have been raised,
this chapter has argued that Garrigou’s development of the EA within the Thomistic
tradition could be developed utilizing the principles, metaphysical categories, and
methodology of Aquinas. In addition, given the general methodology of Strict
Observance Thomism, this would represent an authentic extension of Aquinas’ work.
Garrigou finds within Aquinas the necessary resources to develop a natural theological
argument from the desire for happiness and the finitude of lower goods.
In the second section of this chapter, I provided an exposition and analytic
reconstruction of the argument within Garrigou’s corpus, identifying its structure,
particularly with reference to the Quinque Viae. Although possible formulations of the
EA are in line with each of the five ways, it was concluded that the Via Quarta provides
the general schema and context for Garrigou’s formulation of the argument. However, it
became apparent that two distinct versions of the EA can be found in Garrigou’s work:
the ‘Strict 4th Way EA’ and the ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’, with the latter representing the
standard and central formulation of the argument offered by Garrigou. In this argument,
Garrigou maintains that (1) Natural desires correspond to real goods; and since (2) The
human will naturally desires a universal, perfect Good, it should be concluded that (3)
there exists a universal, perfect Good.
In the third section of this work, I attempted to provide a further analysis of the
standard version of the argument in order to identify the underlying metaphysics of
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formal and final causality, and set Garrigou’s construal of the argument both in light of
and in comparison to the Neoscholastic and broader Thomistic tradition which
recognized it. While Garrigou’s formulation of his standard ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’
shows certain affinities and similarities with other presentations of the argument, and thus
escapes the appraisal of uniqueness, it was his extended attention to the argument and
justification for its premises which distinguished his work. This, in turn, made evident his
critical reliance on a realist metaphysical account of human nature and its correlative
goods. Therefore, the main contention of this chapter appears to be well grounded:
Garrigou’s development of the EA rightly falls within the Thomistic tradition,
particularly by utilizing the metaphysical principles of Aquinas. This further develops the
central thesis of this dissertation; that Garrigou’s Eudaimonological Argument represents
a viable project in natural theology within the Thomist tradition when properly
understood in light of its underlying metaphysical principles, specifically formal and final
causality. However, this thesis is still susceptible to notable problems, as Garrigou’s
standard version of the EA is not without its challenges, even when cast within the
Thomist and Neoscholastic tradition. Various objections have been raised against both
the ‘Strict 4th Way EA’ and Garrigou’s standard ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’ (either directly
aimed at them or that indirectly implicate them). In the following chapter these objections
to Garrigou’s standard EA will come to the fore and provide grounds for further
exploring the argument.
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CHAPTER 3
FORMAL AND FINAL CAUSALITY
IN THE EUDAIMONOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

The previous chapters of this work began with the recognition of a movement in
the western philosophical and theological tradition which begins in distinctively human
appetites centered in the quest for happiness and ascends through varying levels of goods
to arrive at an ultimate terminus and perfect Good. Although this ascent has been
characterized in various ways, Augustine provided the initial impetus for formulating
inferential criteria and principles by which to identify a plausible candidate for this
ultimate end. In Aquinas, these steps tracing the movement become more focused and
further developed. However, it is in Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange that the ascent takes on
an explicit form as a project in natural theology, which this dissertation has termed a
Eudaimonological Argument (EA). An analysis of Garrigou’s work yielded two distinct
versions of the EA, both of which were expressions of Aquinas’ Via Quarta: the ‘Strict
4th Way EA’ and the ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’, with the latter representing the standard
and central formulation of the argument offered by Garrigou. Further analysis of the
argument shed light on its operative assumptions and made evident Garrigou’s critical
dependence on formal and final causation. As a project falling within the Thomistic
tradition and 20th century Neoscholasticism, these assumptions are unsurprising.
Nevertheless, further investigation into the reliance of the standard EA on formal and
final causality are open to scrutiny, even from within this tradition.
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The role of final causality was made evident in the first premise of Garrigou’s
Standard EA, which is that natural desires correspond to real goods. The grounds for this
correspondence thesis are tendentious at best apart from the assumption of finality
causality which entails that natures are ordered to corresponding proper ends. The role of
formal causality became evident particularly in the second premise of the ‘Strict 4th Way
EA’, which maintained that the multiple presupposes the one and the imperfect
presupposes the perfect. The entailment from multiple and imperfect goods to the single,
perfect good requires recognition of both the reality of formal natures and their
dependence on, or relation to, a universal. However, questions loom even within the
Thomistic and Neoscholastic traditions concerning each of these assumptions. If final
causality cannot be justified apart from theological grounds, then Garrigou’s standard EA
is undercut, as it is supposed to be demonstrating God’s existence, not appealing to
theological propositions. Further, even granting final causality, if the move from specific
final ends to an overarching and ultimate final end is problematic, then Garrigou’s
standard EA faces another sort of challenge. Regarding formal causation, if formal
causality doesn’t require or entail the existence of universals, Garrigou’s ‘Strict 4th Way
EA’ is in jeopardy. Therefore, it is the purpose of this chapter to first bring these putative
objections into sharp relief by making the problems they raise for the EA explicit.
Second, this chapter will seek to confront these objections and to undercut and/or rebut
them by appealing to the resources within Aquinas, Garrigou, and the broader
Neoscholastic tradition itself. What this chapter will argue is that both sets of concerns
can be met by further analysis of the features of formal and final causality.
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1. Formal Causality and the Eudaimonological Argument
What chapter 2 of this dissertation surfaced was that Garrigou’s formulation of
the EA critically relies upon the doctrine of formal causality, and that in so doing it
appeals to the Via Quarta as well as a consideration of universals. The difficulty for the
EA raised by considerations of formal causality comes to the fore in its appeal to
universals. In the previous chapter’s formulation of Garrigou’s ‘Strict 4th Way EA’, he
began with human desires for limited, finite goods and moved by inference to a single,
perfect Good. This was achieved by use of the principle in premise (2), that the multiple
presupposes the one and the imperfect presupposes the perfect. The entailment from
multiple and imperfect goods to the single, perfect good is achieved by appealing both to
formal natures (of particular goods) as well as their relation to a universal (Goodness).
But this raises a particular and systemic problem for Garrigou given his commitments
and those of the broader Thomistic and Neoscholastic tradition concerning universals.
Aquinas and the ensuing tradition is supposed to be committed to a moderate realism,
which holds that universals are only located in particulars and the minds that abstract
them from those particulars. For example, Edward Feser writes, “For a Scholastic like
Aquinas, essences do not exist in a Platonic ‘third realm’ but only as either immanent to
the particular things whose essences they are, or as abstracted by an intellect.”1 Similarly,
Ralph McInerny concludes that “we see Thomas rejecting Platonic Ideas insofar as these
are invoked to solve the problem of universals and instead opting for the Aristotelian
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solution.”2 Thus, on a moderate realist account, goodness can be instantiated with
specific objects, which the mind then perceives and recognizes as an instance of the
universal, Good. But the universal qua universal only exists in the mind. What this entails
is that at best, the inference from goods to Good in the EA could yield is that the
universal Good exists in the mind alone. And if it is only universal in the mind that has
abstracted it from the particular, then the argument has fallen short of demonstrating that
there exists an extra-mental Good itself.
This problem can be exacerbated and further illustrated by creating a parallel with
other universals. If we take various individual humans into consideration, we can (on
moderate realism) come to recognize that they all share in a single common nature,
humanity. But as Aquinas maintains, although the nature is real and present in particulars
and is rightly abstracted by the mind, there is no single humanity or perfect Human that
exists independently of human cognition; for this would be to fall back into the views
traditionally associated with Plato. Illustrating this problematic inference, John Peterson
describes moderate realism as being opposed to ‘extreme realism’ because
It disagrees with the latter in that it denies that universals are things. …treeness, is
not a thing in its own right but rather a property or quality of a thing. …There is
not in addition to this oak, this maple and this elm, etc., some further thing called
treeness. Rather, treeness is always present in this oak, this maple, or this elm, etc.
This oak and this maple are similar by virtue of the fact that they are trees but
from this it does not follow nor is it the case in the view of the moderate realist
that there is some other thing treeness which each of these particular trees as well
as all other particular trees exemplify.3
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Garrigou’s movement from particular goods to the actual existence of a universal Good
would be another example of this same fallacious inference pattern. But this undermines
the second premise of the EA, leaving it unsound.
Perhaps Garrigou has a way of avoiding this difficulty. While this criticism
clearly applies to his ‘Strict 4th Way EA’, his standard version of the argument does not
require this same movement from particulars to universals. In the standard version of the
EA Garrigou began with a desire for the universal Good and then utilizes the principle of
finality to establish the correspondence thesis that such natural desires correspond to real
goods. Thus, it is only final causality as applied to the human appetite for a perfect,
universal Good which allows for Garrigou to conclude that such a Good exists; thereby
circumventing the problem posed by the moderate realist.
Unfortunately, this attempt to rescue the EA from its incompatibility with
moderate realism fails on two fronts. First, even granting the correspondence thesis and
the principle of finality, the natural desire would only be properly directed towards a
universal conceived by the mind. Thus, the argument could only conclude that there exists
a concept of the Good that humans naturally desire, but not that such a Good exists
independent of human cognition. The second reason why the appeal to the standard
formulation of the EA does not escape the challenge of a moderate realist framework is
because the standard EA, on further analysis, turned out to also critically rely on the same
movement from particular goods to the universal good. In chapter 2 of this work, we saw
how Garrigou’s justification for premise 2 of the Standard EA restricted the specifying
object of the will from being immediately identified as God. Instead, he argued that the
human will only naturally desires a universal, perfect Good on the basis of the nature of

142

the intellect as apprehending a universal Good (see the argument from 2h-2n). But this
recognition of the universal Good by the intellect is the result of abstracting from
particular, finite goods; the same movement that is central to the ‘Strict 4th Way EA’. So,
in either version of the argument, Garrigou must appeal to the inference from particular
goods to a perfect Good, and given moderate realism this establishes that such a universal
only exists in the minds of the faculties of human knowers. So, given that both versions
of the EA depend on this inference to a universal, does affirming moderate realism
undercut the viability of Garrigou’s Eudaimonological Arguments? Further, must
Garrigou concede a form of Platonic realism to rescue the EA from this challenge? This
cannot be his response for he clearly denies Platonism and explicitly affirms the moderate
realist framework. For example, in his defense of the ontological validity of the first
principles, Garrigou affirms that,
the true solution of the problem of universals is to be found only in moderate
Realism. Empirical Nominalism abolishes the intellect and intelligibility.
Subjectivistic Conceptualism reduces our intellectual life to a coherent dream.
Moderate Realism, as formulated by Aristotle, St. Thomas, and the traditional
philosophy of the Schools, safeguards our intellectual life and its real validity,
without admitting the exaggerated Realism of Plato, Spinoza, and the
Ontologists,4
It is important to note not only Garrigou’s clear affirmation of the moderate realist
position, but also his additional recognition that it represents the traditional Scholastic
and Neoscholastic view. It seems that any EA developed from Aquinas by Garrigou runs
afoul of a standard Thomistic and Scholastic doctrine.
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1.1 Addressing the Problem of Moderate Realism for the EA
In order to address the challenge from moderate realism to the Eudaimonological
Argument, we need to revisit the question of universals. To foreshadow the conclusion to
come, this section will argue that accounts of Thomistic moderate realism suffer from a
critical ambiguity, and that addressing this ambiguity resolves both the interpretive
perplexity of the Via Quarta and the objections to the EA from a moderate realist account
of universals.
There can be no doubt that Aquinas’ position on the question of universals is
vexed by ambiguity.5 But given that Aquinas holds that universals are in some sense real,
how shall we distinguish the type of realism to which he holds? In order to disambiguate
this problem, we have to identify the particular question under consideration. In virtue of
what is he being characterized as a moderate realist? If the view under consideration is
epistemic, and the question is ‘how do we arrive at knowledge of universals?’, then there
can be no doubt that Aquinas follows an Aristotelian Realism and denies a Platonic
Realism that we might identify with Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, and other ‘Ontologists’
(as addressed in the last chapter). For Aquinas denies that the mind has an unmediated
grasp of forms. Instead he affirms that “human knowledge reaches the intellect by

5

Illustrating the full extent of this ambiguity, Brian Leftow remarks, “Aquinas’ theory of
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beginning with the senses” (De Potentia 3, 5).6 Further, Aquinas argues that to admit
direct apprehension of forms would undermine the purpose of the body (ST I, 84, 4).7 So
we cannot come to know universals apart from particular sensibles. Gilson summarizes
the standard Thomistic-Aristotelian account of knowledge formation by the natural light
of the mind,
Natural light does not confer upon us knowledge of material things by
participation alone in their eternal essences. It still requires the intelligible species
which it abstracts from things themselves. The human intellect possesses
therefore a light just sufficient in order to acquire the knowledge of the
intelligibles to which it can raise itself by means of sensible things.8
There is no interpretive dispute over this question as the doctrine of abstraction represents
the standard reading of Aquinas.9 Moreover, Garrigou would clearly affirm this doctrine
as the proper reading of Aquinas and representative of his own view, as is evident by his
rejection of the ‘Ontologists’.10
However, many interpreters use this account of Thomistic epistemology as the
grounds for a Thomistic ontology of universals. Eleonore Stump, for example, argues that
“For Aquinas, a universal is the concept a knower has when he abstracts, for example,
redness from a material thing in which the particular form (this redness) is and considers
it just as redness, apart from its association with the particular matter it configures.
…What actually exists in reality, however, is just a particular form in a particular
6
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thing.”11 Stump has traced Aquinas’ account of apprehending universals and from this
arrives at what she holds to be Aquinas’ ontology of universals. She reasons in this way:
since in human knowledge we begin with particulars and abstracts the essence as a
universal, then in reality the universal essence only exists in the mind of the human
subjects apprehending them. McInerny and Feser’s conclusions also illustrate this
justification.12 McInerny’s characterization of Aquinas’ view about the status of
universals is due to the fact that Aquinas holds that we abstract form from individual
matter (as represented by sense images), as well as his analysis of Aquinas’ account of
Augustinian illumination.13 After detailing Aquinas’ theory of knowledge and noting that
“essences are universal qua abstracted from the particular individuals by an intellect
which knows them,” Edward Feser concludes that “for the moderate realist, [there are] no
such things as mind independent abstract objects.”14 Similarly, David Oderberg
concludes that “nothing abstract exists without abstraction. And abstraction is an
intellectual process by which we recognize what is literally shared by a multiplicity of
particular things.”15
When the question is moved from the epistemology of universals to their
ontology, it first appears that Aquinas is also rightly seen as an Aristotelian. If the view
under consideration is ontological, and the question is ‘do universals subsist apart from
particulars as separated substances in themselves?’, then again there can be no doubt that
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Aquinas follows an Aristotelian Realism and denies a Platonic Realism. In Wuellner’s
classic Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, he characterizes subsistence as that which
has being and operation through itself, not through union with another; and therefore as
existence proper to a whole substance.16 Aquinas explicitly rejects forms or universals as
possessing subsistence. In Summa Theologiae I, 6, 4, Aquinas notes that Plato held the
existence of separate ideas (species separatas) but avers that this opinion appears to be
unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves (per
se subsistentes) .17 Aquinas follows Aristotle and Avicenna and rejects subsistent
forms/universals for sensible particulars because of the incoherence this would entail.18
For the forms subsist immaterially but they would constitute the essences of a material
subject. Thus, the form (of a rock, say) which has materiality essentially would have to
subsistent but without matter, which is incoherent because this would be to affirm that
materiality is both essential and not essential to the essence. Or, eliciting the incoherence
from another direction, a doctrine of subsistent forms would entail that the ideal,
archetypal rock was immaterial. Frederick Copleston registers this as the standard read of
Aquinas, noting that he is at one with Aristotle in denying the separate existence of
universals.19 And, as we have seen, Garrigou would also affirm this reading of Aquinas
and concur. Garrigou writes,
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Whatever implies a combination of material elements in its very concept, is
incapable of existing apart from matter and from the individual in which it is
found. E.g., Flesh cannot exist apart from this or that flesh, though it can be
thought of separately. The exemplars of material things can never be anything but
ideas, not real types. This is what avoids Plato’s exaggerated realism. 20
The moderate realist reading as a form of Aristotelianism over and against the Platonic
view appears well grounded when considering the ontological subsistence of universals.
But in asking about the independent subsistence of forms, we have not exhausted
questions concerning their ontology. Granting that (on Aquinas’ view) universals don’t
exist as separated substances, we must further ask, ‘do the forms exist apart from
particulars, and if so, where and how?’ The standard interpretation of Aquinas, as noted
earlier, affirms that (i) Aquinas hold that universals only exist in particulars and in minds
that abstract them from the particulars, and that (ii) this is the moderate realist position.
So prevalent is this interpretation that in addition to Feser, McInerny, Stump, and
Orderberg, cited earlier, examples of interpreters affirming these conjoined propositions
are not difficult to find.21 John Haldane writes, for example,
Here I follow Aquinas and maintain a position between the view that everything
that exists is individual, and the opinion that universals exists as such outside the
mind. This via media holds that distinct substances may yet possess formally
identical (though numerically diverse) natures but only as abstracted in the
20
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intellect…Universals are formed by abstraction from a plurality of formally
identical natures existing in materially individuated substances” (emphasis
added).22
Or, as Ralph Clark maintains, “It is true that universals exist only in the intellect
according to St. Thomas…” Clark further suggests that Aquinas holds that “universals
exist neither in things nor apart from things in any sort of ‘Platonic heaven,’ but only in
minds conceiving things.”23 Upon further analysis, however, I will argue that both of the
propositions ((i) and (ii)) of the standard interpretation are false. The underlying
assumption of this characterization of Aquinas as a moderate realist is the following: if
one is a Realist, then they are either a Platonic or an Aristotelian Realist. Aquinas is
clearly not a Platonic Realist (because of the reasons just surveyed). Thus, Aquinas is an
Aristotelian Realist. This strong disjunctive is exhibited in Gilson’s more general
presentation of Aquinas’ relationship to Plato and Aristotle. He writes,
Aquinas was obliged to choose, once and for all, between the only two pure
philosophies which can exist, that of Plato and that of Aristotle. Reduced to their
bare essences, these metaphysics are rigorously antinomical; one cannot be for the
one without being against all those who are with the other, and that is why Saint
Thomas remains with Aristotle against all those are counted on the side of
Plato…As a philosophy, therefore, Thomism was born out of a pure philosophical
option to choose against the philosophy of Plato, in favour of that of Aristotle.24
Once it is granted that Aristotelian realism on universals is synonymous with (or,
identical to) moderate realism, then the characterization of Aquinas is complete. But the
critical error in this reasoning is that it presents us with a false disjunctive; there is a
tertium quid between Platonic and Aristotelian Realism (which we will call, ‘Thomistic
22
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Realism’); this represents a genuine form of moderate realism. Thus, I suggest that we
can identify three separate positions:
Aristotelian Realism =df affirms that forms exist in particulars and as universals
(only) in minds that abstract them.
Platonic Realism =df affirms that forms exist as universals independent of minds
that abstract them, and subsist individually and separately.
Thomistic Realism =df affirms that forms exist in particulars and as universals in
minds that abstract them, as well as existing independent of minds that abstract
them, but denies that they subsist individually and separately.
The Thomistic Realist agrees with the Aristotelian against the Platonist in denying that
the forms exist as subsistent individuals, as mentioned above. Moreover, the Thomist
Realist agrees with the Aristotelian against the Platonist in affirming that forms exist in
the particulars that have them. In these two affirmations, both qualify as Moderate Realist
positions. But a further question remains, which will further distinguish the Thomistic
from the Aristotelian position; can a form exist independent of particulars and the minds
that have abstracted it from them? The Aristotelian answers in the negative but the
Thomist answers in the affirmative. On Thomistic Realism the reality of universals is not
reducible to the abstractive intellect; instead, universals do have reality apart from
particulars and the mind’s abstraction. Which is the best reading of Aquinas’ actual
position? I will here briefly canvas and assess the reasons for an Aristotelian Realist
interpretation before giving my own reasons for affirming Thomistic Realism.
There are a number of textual reasons usually marshaled for reading Aquinas as
an Aristotelian Realist. The first type of texts is those supporting a Thomistic
epistemology which is then used as grounds for an ontology of universals along
Aristotelian lines. For example, Ralph Clark appeals to a passage in de Veritate, where
Aquinas writes that “it is clear that abstraction, which is common to all intellects, makes
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a form a universal.”25 But this passage doesn’t deny the reality of universals outside of
human minds. Clark takes this passage to indicate the etiology of universals; that is, he
understands Aquinas to be affirming that a universal comes into existence (solely)
through the mind’s activity. But the passage can equally be read as simply identifying the
shift in the modal status of a form. Aquinas is only describing the process in which a
human mind which takes a particular form and then universalizes it in instances of
knowledge-formation. This is the shift in the modal status of the form (from localized and
individualized in the subject to being universalized in the apprehension in the intellect),
which Aquinas addresses in other places such as On Being and Essence.26

For example, in the process of abstraction, a particular subject, Rachel (say), is taken up
by the intellect and stripped from its particularizing features where it is then conceived in
its universal mode as humanity. As Rachel is a specific instance of a human form which
structures this parcel of matter that together constitute this form/matter composite. It is in
this sense that the intellect ‘makes a form a universal’. Similarly, McInerny appeals to ST
I, 85, 1 as evidence for Aquinas’ position on universals. But this passage is susceptible to
the same interpretation and analysis of De Veritate II just given. In fact, far from
restricting the existence of universals to human cognition alone, Aquinas here suggests
that while “our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms,”

25

Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, ed. Joseph Kenny, trans. Robert W.
Mulligan, James V. McGlynn, and Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), II, 6, ad
1, accessed November 9, 2016, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer.htm.
26

Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, 2nd Revised edition. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1968), chap. 3.

151

it is “through material things thus considered [that] we acquire some knowledge of
immaterial things (immaterialium).”27 Thus, what must be kept in mind is that analyzing
universals exclusively through the question of epistemology does not warrant the
question about their ontological status and a closer investigation of the textual material
demonstrates that the ontological conclusions do not follow from the observations about
abstraction. It doesn’t necessarily follow from Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology that
the ontological location of universals must be reduced to solely within in the mind.
There are other textual reasons usually marshaled for reading Aquinas as
restricting universals to the minds of human cognizers. For example, Baur, Clark, and
Stump appeal to Aquinas’ comments in ST I, I, 39, 4, ad 3. Aquinas considers the use of
referents such as ‘God’ and ‘Man’, and writes,
since the form signified by this word "man"—that is, humanity—is really divided
among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is no
adjunct determining it to the person—that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or
community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the
consideration of the mind.28
Baur concludes from this passage that “Aquinas says that what is common by way of
predication – such as ‘the unity or community of human nature’ is nothing in reality, but
only in the consideration of the mind.”29 This passage, rather than arguing from silence,
offers a categorical denial of the reality of the universal form except as it has been
considered in the mind. But Aquinas’ statement here is ambiguous. If he means that the
predicate ‘humanity’ has no reality whatsoever apart from the mind, then this would
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reduce Aquinas to a pre-Kantian conceptualist, imposing forms on particulars which do
not possess them in themselves. However if Aquinas is addressing the subsistence of
humanity as an independently existing and perfect archetypal Human, then clearly
Aquinas intends to convey that a subsistent Human is not a reality. However, as we have
already seen, to deny the doctrine of subsistent, separated substances independently in a
Platonic Heaven is not to deny universals a reality other than the modes that the
Aristotelian realist affirms.
Jeffrey Brower’s case against reading Aquinas as any type of realist is entirely
based on his reading of two passages from his commentary on Peter Lombard’s
Sentences: In Sent 1.19.5.1 and In Sent 2.17.1.1.30 Brower contends that based on these
texts, “There can…be little doubt that Aquinas explicitly rejects the existence of
universals at various places in his writings.”31 Aquinas writes, “Humanity is something
that exists in reality, but there it is not universal. For no humanity that exists outside the
mind (extra animam) is common to many” (In Sent 1.19.5.1). Brower suggests that the
implication of this passage is that two individuals must have their own distinct natures.
To reinforce his interpretation of Aquinas’ denial of common natures, he cites the second
passage:
Even if this individual [say, Socrates] is a human being and that individual [say,
Plato] is a human being, it is not necessary that both have numerically the same
humanity—any more than it is necessary for two white things to have numerically
the same whiteness. On the contrary, it is necessary [only] that the one resemble
the other in having [an individual] humanity just as the other does. It is for this
reason that the mind—when it considers [an individual] humanity, not as
belonging to this [or that] individual, but as such—forms a concept that is
common to them all (In Sent 2.17.1.1).
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Brower concludes from these two passages that “Aquinas develops his views in a way
that would appear to bring them in line with Ockham’s nominalism an important respect.
For Aquinas insists here that things are not members of the same natural kind in virtue of
possessing numerically the same nature. On the contrary, they are members of the
relevant kind by virtue of possessing distinct but resembling natures.”32 But Brower’s
case here is unconvincing. Contrary to Brower’s claim, Aquinas does not deny the
existence of universals; only the universal mode when a form is instantiated; for then it
becomes individual. Let us return to the question of the modal status forms can take on.
In his work, On Being and Essence, Aquinas addresses this directly:
…a nature or essence signified as a whole can be considered in two ways. In one
way it can be considered according to its proper content, and this is an absolute
consideration of it. In the other way an essence is considered according to the
existence it has in this or that. 61. And although the intellectually grasped nature
has the character of a universal according as it is compared to things outside the
soul, because it is one likeness of all of them; still according as it exists in this
intellect or in that one, it is something particular.33
Since a form’s modal status is something accidental to it, the form can exist as in an
absolute way (when, for example, the mind grasps it apart from all the contingent features
of the subject) or the form can exist as a particular (when, for example, it is conjoined
with matter and an act of existence to make up a subject). In the first former case, the
form is universal while in the latter it is singular. Thus, forms can be immanent to
individuals and transcend those individuals. In the passages cited by Brower, Aquinas is
affirming that there are immanent forms, which are not numerically identical. By
contrast, he is simply denying that two particulars (Socrates and Plato) have the
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numerically same immanent form, while granting that they have the same absolute,
universal form. These are discrete form instances; the human form possessed by Socrates
is not the numerically same human form possessed by Plato. Both of these are
numerically distinct immanent forms, organizing different parcels of matter, which share
the same proper notion. The proper notion of humanity when considered in the absolute
sense and apart from discrete particulars (such as Socrates and Plato) is the universal.
Thus, what Brower should have concluded from the passages in In Sent 1 and 2, is not
that ‘two individuals must have their own distinct natures’ as if there was nothing which
they share in common. Rather he should have concluded that two individuals must have
their own distinct natures-instances, or immanent forms; and what they share in common
is the absolutely notion conveyed by the universal.

1.2 The Case for Thomistic Realism
Consideration of the grounds for seeing Aquinas as an Aristotelian Realist has
demonstrated that this characterization is not inevitable. Although he clearly follows
Aristotle in the epistemology of abstraction and in the denial of subsistent forms, neither
of these considerations nor their attending textual grounds gave conclusive reasons to
reduce the existence of forms to subjects and human minds. But if the case for Aquinas as
an Aristotelian Realist is not conclusive, what can be said in favor of the view of
Thomistic Realism?
Recall that the Thomistic Realist account of Aquinas on universals as
distinguished from Platonic and Aristotelian accounts was the following:
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Thomistic Realism =df (i) affirms that forms exist in particulars, and (ii) as
universals in minds that abstract them as well as (iii) independent of minds that
abstract them, but (iv) denies that they subsist individually and separately.
Denial of (i) would be a return to nominalism and conceptualism (and entertaining
Aquinas as a proponent of either one of these is beyond the scope of this paper and
strains plausibility). As noted, Aquinas clearly affirms (ii) and (iv) with traditional
Aristotelian Realism. The critical and distinguishing proposition is located in (iii), that
universals exist independent of minds that abstract them. Does Aquinas affirm this
proposition, and if so, why?
In direct contradiction to the Aristotelian Realist interpretation of Aquinas, it can
be clearly demonstrated that Aquinas affirms that universals exist independent of
particular subjects and the minds that abstract them. This is made evident by considering
both his arguments for universals and his doctrine of Divine Ideas, beginning with the
latter doctrine. Aquinas’ affirmation that universals exist apart from particulars and minds
which have abstracted them is most clearly evident in his doctrine of Divine Ideas. In
question 84, article 5 in the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas is addressing
the question, “Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?”34
His answer begins with a brief recapitulation of Augustine’s teaching on the Divine Ideas
from De doctrina Christiana.35 Here Augustine, “who was imbued with the doctrines of
the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it: and
those thing which he found contrary to faith he amended.”36 And what he amended here
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was the Platonists view that the Ideas subsist of themselves and work as creative
substances. Thus, Aquinas tell us that “for the ideas defended by Plato, [Augustine]
substituted the types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to which
types all things are made in themselves, and are known to the human soul.”37 Aquinas
does not merely report Augustine’s view but uses it as the grounds for his answer to the
question under consideration. Aquinas concludes that although we do not see the eternal
types by directly perceiving God, nevertheless he maintains that “the human soul knows
all things in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we know all things.”38
This knowledge comes instead by way of our own intellectual light, the mind. What is
important for our purposes however is not the epistemology, but the ontology, of the
eternal types. Aquinas recognizes and affirms Augustine’s emendation of the Platonic
Doctrine of Ideas, which principally includes relocating the Ideas. The Ideas are now the
‘types of all creatures existing in the Divine Mind’, which only subsequently come to be
instantiated in particulars, and then lastly are known to the human mind.39 In question 15
of the Prima Pars, he is considering, ‘whether or not there are ideas?’40 Aquinas answers
affirmatively, “It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word
‘Ιδέα’ is in Latin ‘forma.’" Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing
apart from the things themselves.”41 In Prima Pars, question 44, Aquinas also explicitly
embraces this view as his own, stating
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Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This
determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle,
for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the
variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the
types of all things, which types we have called ideas—i.e. exemplar forms
existing in the divine mind.42
And in ST I, 65, 4, Aquinas gives particular attention to both the exemplary and efficient
causal role of forms as eternal types. Here Aquinas contends that the forms of corporeal
things are immediately-efficiently caused by some composite (form/matter) agent (e.g.,
this father produces this son), but these very composites must be referred back to God as
the first cause.43 Thus, even the corporeal forms of bodies when first produced came
immediately from God. In reply to objection 2, he writes that “Forms received into matter
are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but
…still higher [than forms in the angelic intellect], to the types in the Divine intellect, by
which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things.”44 And these forms as types of
things in the mind of God, Aquinas reminds, was held also by Boethius.
In a critical passage, Aquinas gives a specific delineation not only of the locales
of natures, but their interrelationships and dependence. In Quodlibet VIII, I, I, Aquinas
writes:
That which is prior is always the reason for what is posterior, and when the
posterior is removed, the prior remains but not conversely. Thence it is that what
is attributed to a nature according to an absolute consideration is the reason for its
being attributed to some nature according to the existence which it has in a
singular, and not conversely. For Socrates is rational because man is rational, and
not conversely. So if Socrates and Plato did not exist, rationality, would still be
attributable to human nature. Likewise, the divine intellect is the reason for the
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nature absolutely considered and for the nature in singulars. And the nature
absolutely considered and in singulars is the reason for the human understanding
and in some way the measure of it.45
There are a number of critical observations which emerge from this passage. First, the
nature as such is identified with the divine idea. Second, the nature as such is not
dependent on particulars for its truth/reality. Third, the divine mind is the reason for the
nature as such and for the existence of natures in singulars. Fourth, the nature as such,
and the nature in singulars, is the reason or ground for human understanding. This,
therefore, presents the 3-fold structure of forms (in the divine mind, in things, in human
minds). And fifth, the nature as such is (in some way) the measure of the nature as
apprehended in human minds. This correlates with Aquinas’ statement in De Potentia,
“From the very fact that being is ascribed to a quiddity, not only is the quiddity said to be
but also to be created: since before it had being it was nothing, except perhaps in the
intellect of the creator, where it is not a creature but the creating essence.”46
Passages such as these which introduce the role of the divine ideas provide the
material and grounds for the following schema of universals.47 Aquinas affirms:
(i) universalia post rem (‘universals after the thing’) - the concepts of the human
mind posterior to the particulars represented by these concepts.
(ii) universalia in re (‘universals in the thing’) - the universal features of singular
things, inherent in these things themselves.
(iii) universalia ante rem (‘universals before the thing’) - the universal exemplars
in the divine mind.48
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This three-fold schema of the ontology of universals in Aquinas’ thought brings into
sharp relief the inadequacies of an Aristotelian Realist portrayal of Aquinas. The
Aristotelian Realist confines essences/forms to universalia in re and universalia post rem.
But given the doctrine of Divine Ideas, it can be seen that Aquinas also affirms
universalia ante rem. Thus, contra Stump, Baur, McInerny, Orderberg, and others, it is
mistaken to restrict the ontological status of universal forms to particulars and human
minds. Perhaps one might try to salvage the Aristotelian Realist reading by considering
that this view never meant to deny universalia ante rem. In confining universals to
particulars and minds, maybe these authors intended to include the divine mind as a
locale. Perhaps, when the aforementioned Aristotelian Realist interpreters of Aquinas
hold that universals only exist in minds, we might charitably read them as holding that
this includes both human and divine minds. Unfortunately, this re-reading fails to salvage
the view. To see why, recall that the characterization of this standard interpretation given
earlier included two propositions: (i) Aquinas hold that universals only exist in particulars
and in minds that abstract them from the particulars, and that (ii) this is the moderate
realist position. The reason that this standard interpretation is not able to be harmonized
with the schema of universals provided above concerns universalia ante rem. Since
universals before the particular thing exist in the divine mind, knowledge of them is not
gained via abstraction. The divine mind is the cause and source of things, not a passive
recipient. God does not apprehend particular subjects, such as a dog, and then strip away
all the particularizing features to arrive at a knowledge of caninity. Instead, the
48
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universalia ante rem, canine, serves as the exemplary form by which particulars are
brought into existence. However, in contrast, the Aristotelian Realist has universal forms
only existing in minds that have abstracted them from particulars. Thus, an Aristotelian
Realist reading of Aquinas cannot be sustained in light of his doctrine of divine ideas and
the reality of universalia ante rem.
Before moving on it is important to evaluate both the Via Quarta and the critical
inference from goods to the universal Good, and see why Aquinas would affirm the
existence of universal ideas in the divine mind. On one hand, this can be seen simply as a
theological entailment given his views concerning the divine nature and activity. In
Summa Theologiae I, 44,
Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This
determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle,
for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the
variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the
types of all things, which types we have called ideas—i.e. exemplar forms
existing in the divine mind.49
Since God is the ultimate cause of all things, and since God possesses wisdom and
knowledge, it follows that God would use these perfections in creating. To create using
knowledge would be to impart forms and principles which preexist in the divine mind to
the particular subjects being made. But this entails that the forms and principles preexist
in the divine mind, and thus that universals exist independent of particulars and minds
that abstract them, giving us a doctrine of divine ideas. Although this rough sketch of a
theological justification for positing universalia ante rem provides a sound justification, it
presupposes and begins with a theological metaphysic. If this is the only way to ground
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affirmation of universalia ante rem, then both the Via Quarta in general and the
Eudaimonological Argument in particular are in jeopardy; for they would rely on
assumptions which can only be justified given the very thing they are attempting to
demonstrate. In fact, Aquinas does not rely solely on the theological justification for
affirming universalia ante rem, but instead he provides two independent arguments, both
of which do not presuppose, but conclude to, God’s existence.

1.3 Aquinas’ Argument for Universals
I will here briefly summarize Aquinas’ grounds for affirming the existence of
universals (apart from theological presuppositions), though I will not attempt to defend or
extend these two arguments. It is enough to show that a movement from particulars to
universals is present within the Thomistic and Neoscholastic tradition. The first argument
for Universals which Aquinas affirms is Plato’s traditional ‘One Over Many’ argument as
Aristotle named it.50 In Plato’s Republic Socrates states that “We are in the habit of
assuming one Form for each set of many things to which we give the same name.”51 That
is, multiple individuals exhibit a common feature or admit of common predication, then
this is accounted for by reference to some underlying form or essence which the multiples
exhibit or instantiate. Two passages illustrate Aquinas’ use of the argument. In De
Potentia, chapter 3, article 5 Aquinas is discussing the question of ‘whether there can be
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anything that is not created by God’.52 However, he begins by addressing the topic of
universals (and universal causes), and then he gives three arguments for a universal cause
of being. The first argument utilizes the premise, which Aquinas directly attributes to
Plato, that prior to every multitude there must be some unity, not only in number but in
the nature of things. Aquinas develops the claim, arguing
If something is found to be common to many things, it is necessary that it be
caused in them by some one cause. For it is not possible that that [common
feature] belongs in common to each one in itself, since each one, according to
what it is in itself, is distinct from the others , and a diversity of causes would
produce diverse effects.53
He then utilizes this principle to address universal being. What is important here is that
Aquinas is beginning with common predication of a feature to multiple particulars (i.e.,
the many) and inferring a formal unity (i.e., the one). Of course, as seen above, further
analysis will demonstrate that this formal unity cannot subsist in separate existence. Yet,
this ontological proscription against subsistent form does not preclude Aquinas from
inferring the one from the many. To the point, in On Being and Essence¸ Aquinas argues
In singular things [a nature] has a multiple existence in accord with the diversity
of these singular things; yet the existence of none of these things belongs to the
nature considered in itself, i.e., absolutely. For it is false to say that the nature of
man, as such, has existence in this singular thing; because if existence in this
singular thing belonged to man as man, man would never exist outside this
singular thing. Similarly, if it belonged to man as man not to exist in this singular
thing, man would never exist in it. But it is true to say that it does not belong to
man as man to exist in this or that singular thing, or in the soul. …and it is the
nature so considered which is predicated of all individuals.54
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Here Aquinas is considering the nature considered absolutely (simply as the form itself).
He reasons that none of the particulars (i.e., ‘singular things’), nor its apprehension in the
mind (‘in the soul’) is sufficient to account for the nature considered absolutely. Singular
things (which share some feature in common) require reference to the ‘nature considered
in itself’ (primam considerationem) or ‘absolutely’ (absolutam). Garrigou similarly
argues that “If the same note is found in various beings, it is impossible that each should
possess it in its own right. …and thus receives it from another that does possess it in its
own right.”55 Although Aquinas eschews the inference to subsistent, separated Forms, he
does not deny and in fact utilizes the inference from multiple particulars to a single
universal form; and it is a universal form that ontologically precedes both the mind’s
abstraction and the instantiation in particulars as a universalia ante rem.
The second argument for Universals which Aquinas affirms is the found in his
analysis of degreed perfections. When considering the existence of varying degrees of
any positive perfection Aquinas concludes that this variance entails the existence of the
full perfection. And as O’Rourke notes, “the existence of varying degrees of perfection
merely adds an extra dimension to the phenomenon of the one and the many, of
multiplicity and unity in the universe.”56 Thus, for example, in De Potentia 3, 5 Aquinas
is once again considering the possibility of a universal cause. His second argument for
this conclusion runs as follows: “whenever something is found to be in several things by
participation in various degrees, it must be derived from that one in which it exists most
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perfectly.”57 Aquinas states that the Via Quarta begins with “the gradation to be found in
things” (ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur).58 Here he argues, “Among beings there
are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are
predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways
something which is the maximum.”59 As Holloway explains Aquinas’ reasoning here,
the argument consists in showing that degrees of more or less of the same
perfection depend for their intelligibility upon the maximum degree of that
perfection. Here the argument is concerned directly and explicitly with exemplary
causality (the cause of intelligibility of these degrees of perfection).60
In this second argument for universals it isn’t accounting for multiplicity but degreed
approximation and variance. The intelligibility of varying degrees of a single but
common feature requires a standard which perfectly possesses the feature. Garrigou
recognizes this principle as critical to the Via Quarta and affirms it, writing, “When a
perfection is found in various degrees, it must be explained by a being which is that very
perfection.”61
An additional consideration rarely factored into identifying Aquinas’ view of
universals and his version of realism is his doctrine of natural law. Aquinas’ normative
and metaethics falls squarely in line with a traditional Natural Law Theory.62 On this
account, a general notion of metaphysical goodness underlies the analysis of the moral
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good.63 Goodness is understood teleologically, where good is the realization of a final
end. As Aquinas notes, “the end is the measure of things ordered to the end” (or, “…the
rule of whatever is ordained to the end”).64 A thing’s form (nature/essence) entails certain
final causes or natural ends. It is the realizing of those particular and distinctive final
causes or natural ends which constitutes the good for any given thing.65 The distinctive
form of a thing will entail distinctive natural ends and thus require distinctive forms of
fulfillment. The moral good comes about when rational and volitional faculties are used
to realize those natural ends; e.g., when persons intellectually grasp what is good given
their nature and freely choose to pursue it.66 As Aquinas explains, “all those things to
which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good,
and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of
avoidance.”67 Thus, human beings can exhibit varying degrees (‘more or less’) of
goodness or evil insofar as they willingly depart from the ends given by their nature.
In standard presentations of Aquinas’ moral philosophy, Natural Law is
metaphysically linked with Eternal Law (lex aeterna).68 The eternal law, for Aquinas, is
that rational plan by which everything is ordered,69 while the natural law is the distinctive
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way that human beings participate in the eternal law.70 As Eleonore Stump notes, natural
law is a “certain participation on the part of a rational creature in God’s eternal law”,
which is “the ordering in God’s mind of created things in the world.”71 The divine
intellect knows the nature of things and the divine will creates in accordance with this
knowledge.
What all of this entails, however, is that for Aquinas’ account of natural law the
forms (natures/essences) of particular things in the world are not ontologically reducible
to particulars and the mind’s abstracting of them. The formal causes of particular things
which entail the natural ends and thus their degree of goodness insofar as these ends are
realized, are rooted in the eternal law. Thus, Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory requires
universalia ante rem. Although the implications for Aquinas view on eternal law for his
doctrine of universals is rarely recognized, Anthony Lisska’s analytic reconstruction of
Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory makes this connection. Lisska observes,
…for Aquinas, eternal law functions as an ontological principle of explanation.
Eternal law plays a role similar to what Plato attempted in his ontology through
the world of the Forms. …In Aquinas’s ontology, one must take the world of the
Forms schematically and place it into the divine mind. …What Aquinas meant by
eternal law is the set of archetypes, analogous to the world of Forms, which are
found as the divine ideas in God’s mind.72
What this analysis of Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory entails is that the version of moderate
realism characterized by McInerny and others which limits forms to particulars and
abstracted in minds does not cohere with Aquinas’ doctrine of Eternal Law.
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It should be seen then that the form of realism that Aquinas affirms does not
coincide with either a Platonic or Aristotelian Realism. With Aristotelian Realism,
Aquinas’ position concerning universals affirms that forms exist in particulars, and as
universals in minds that abstract them. However, given his continuance of the
Augustinian doctrine of divine ideas, he also holds that forms exist independent of minds
that abstract them, as universalia ante rem. Can such a view still be considered a version
of moderate realism? Yes, if one characterizes moderate realism (rightly so) as the
rejection of separate and subsistent forms existing in toto. As we have seen, contra
Platonic Realism he denies that they subsist individually and separately. Nevertheless,
Aquinas offers a number of reasons for affirming universalia ante rem, reasons which do
not immediately presuppose a theological framework. First, he utilizes the Platonic ‘One
Over Many’ argument where multiple individuals exhibiting a common feature or
admitting of common predication is accounted for by reference to some underlying form
or essence, which ontologically precedes the particulars and the form abstracted by the
mind. The second argument for universalia ante rem which Aquinas affirms emerges
from consideration of the existence of varying degrees of any positive perfection which
entails the existence of the full perfection as the standard to which the variance is
grounded. This second argument is further demonstrated and strengthened when
considering Aquinas’ account of the natural law. The formal natures of particular things
entail natural ends, and their degree of goodness is found in the extent to which these
ends are realized. The natural law account of formal and final causality is ultimately
rooted in the eternal law as the archetypal plan for particular subjects existing in the
divine mind. What these arguments, and the Thomistic Realism they entail suggest is that
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the version of moderate realism characterized as Aristotelian fails to captures Aquinas’
view of universals. Further, and most importantly for Eudaimonological Argument,
Thomistic Realism allows for the movement from particular instances of goods (say) to
the universal Goodness; this universal construed as something existing independent of
those particulars and as a mere mental abstraction. Given that both versions of Garrigou’s
EA relied on this inferential movement, Thomistic Realism demonstrates that the EA can
coherently fit within the thought of Aquinas and the ensuing Scholastic tradition insofar
as it recognizes this aspect of his thought. Therefore, we can conclude that moderate
realism does not present a defeater to Eudaimonological Arguments as they have been
formulated from the work of Garrigou-Lagrange.

2. Final Causality and the Eudaimonological Argument
Having addressed issues arising from the role of formal causality in the
Eudaimonological Argument and the objection from moderate realism, a second set of
concerns arises when considering the role of final causality in the Eudaimonological
Argument. Two particular problems come to the fore in this regard. I will seek to further
elucidate these two problems as they concern the EA, addressing each one in turn. The
first problem comes from challenges posed to the inference to a single, ultimate end for
all human beings. The second problem comes from the contention that appeals to final
causality necessarily presuppose God’s existence; and thus the use of finality in the EA
makes it structurally invalid. If either of these two types of problems concerning final
causality succeeds, the EA must be deemed unsound. Let us take a closer look at these
problems and consider how they might be addressed.
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2.1 The Problem of Inferring a Single, Ultimate End
The first problem arising from final causality as applied to the EA is aimed at the
inference to a single, ultimate end for human beings. As analyzed in Chapter 2 of this
dissertation, Aquinas’ ‘Treatise on Happiness’ in Summa Theologiae, prima secundae,
seeks to establish that there is an ultimate end to human life from an analysis of human
agency.73 In so doing his method resembles Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,
wherein Aristotle reasons, “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and
pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been
declared to be that at which all things aim.”74 Aquinas similarly argues in the following
manner. Since all agents act for ends,75 the structure of human acts is an essentially
ordered series of means-ends which must ultimate terminate in an ultimate end sought for
its own sake.76 Then Aquinas argues that this ultimate end is one and the same for all
human beings: their perfection which brings all their desires to rest.77 Garrigou’s standard
Eudaimonological Argument utilizes this characterization of the ultimate human end to
establish premise (2) the human will naturally desires a universal, perfect Good.
However, some have protested that the inference to a single, ultimate end is
fallacious or unwarranted for a variety of reasons. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach
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have claimed that this inference involves an illicit quantifier shift that renders it invalid.78
Anscombe identifies the problem in this way,
The old arguments were designed to show that the chain [of human actions] could
not go on forever; they pass us by, because we are not inclined to think it must
even begin; and it can surely stop where it stops, no need for it to stop at a
purpose that looks intrinsically final, one and the same for all actions. In fact there
appears to be an illicit transition in Aristotle, from ‘all chains must stop
somewhere’ to ‘there is somewhere where all chains must stop.’79
A quantifier shift fallacy occurs when the quantifiers of a series of statements (e.g.,
‘some’ and ‘every’) are erroneously transposed; they shift positions in the first and
second statement. On this charge, the fallacy occurs from concluding that there is one
good at which everything aims from the fact that everything aims at some good.
Analogously, it would be fallacious to infer that since every object has a shape, there
must be one single shape that every object has. Anthony Kenny alleges that even if
Aristotle can evade this fallacy, “it entrapped some of his followers, notably Aquinas
(S.T. Ia IIae, I, 4-6).”80 Does the inference to a single, ultimate end exhibit a fallacious
inference and does this undermine the standard Eudaimonological Argument?
This charge against Aristotle and Aquinas has not gone unaddressed, and a
number of proposed solutions have been offered. First, in Michael Pakaluk’s analysis of
book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, what Aristotle is offering is not an argument to a
single good but identifying the essential nature of goodness. Pakaluk explains,
What Aristotle wishes to claim, in effect, is that ‘good’ should be defined as
‘aimed at.’ To be a good is to be a goal (or an ‘end’). To confirm that this is his
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purpose, note that the rest of the chapter presupposes this identification. …His
introductory lines are designed not to give a grand argument, but to replace talk of
goods with talk of goals.81
What this reading entails is that Aristotle, and Aquinas following him, is seeking to
establish not that there is some single highest particular, but instead provide a criterion or
condition that would suffice to establish such an ultimate good.82 If there is such an
ultimate good it must be that which is desirable for its own sake, with all other goods
subordinated to it. But this is not the only resolution to the alleged quantifier shift fallacy
from the desire for goods to a good of all desires. David Oderberg also suggests that this
is not Aristotle’ (and by extension Aquinas’) argument.83 Oderberg raises a parallel
inference to illustrate the difference:
Every material object has some colour; therefore, there is some property, namely
being coloured, that every material object has.84
Given this parallel, Aristotle’s argument is that since every activity aims at some good,
there is a property of goodness at which all things aim. An analysis of human action and
practical reason yields the recognition of a single property which serves as the object of
action. When developed this analysis of practical reason is sometimes labeled as the
‘guise of the good’ thesis; namely, that whenever we act we necessarily do so for the sake
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of something we take to be good in some way (whether it is actually in fact good or not
would be a secondary matter).85
Careful attention to Aquinas’ argument in the ‘Treatise on Happiness’, however,
demonstrates that acquitting Aquinas of the charge illicit quantifier shift doesn’t depend
on these interpretive moves regarding Aristotle’s opening of the Nicomachean Ethics.
For, as noted in the previous chapter, Aquinas does not make the simple inference from a
good sought as an end in itself to a single good that all seek. Instead, Aquinas develops
three independent arguments which seek to establish that there is a single, ultimate end
for all human beings: (i) the argument from natural perfection; (ii) the analogical
argument from rational first principles; and (iii) and argument from the common genus of
human action.86 Whatever assessment one might have of these arguments, they make
evident that Aquinas has attempted to move from particular ends to an ultimate end by a
variety of considerations and principles rather than a simple and illicit shift in quantifying
some goods to one good.
There is one additional and critically important response to the objection from
using mediate ends and particular goods to rising to an ultimate end and final good that
must be brought to bear on the discussion. However, before so doing, introducing another
formulation and further development of this objection is in order. The work of New
Natural Law Theorists such as Robert George, Germain Grisez, and Christopher
Tollefsen holds to an incommensurability thesis regarding final goods for human beings
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(e.g., there are multiple final goods for human beings, but that they cannot be
hierarchically arranged or prioritized).87 For example, John Grisez writes,
Yet, considered precisely as the ultimate reasons for acting, the whole set of basic
goods does not constitute a hierarchy. Rather as ultimate reasons for acting, they
are incommensurable: neither equally good nor more or less good than one
another. For, as reasons for which there are no further reasons, the basic human
goods are irreducible; and as pertaining to diverse categories, they are good in
diverse ways.88
This suggests that the inference to an ultimate end and final good is subject to the
objection from the incommensurability of human goods; namely, that since natural
human goods cannot be arranged hierarchically, there can be no extrapolation to a single,
highest good. This New Natural Law thesis has not gone without significant challenges.
That it runs at odds with the traditional Natural Law Theory as developed by Aquinas,
Thomists, and Scholastics is easily demonstrable. On the traditional view, the morality of
human actions is ultimately characterized by the rational ordering of goods to which we
are inclined by our natures/essences.89 As Aquinas writes, “Reason was given to man that
he might ensue those things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in
accordance with the order of reason.”90 The function of practical reason is to make the
evaluative comparisons between various ends and to properly order them.91 Thus, as
Daniel McInerny contends,
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the incommensurability thesis runs counter to…the ‘neo-scholastic’ [and]
Thomistic understanding that the human good exists naturally as a hierarchical
arrangement…in which goods are ordered both to one another and to the
absolutely ultimate end. …non-arbitrary choices between contending substantial,
or intrinsically valuable, goods are only possible when one of the goods is seen
either as a necessary or expedient means for the attainment of another and
intrinsically more valuable good.92
What the incommensurability thesis undermines is the grounds for ordering goods and
thus for making decisions between competing goods, resulting in the moral equivalency
of all pursuits.
Whatever the shortcomings (or strengths) of the incommensurability thesis, in the
end its plausibility does not serve to defeat the Eudaimonological Argument. The
inability of the New Natural Law Theory and its incommensurability thesis to undercut
the standard Eudaimonological Argument is made evident by the fact that the ThomisticGarrigou formulation can allow for such a plenary distribution of basic goods. The
standard EA is compatible with this thesis for it only requires that (i) natural desires have
corresponding goods, (ii) the intellect perceives a universal good, (iii) desires emerge
from perceived goods, and (iv) perfection or happiness requires satiation of natural
desires. Each of these claims is consistent with the assumption that the range of basic
goods admits no prioritization or standard of ranking. As long as human nature desires a
universal, infinite good, final causality suggests that such a desire has a corresponding
referent, irrespective of how or if it may be ranked among others. Moreover, and
returning to the earlier objection concerning the conclusion to an ultimate end arising
from the nature of human action and practical reason, the EA can also grant this objection
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while remaining essentially sound. Theses (i)-(iv) do not specifically require that we can
deduce a single, ultimate end for human beings from the particular end driven nature of
action. All that the EA requires is that human nature does in fact seek a perfect, universal
good; and does so because of the universal reach of the intellect. Whether or not the
natural desire for a universal good can be reached via an analysis of desires for lower or
basic goods, or the structure of human action itself, would not affect the argument.
Therefore, objections from the quantifier shift, the impossibility of inferring a single,
ultimate end, and the incommensurability of basic goods should not be seen as successful
defeaters to the standard Eudaimonological Argument as offered by Garrigou and
formalized in this work.

2.2 The Problem of Final Causality and Theistic Assumption
While the use of final causality and a teleological view of human action and
nature may avoid these aforementioned objections, there is one repeated and persistent
problem pertaining to final causation that, if successful, completely undermines the
Eudaimonological Argument. This objection maintains, in essence, that appeals to such
teleology are vacuous apart from theological presuppositions; and from this it follows
that the standard Eudaimonological Argument is an extended exercise in petitio principii
– assuming in the premises the very conclusion the argument is attempting to
demonstrate. Garrigou is not unaware of this type of objection to the argument he is
developing. He notes that “certain theologians maintain that the principle, ‘the desire of

176

nature cannot be purposeless,’ is not certain for us except and until we have demonstrated
that our nature is the work, not of chance, but of an intelligent and good God.”93
To see the force of this problem, consider again the standard ‘Expanded 4th Way
EA’ as expounded in chapter two of this dissertation. This formulation of the argument
highlighted the ‘correspondence thesis’ as the critical first premise: (1) Natural desires
correspond to real goods. It was there further demonstrated that this premise critically
relies on the doctrine of final causality. In Le Realisme Du Principe de Finalite, Garrigou
brings this dependence to the forefront as he notes that “this argument is made explicit by
the principle of finality: every agent acts of an end.”94 And, on Garrigou’s view, final
causality entails objective correlates for natural desires. If an object, good, or state of
affairs is not actual or realizable, then the inclination would not be properly so directed or
aimed. In other words, the principle of finality entails not only that natural desires are
inherently directed, but further, in order to be so directed, there must be an actually
existing corresponding object, good, or state of affairs (thus, the ‘correspondence thesis’).
Now, given the EA’s reliance on final causality, a set of concerns comes to the fore even
from within the broader Thomistic and Neoscholastic tradition. The prominent 20th
century Cardinal Désiré-Joseph Mercier well-articulates this concern:
Granted that human nature is not vitiated by some radical flaw, undoubtedly God
must exist as the end of its higher activities. But can we postulate that our nature
is so made? Is it not precisely because it is God who made it that we know it is a
perfect production? How, in consequence, can we affirm the existence of God by
basing it on the needs of our nature? It is true we can say that, if God did not
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exist, man alone of all creatures would be irremediably unhappy. …why have we
need of God as the satisfaction of our nature except because He is necessary as an
explanation of the world?95
The teleological view of human nature required for the standard Eudaimonological
Argument to get off the ground is intelligible, according to Mercier, only within explicit
theological presuppositions. The view that finality could not be recognized or
demonstrated through natural reason can be traced back to William of Ockham. He
claimed that
someone who is just following natural reason would claim that the question ‘For
what reason?’ is inappropriate in the ask of natural actions. For he would maintain
that it is no real question to ask for what reason a fire is generated; rather, this
question is appropriate only in the case of voluntary actions.96
Such a recognition of the reasons for natural agents acting, according to Ockham, could
only come from divine revelation. He contests, “If I accepted no authority [i.e. of the
truth of faith], I would claim that it cannot be proved either from propositions known per
se or from experience that every effect has a final cause…For it cannot be sufficiently
proved that every effect has a final cause.”97
Robert Pasnau similarly sees Aquinas’ final causality as critically dependent on
his theistic assumptions, which precludes using teleology as grounds apart from those
assumptions. This would make the EA fatally dependent on a comprehensive natural
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teleology that is no longer plausible.98 Consider Pasnau’s critique of Aquinas’ argument
for immortality, which utilizes a parallel to premise (1) of the standard EA. In
considering ‘whether the human soul is incorruptible’, Aquinas argues, “everything that
has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain.
Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible” (emphasis added).99 But, Pasnau
responds, this argument depends on strong teleological assumptions that are no longer
plausible.100 Pasnau explains, however, that Aquinas is committed to final causation
because he thinks that nature is the work of a governing intelligence, without which it
could not stand.101 Pasnau’s assessment in this regard rests, in part, on his analysis of the
structure of natural ends. He writes, “Ends exert their seemingly magical backward
influence only through mind; if nature does not act according to the divine plan, then
there is no genuine acting for ends, no genuine teleology in nature.”102 Thus, when he
characterizes Aquinas’ account of the perfected happiness, it is one that necessarily
presupposes God’s existence as independently demonstrated.103 Pasnau is not alone in
this; Mark C. Murphy concurs. In his explication of the Natural Law and whether the
content of the good includes God, he writes,
If there is a being that is the most fundamental explanatory principle of all, …then
of course it will be good for human to know that being. …if there is a being of
98
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perfect knowledge and goodness, …then of course it will be good for humans to
be in friendship with that being. These accounts of the truth of the propositions it
is part of the human good to know God and it is part of the human good to be
friends with God do not even entail God’s existence, so God’s existence can
hardly be asserted by those accounts.104
What the analysis of Mercier, Pasnau, and Murphy demonstrate is that if final causality
and the teleological view of human nature necessarily rely on theistic assumptions, then
any attempt to utilize these tenets to demonstrate God’s existence will fallaciously beg
the question.105 Although, as noted in chapter 2 of this dissertation, Garrigou and others
often work from theological assumptions in developing accounts of human happiness and
perfection, the human quest for perfection can be carried out independent of such
assumptions and will yield grounds for affirming God’s existence. But if those such as
Mercier, Pasnau, and Murphy are correct, this option is not left open.
What can be said in way of response to this challenge posed to the standard
Eudaimonological Argument? Addressing this challenge raises an important set of issues
regarding final causation that I will explore at some length. However, before so doing, a
couple preliminary responses are in order. First, to require theological knowledge before
identifying teleology is directly at odds with the method Aquinas uses if the Via Quinta,
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so it can hardly be said to represent the traditional Thomist or broader Scholastic
position. As John Wippel explains in his exposition of the Via Quinta,
Thomas’s text makes it clear that he really has in mind an argument based on final
causality in nature. …this argument begins with something which Thomas regards
as evident to us from the world of everyday experience. Natural bodies, that is to
say, things which are equipped with their own natures but lack the power of
cognition, act for the sake of an end.106
Indeed, as Christopher Martin notes in his extended analysis of the Via Quinta, Aquinas
thinks it almost unquestionable that particular things act for an end.107 Instead, what is
more difficult to establish “is the step from the unconscious end-directedness which we
see all around us to the conscious end-directedness which he needs to assert if he is to
prove the existence of God.”108 In fact, even those such as Mercier who objected to the
appeal to final causality for the EA, make parallel appeals to the obviousness of finality
and order in developing their own formulations of the Via Quinta. Mercier affirms, “that
there is order in the universe is abundantly manifest,” and he goes on to delineate four
distinct levels or classes of order to underscore its ubiquity.109 And Mercier is not here
engaging in theological explanation of the world taking God’s existence for granted; he is
developing an argument in natural theology wherein the presence of final causality is
taken as his premise.110

106

Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 480.

107

Martin, Thomas Aquinas, 180.

108

Ibid.

109

Mercier, A Manual Of Modern Scholastic Philosophy Cardinal Mercier, II:49–50.

110

Ibid., II:49–54; Similarly, Baschab argued that the EA was inadequate and inconclusive
because it depended on teleological assumptions which he claimed were unjustified apart from theological
grounding, offers his own teleological argument. He contends, "Of all the arguments for the existence of
God, the most obvious as well as the most forceful is the teleological. Its appeal is direct and universal. It
solid foundation is the manifest order in the universes perceptible even to the untrained eye and
undeveloped mind." Baschab, A Manual of Neo-Scholastic Philosophy, 405–406.

181

Secondly, there are prominent examples of scholars who recognized and affirmed
teleology while holding to philosophical naturalism or at least holding that teleology
didn’t have theistic presuppositions or implications. Although Aristotle is a type of theist
affirming an Unmoved Mover, he sees no particular relationship between the final
causality intrinsic to natural substances and this ultimate Being. In Metaphysics XII, even
while recognizing the teleology of the universe as a whole,111 he does not end ‘with a
positive account, but with a criticism of his predecessors who have advanced an account
of an extrinsic cause of the cosmos.”112 On Aristotle’s views, final causality did not
derive from a divine source.113 Philippa Foot in Natural Goodness, sets out to establish a
natural normativity based on an analysis of natural kinds as teleological Aristotelian
categoricals and applies this account to human beings.114 However, Foot’s teleology and
ensuing moral realism is defended along naturalist lines.115 She is prepared to recognize
inherent final causation that not only doesn’t require a theistic metaphysics, but denies
it.116

111

Aristotle, Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1, bk. Metaphysics XII (Lambda).

112

Monte Ransome Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford : Oxford ; New York: Clarendon
Press, 2006), 271–286; see also, Stephen Menn, “Aristotle’s Theology,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Aristotle, ed. Christopher Shields (Oxford University Press, USA, 2012), 444–448.
113

Edward Feser, “Teleology: A Shopper’s Guide,” Philosophia Christi 12, no. 1 (2010): 148. It
should be noted here, that the form of moderate realism labeled ‘Aristotelian’ in the previous section,
which Feser identified with Aquinas’ views is something he later appears to shift. In the work cited here,
Feser identifies ‘Scholastic Realism’ as a tertium quid between Platonic and Aristotelian Realism, and
identifies it with Aquinas. The ‘Scholastic Realism’ therein expressed coincides with the ‘Thomistic
Realism’ defined in this dissertation.
114

Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness, 1st ed. (Oxford (UK): Clarendon Press, 2003), chaps. 2, 4.

115

Ibid., 5.

116

For another example of a contemporary philosopher who acknowledges teleology but denies
any theistic implications, see Thomas Nagel, Mind & Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian
Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, 1st edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

182

For the third response to the objection under consideration, it must be noted, as
chapter 2 demonstrated, that Garrigou actually offers a series of independent arguments
in support of premise (2) and its appeal to finality; none of which relied on theological
presuppositions.117 First, Garrigou provided an a posteriori, inductive consideration to
justify the correspondence between natural desires and goods. Garrigou suggests that
experience shows that the natural desires of lower beings are not in vain.118 Second,
Garrigou advanced the notion of finality as a self-evident principle. He explains, “[n]ow
the end is precisely that determinate good to which the act of the agent or the motion of
the mobile object is directed. This principle [is] self-evident to one who understands the
meaning of the words agent and end.”119 Third, his primary consideration in support of
the principle of finality, developed from an argument by Aquinas, seeks to
metaphysically link efficient and final causality. Garrigou explains, “whoever recognizes
the principle of efficient causality, must also recognize the principle of finality, because
there can be no efficiency, tendency, action, or passion without purpose.”120 Final
causality is taken to be the overarching explanation for the totality of causal analysis, as it
is the cause of all causes; ultimately linking it to the Principle of Sufficient Reason.121
While an assessment of these justifications is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and
aside from their plausibility, what they clearly demonstrate is that the standard
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Eudaimonological Argument need not make appeal to God’s existence prior to
motivating its premises. Instead, Garrigou’s case rests on his broader metaphysics: the
first principles and notions, derived from the intellect’s awareness of being,
systematically delineated and defended against various objections and metaphysical
alternatives. In point of this fact, in Garrigou’s magnum opus and principal defense of
God’s existence consisting of just under 400 pages, the first 241 pages are given to the
systematic and extended defense of the ontological and transcendental validity of the first
principles before arguments for God’s existence are even broached.122 As Garrigou
himself observes,
Perhaps some may be surprised that so many pages of this book are taken up with
the abstractive intuition of intelligible being and of the first laws of beings. The
reason is that it seems to us impossible to reply to the current objections against
the traditional proofs for the existence of God, without recurring to these
preliminary fundamentals of general metaphysics concerning being, identity,
becoming, multiple, substance, causality, and finality.123
Whether or not Garrigou’s case for this philosophical grounding and his argument for
final causality are successful is another question and open for dispute. However, what
they demonstrably exhibit is the dubious nature of the claim that final causality is only
grounded in explicit theological presuppositions.
One last response to the objection that the standard Eudaimonological Argument
begs the question is to offer an ontological analysis of finality which makes its immediate
and direct recognition plausible. This analysis and its implication for recognizing final
causality (apart from theological presuppositions) derives from the scholastic distinction
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between extrinsic and intrinsic finality.124 However, in order to get clear on this
distinction, we must return to the consideration of formal causation on a Thomistic
Realist view addressed in the first section of this chapter. What the analysis in the first
section demonstrated is the two-fold nature of forms. Forms, as natures or essences, can
be both immanent to a particular as well as universal ante rem in the mind of God. This
yields the distinction between intrinsic vs. extrinsic formal causes, where the intrinsic
formal cause is the nature or essence present within a particular joined with a parcel of
matter and the extrinsic formal cause is the exemplary idea of the form in its universal
mode.125 As Aquinas notes, “a formal cause… [can be] either inherent or exemplar.”126
And detailing the relation between the two, Aquinas writes,
Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the
same type, as the Platonists held, but …to the types in the Divine intellect, by
which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to
be brought by movement into act.127
The previous section of this chapter focused on universals and thus extrinsic formality.
However, in order to address the problem of recognizing final causality, the focus here
turns to the intrinsic formal cause.
Since all particular subjects possess immanent forms, this entails that the
underlying principles are inherent to the thing itself. This is what makes something a
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natural substance as opposed to an artifact.128 Natural substances have characteristic
activities which derive from something intrinsic to them. As Aristotle explains, “The
nature of a thing, then, is a certain principle and cause of change and stability in the thing,
and it is directly present in it – which is to say that it is present in its own right and not
coincidentally.”129 Whereas with all products (of human art), “none of them intrinsically
contains the source of its own production.”130 Take the difference between a tree and a
wooden chair. A tree is a natural substance whereas the wooden chair is a kind of artifact.
The parts of the tree have an inherent propensity to function coordinately, allowing it to
metabolize, grow, reproduce, etc. In contrast, the parts of the chair have no inherent
tendency to function coordinately; they must be arranged to do so by an extrinsic source
(i.e., a carpenter). Whereas the tree possesses immanent constitutive principles that are
due to its inherent substantial form, “any ordinary artifact is configured only with an
accidental form. The production of an artifact…brings together already existing
things…which in the new composite still remain the things they were before being
conjoined.”131
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Now, as already noted, on Aquinas’ view final causes follow from formal causes;
that is, a thing’s nature determines the ends appropriate to it. Since Rachel has a human
nature, knowledge and friendship constitute proper ends for her; and since some specific
oak has the nature of a tree, photosynthesizing light and absorbing nutrients from the
ground are proper ends for it. What follows from this is that since forms are inherent to
particular subjects, so are their natural ends. That is, because natural substances have
intrinsic formal causes, they also possess intrinsic final causes (i.e., intrinsic finality). As
Peter Coffey explains,
Scholastic philosophers…following the thought of Aristotle, consider that every
agency in the universe is endowed with an intrinsic principle of finality which
constantly directs its activities towards the realization of a perfection which is
proper to it and which constitutes its intrinsic end.132
The intrinsic final causes are what account for the natural tendencies and orientations
towards certain ends. Teleology is ‘built in’ to things possessing intrinsic forms, whereas
things like artifacts have teleology imposed ‘from the outside’ (i.e., extrinsic finality).133
For artifacts, “those tendencies are…there only insofar as an artificer has put them
there.”134 A defining characteristic of a substantial form is that it allows for properties
and causal powers that are irreducible to the parts of a particular thing.135 Those causal
powers represent the tendencies towards actualization, which are a thing’s natural ends.
Thus, since Rachel has a human nature in virtue of an immanent substantial form, she has
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powers of rationality which are not reducible to any parts (e.g., neuronal cells), and the
exercising of those rational powers (through reasoning and apprehending truth, c-fiber
firings, etc.) are her natural ends. Therefore, her natural ends (i.e., her teleology) are
inherent to her; not something imposed from ‘the outside’. An extrinsic universal finality
would be the overarching and tectonic principles which govern the universe. The
emphasis on intrinsic finality isn’t to deny, of course, the existence of universal extrinsic
teleology. Rather this is to distinguish between immediate, proximate, and distal sources
of teleology. Thomas Gilby recognizes the implications of Aquinas general metaphysics
as it relates to distinguishing what I have identified here as intrinsic finality from
universal extrinsic finality. He writes, on “…[Aquinas’] pluralist metaphysics…there are
real beings distinct from the subsistent being of God, real secondary principal causes
distinct from the First Cause, and real ends distinct from the ultimate ends.”
Where does all of this lead us with respect to the objection from Mercier, Pasnau,
and others that the final causation necessary for the success of the EA presupposes God’s
existence and thus entails that the EA begs the question? What the foregoing analysis of
immanent form and thus immanent teleology provides is the possibility of recognizing a
localized or particularized teleology inherent to particular substances apart from
assuming a comprehensive and theologically grounded teleology at the outset. If forms
are intrinsic to particular subjects, and since natural ends follow formal causes, then the
natural ends are intrinsic to particular subjects. Now, if natural ends are intrinsic to
particular subjects, then they are capable, per hypothesi, of being apprehended by the
mind in its recognition of the particular subject itself; and these intrinsic ends are capable
of apprehension apart from universal ultimate ends. If formal and final causality are
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immanent to particular subjects, then we can recognize that, say, exercising our rational
faculties for the sake of apprehending truth is a proper end given our human nature; and
we can do so without needing recourse to an overarching theological framework. At the
outset of his From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again, a defense of final causality in a
post-Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution milieu, Étienne Gilson relies on this very
division between finality and theology. He explains,
The notion of final causality has not been treated kindly. One of the principal
reasons for the hostility toward it is its long association with the notions of a
creator God and providence. …The object of the present essay is not to make of
final causality a scientific notion, which it is not, but to show that it is a
philosophical inevitability and, consequently, a constant of biophilosophy, or
philosophy of life. It is not, then, a question of theology. If there is teleology in
nature, the theologian has a right to rely on this fact in order to draw from it the
consequences which, in his eyes, proceed from it concerning the existence of
God. But the existence of teleology in the universe is the object of a properly
philosophical reflection, which has no other goal than to confirm or invalidate the
reality of it.136
Gilson’s project in this work relies solely on philosophical reflection in his attempt to
recover the embedded purposiveness of things in the world.
What would preclude recognition of immanent teleology? Edward Feser,
concurring with Gilson’s analysis, claims that it was the advent of mechanism and
scientism which sought to displace formal and final causality while retaining truncated
accounts of efficient and material causality.137 What this resulted in was a surprising
concurrence between many theists and naturalists regarding the basic conception of the
physical world. As Feser explains,
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Modern philosophers have almost universally embraced this [mechanistic]
conception of scientific explanation. They have disagreed about whether an
appeal to irreducible teleology conceived of as something extrinsic to the material
world ought to supplement the mechanistic explanations of empirical science.
Contemporary naturalists deny that any such appeal can be justified. By contrast,
early modern thinkers like Boyle and Newton regarded an appeal to extrinsic
teleology—in particular, to God’s intentions and activity as artificer of the natural
world—as an essential capstone to the edifice of science. William Paley’s design
argument gave this line of thought its most fully developed and influential
articulation. …the arguments of contemporary ID theorists like William Dembski,
though differing from the arguments of Boyle, Newton, and Paley in various
particulars, carry on their appeal to teleology as something extrinsic to the
material world, and allow that at least much of the natural order is in principle
nonteleological. Where these thinkers all agree with each other and with their
naturalistic opponents is in rejecting the Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of
final causes as inherent in material substances.138
Sharing the mechanistic assumptions, many design models, following in the tradition of
William Paley, make appeal to a “teleology manifest in nature [as] extrinsic, entirely
derivative from an outside source.”139 These arguments take the mechanical conception
of nature for granted and require direct divine activity as the source of explanation for
teleological features of the universe. The point here is not to adjudicate this dispute, nor
is it to defend immanent final causality. Rather, this characterization of the shift towards
mechanism could explain why some would deny the recognition of teleology apart from
explicit theological resources. Instead, the traditional scholastic affirmation of immanent
forms and thus immanent teleology provides the ontology needed for a more direct
recognition of final causality as present within the individual substance. If this realist
construal of the basic contours of the world is even possible, then so, by extension, is the
recognition of final causality apart from assuming God’s existence at the outset;
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rendering the objection here under consideration either mute, or in need of further
defense.

3. Conclusions
The Eudaimonological Argument, which initially emerges in Augustine, develops
in Aquinas, and comes to full expression in Garrigou, seeks to provide justification for
affirming God’s existence through an appeal to distinctively human appetites and
capacities centered in the quest for happiness arriving at an ultimate terminus and perfect
Good. As Garrigou has developed it, two versions of the EA connected with Aquinas’
Via Quarta come to the fore: the ‘Strict 4th Way EA’ and the ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’,
with the latter representing Garrigou’s standard and most developed version of the
argument. Initial investigation into both versions in the previous chapter made its
operative assumptions evident; specifically, its critical dependence on formal and final
causation. In this chapter, two types of potential defeaters were identified in connection
with these two types of causation.
Regarding formal causality, in the first section of this chapter a specific objection
was posed to the EA from standard construals of moderate realism. Both versions of the
EA were shown to be dependent on the movement from multiple and imperfect goods to
a single, perfect good, and that such a movement is achieved by appealing both to formal
natures (e.g., of particular goods) as well as their relation to a universal (e.g., Goodness).
But the problem this raised comes from the apparent commitments of Garrigou and those
of the broader Thomistic and Neoscholastic tradition concerning universals. Aquinas and
the ensuing tradition is supposed to be committed to a moderate realism, which holds that
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universals are located only in particulars and the minds that abstract them from those
particulars; undercutting the inference from particular goods to an actual, mindindependent universal Good.
In response to this objection, it was argued that the form of realism that Aquinas
affirms does not coincide with either a Platonic or Aristotelian Realism. Instead, his view
was best characterized as the tertium quid of Thomistic Realism, defined as the view that
forms exist in particulars and as universals in minds that abstract them, as well as
independent of minds that abstract them, but denies that they subsist individually and
separately. To demonstrate this, first, the various textual arguments for an Aristotelian
Realist reading were addressed and offered plausible reinterpretations. Although he
clearly follows Aristotle in holding to an epistemology of abstraction and in the denial of
subsistent forms, neither of these considerations nor their attending textual grounds gave
conclusive reasons to relegate the existence of forms solely to particulars and human
minds. Second, to make the positive case for Thomistic Realism, it was argued that it can
be demonstrated that Aquinas affirms that universals exist independent of particular
subjects and the minds that abstract them. This is established by considering both his
arguments for universals and his doctrine of divine ideas. The first argument for
Universals which Aquinas affirms is the traditional ‘One Over Many’ argument which
affirms that where multiple individuals exhibit a common feature or admit of common
predication, then this is accounted for by reference to some underlying form or essence
which the multiples exhibit or instantiate. The second argument for Universals which
Aquinas affirms is found in his analysis of degreed perfections. When considering the
existence of varying degrees of any positive perfection, Aquinas concludes that this
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variance entails the existence of the full perfection. Both of these arguments provide part
of the rationale for affirming that universals exist independent of particulars and minds
that abstract them, as universalia ante rem in the mind of God. Therefore, since Aquinas
affirms universalia ante rem, and argues from multiple, imperfect particulars to those
universals, Garrigou’s inference from goods to the Good falls squarely in line with
Aquinas’ thought and is not undermined by Aristotelian characterizations of moderate
realism.
In the second section of this chapter a number of objections to the
Eudaimonological Argument emerging from the doctrine of final causality were
considered. The first problem arising from final causality as applied to the EA is aimed at
the inference to a single, ultimate end for human beings. Focused on Aristotle, this
objection maintained that this inference involves an illicit quantifier shift that renders it
invalid. However, two alternative readings of this move in Aristotle provided ways to
avoid charging Aristotle with this fallacy. Even further, however, it was argued that
Aquinas does not make the simple inference from a good sought as an end in itself to a
single good that all seek. Instead, Aquinas develops three independent arguments which
seek to establish that there is a single, ultimate end for all human beings: (i) the argument
from natural perfection; (ii) the analogical argument from rational first principles; and
(iii) and argument from the common genus of human action. Whatever assessment one
might have of these arguments, they make evident that Aquinas has attempted to move
from particular ends to an ultimate end by a variety of considerations and principles
rather than a simple and illicit shift in quantifying some goods to one ultimate good.
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Further development of this objection came from the work of New Natural Law
Theorists which advance an incommensurability thesis about various human goods. The
inference to an ultimate end and final good is subject to the objection from the
incommensurability of human goods; namely, that since natural human goods cannot be
arranged hierarchically, there can be no extrapolation to a single, highest good. However,
two considerations were brought to bear on this contention. First, it was argued that the
rational ordering of goods is a standard and necessary part of traditional Natural Law
Theory as articulated by Aquinas and the ensuing tradition. Second, and more
importantly, the Thomistic-Garrigou formulation of the EA can allow for a plenary
distribution of basic goods. The standard EA is compatible with this incommensurability
thesis, for as long as human nature desires a universal, infinite good, final causality
suggests that such a desire has a corresponding referent, irrespective of how or if it may
be ranked against other goods.
The final and most important objection to the Eudaimonological Argument
maintains, in essence, that appeals to such teleology are untenable apart from
presupposing God’s existence and subsequent design of the world. The teleological view
of human nature required for the standard Eudaimonological Argument to get off the
ground, the objection insists, is intelligible only within explicit theological
presuppositions. The result for the standard Eudaimonological Argument is that is
constitutes an extended exercise in petitio principia, by assuming in the very thing it
purports to demonstrate. There were a number of responses aimed at addressing this
objection.
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First, to require theological knowledge before recognizing teleology is directly at
odds with the method Aquinas uses if the Via Quinta, so it can hardly be said to represent
the traditional Thomist or broader Scholastic position. Second, prominent examples of
scholars who recognized and affirmed teleology while holding to philosophical
naturalism or at least holding that teleology didn’t have theistic presuppositions or
implications were identified as counterexamples to the claim that recognizing teleology
presupposes theism. Third, Garrigou offers a series of arguments independent of theism
in support of final causality. His primary consideration in support of the principle of
finality, developed from an argument by Aquinas, seeks to metaphysically link efficient
and final causality, where final causality is taken to be the overarching explanation for
the totality of causal analysis.
The fourth response aimed at addressing the objection that appeals to such
teleology are untenable apart from presupposing God’s existence, depended on
establishing the distinction between intrinsic vs. extrinsic teleology. In order to make this
distinction clear, appeal was made to the implications of Thomistic Realism noted in the
first section on formal causality. On Thomistic Realism, forms are both extrinsic (as
universals in the minds of God) and intrinsic (as the immanent principles informing
matter) to particular subjects. Given that final causality follows upon formal causality, it
was recognized that finality could also be immanent to particulars. What this analysis of
immanent form and thus immanent teleology provides is the possibility of recognizing a
localized and embedded teleology inherent to particular substances apart from assuming a
comprehensive and theologically grounded teleology at the outset. In contrast, it is the
mechanism and scientism which sought to displace formal and final causality which
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denies this possibility and when taken for granted results in Paley-style teleological
arguments which must make explicit and immediate appeal to theological grounds.
The Eudaimonological Argument, then, can be seen to critically rely on detailed
metaphysical assumptions concerning formal causality (including immanent forms and
universals ante rem) and final causality (including immanently directed ends and
corresponding goods). The various objections which targeted these two metaphysical
assumptions helped to develop their details and demonstrated that the Eudaimonological
Argument’s dependence on them can sustain the scrutiny from within the Thomist and
Neoscholastic tradition. Thus, this further establishes the thesis of this dissertation: that
Garrigou’s EA represents a viable project in natural theology when properly understood
in light of its underlying metaphysical principles, specifically the metaphysics of formal
and final causality.
While Augustine provided the initial impetus for considering a Eudaimonological
Argument, Garrigou following Aquinas brought it to full formulation. However, the
Copernican revolution in philosophy ushered in by Immanuel Kant was to have an effect
on this argument. Both Kant and certain Transcendental Thomists (those seeking to
syncretize Aquinas with Kantian philosophy) continued the tradition of offering natural
theological arguments that can be broadly identified with the Eudaimonological
Argument explicated in this dissertation thus far. However, in the hands of Kant’s critical
philosophy, the contours of the argument come to be significantly altered. What remains
to be done is to consider the Kantian EA and whether or not it represents a genuine
advance or an actual regression.
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CHAPTER 4
THE KANTIAN EUDAIMONOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Immanuel Kant offers the provocative and somewhat surprising claim, for those
with a superficial handle on his work, that “morality … inevitably leads to religion” (6:6).
Kant’s explication of this relationship has traditionally been described as his moral
argument for postulating the existence of God. Although such moral arguments have
interspersed the history of philosophy through to the present day, Kant’s particular
version centers on the notion of the summum bonum (the highest good). Throughout and
after the critical period Kant addressed this notion and did so in a way that connected it
with his moral philosophy and saw in it grounds for rising to the idea of God. In so doing,
Kant was not exhibiting an innovative trajectory but flowing within a long-running
stream of ancient and medieval philosophers. Beginning with Plato and the “ladder of
love” in the Symposium, moving through Augustine’s De Beata Vita and Aquinas Summa
Theologiae, each of these writers attempted to chart a course from the quest for happiness
in the various forms of lower goods and ascending through higher goods to a
transcendent terminus.1 In the hands of Kant’s critical philosophy, however, this course
takes a unique route and is intimately connected with a range of key Kantian doctrines
and positions. It is the purpose of this chapter, in the first part, to examine Kant’s
1
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Eudaimonological Argument from the highest good, with the aim of highlighting a
particular difficulty with its key premise.2 Next, I will use this difficulty as grounds for
exploring Kant’s metaethical views; here I will argue that a consideration of Kant’s
metaethics leads to a systemic dilemma for the critical philosophy. Subsequently, I will
tie this key premise to a new practical antinomy which emerges from a consideration of
his views expressed in Religion. In the end, I conclude that any Kantian
Eudaimonological Argument must either utilize formal and final causality and forego the
critical strictures, or if it abides by those strictures it fails to establish its conclusion. In
the second section, I turn to the school of Transcendental Thomism, which attempts to
adapt Aquinas’ thought with Kant’s critical philosophy. In particular, I examine two
Transcendental Thomists, Joseph F. Donceel and W. Norris Clarke, and their respective
attempts to formulate a Eudaimonological Argument within this tradition. However, I
contend that both authors either abandon the critical philosophy at certain points, or when
they remain within its confines are unable to construct a viable Eudaimonological
Argument. What this chapter seeks to defend, by a via negativa of sorts, is the
indispensability of the traditional realist principles of formal and final causality to the
Eudaimonological Argument by illustrating how the argument becomes unsustainable
when these are abandoned.

1. Kant’s Eudaimonological Argument

2

This argument is standardly referred to as his ‘moral argument’. But this is an incomplete
description as it critically relies on his notion of happiness as well. Thus, and consistent with the
terminology of this dissertation, I will identify Kant’s moral argument as his version of the
Eudaimonological Argument.
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Before exploring Kant’s Eudaimonological Argument, it is important to briefly
relay the implications of his critical philosophy for metaphysics. Although he began his
philosophical work in the tradition of the Wolf-Leibnizian rationalism he had inherited,
he attempted an entire reworking of metaphysics and epistemology beginning with his
Critique of Pure Reason.3 In this and the ensuing works comprising the critical project,
Kant takes aim at (at least) three schools of thought.4 First, he seeks to undo the
traditional metaphysics represented by figures such as Christian Wolf and Alexander
Baumgarten by circumscribing its realist and ‘dogmatic’ reach. Second, he responds to
the Empiricism which sought to ground knowledge solely on experience of the world and
undermine universal and necessary a priori knowledge. Third, he attempts to address the
skepticism emerging from David Hume’s analysis of the Empiricist tradition, which
brought the most basic notions such as causation into question. In responding to each of
these schools of thought, his purpose is to allow for the possibility of human freedom and
autonomy and the certainty of modern science while still retaining traditional beliefs in
God and immortality by revolutionizing both metaphysics and epistemology.
The Empiricists had characterized the mind’s role in knowledge acquisition in a
passive function of receiving impressions from the world of sense. Kant conceded
Hume’s empiricist critique of a priori judgments; that, for example, the mere mental
association of an effect with a cause produced from subjective representations could
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never establish the universal and necessary character of the principle of causation.5 But
Kant would not grant the Rationalist’s notion that this a priori knowledge could be
obtained independently of sense experience through the mind’s intuition of principles and
features of the world. With the first part of the Critique in the section on the
‘Transcendental Analytic’, he attempts to dismantle all projects aimed at acquiring
knowledge of the features of the world through the use of formal concepts and the
principles of understanding.6 Instead, his transcendental method would not deal directly
with the objects of empirical investigation but inquire into the necessary conditions for
the possibility of experience through a reexamination of the mental faculties required for
such knowledge.7 Both the Empiricists and Rationalists operated on the common
assumption that the mind in acquiring knowledge actually conforms to reality. It was this
assumption that Kant’s critique was to take up and reverse. He writes,
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects;
but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that
would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence
let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by
assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree
better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to
establish something about objects before they are given to us. …If intuition has to
conform to the constitution of objects, then I do not see how we can know
anything of them a priori; but if the object…conforms to the constitution of our
faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself.8
The categories of the mind imposed on the phenomena are what, according to Kant, allow
us to account for universal and necessary knowledge of synthetic a priori judgments.
5
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However, instead of starting with the assumption that the mind begins with the world and
conforms itself to it, Kant reverses the order and posits that the world is constituted by
those a priori structures of the mind. Thus, we must assume “that that our representation
of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as they are in
themselves but rather that these objects as appearances conform to our way of
representing.”9 Therefore, our cognition is only able to achieve awareness of the
appearances (phenomena), leaving things in themselves (noumena) unrecognized.10
Where does this leave the principles of formal and final causality, which has
figured so prominently in the preceding chapter’s analysis of the Eudaimonological
Argument? At first glance, it might seem that both formal and final causation continue to
integrally function in Kant’s system. For example, Konstantin Pollok notes that
The distinction between matter, or the determinable, and form, or the
determination, is so ubiquitous in Kant’s critical philosophy that many Kant
scholars of otherwise rather divergent views on Kant implicitly or even explicitly
agree that some kind of hylomorphism underlies many of his investigations.11
But this would be to misconstrue the strictures on metaphysics placed by the critical
philosophy. Although many areas of Kant’s thought utilize and can be accounted for
along the lines of formal and final causality, as for example in his account of beauty and
the aesthetic judgment, in the end because of the strictures on metaphysics, his tenets
cannot coincide with the realist assumptions of the Aristotelian-Thomistic framework.12
As Graham Bird notes, “Kant’s quest for a new metaphysics was revolutionary insofar as

9

Ibid., 112.

10

Ibid., 112 cf. 426.

11

Konstantin Pollok, Kant’s Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reason (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 130.
12

Mary A. McCloskey, Kant’s Aesthetic (New York: SUNY Press, 1987), 78–79.

201

he criticized the deductive procedure of the scholastic ontology… Kant abandoned
substantial forms and obliterated the whole doctrine of essences.”13 Even further, Kant
entirely rejects any realist notion of universals.14 The reason for rejecting any Kantian
affirmation of substantial forms and the other elements of formal causation is his denial
that the mind apprehends real features of the world. A pseudo-formal causality may
persist but this is one that only reflects the structural functions of the human intellect as it
molds the material of sense impressions; the form is only a mental construct.
But is there still a place for a realist construal of final causality and teleology in
Kant’s thought? Teleology appears to play a prominent role in Kant’s analysis of pure
and practical reason. For example, regarding the study of biological organisms, he writes,
Organized beings are thus the only ones in nature which, even if considered in
themselves without relation to other things, must nevertheless be thought of as
possible only as its ends, and which thus first provide objective reality for the
concept of an end that is not a practical end but an end of nature, and thereby
provide natural science with the basis for a teleology…15
Even further, teleology is what unifies both the theoretical and practical parts of Kant’s
philosophy into a single system.16 However, to characterize this teleology as constituting
the actual structure of reality is to, once again, run at odds with the critical strictures. As
Kant makes clear,
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it is merely a consequence of the particular constitution of our understanding that
we represent products of nature as possible only in accordance with another kind
of causality than that of the natural laws of matter, namely only n accordance with
that of ends and final causes, and that this principle does not pertain to the
possibility of such things themselves (even considered as phenomena)…but
pertains only to the judging of them that is possible for our understanding.17
Even the evidence from the putative exhibition of final causality in biological organisms,
cited above, can at best only be relegated to a functional principle guiding investigation.
As Eric Watkins makes clear, on Kant’s view “since we have neither empirical evidence
nor theoretical proof of the existence of …an author of nature…we can only use the
notion of an organism as the product of design as a regulative principle for heuristic
purposes.”18 Therefore, though formal and final causality continue to function in various
iterations in Kant’s work, given the Kantian reworking of traditional metaphysics and
epistemology, they are only a semblance of the metaphysical principles operative in the
Augustine-Aquinas-Garrigou formulation of the Eudaimonological Argument.
Kant presents his notion of the highest good and his version of the
Eudaimonological Argument principally in The Critique of Pure Reason (B834-B847),
The Critique of Practical Reason (5:107-141), The Critique of Judgment (5:429-453),
and Religion (6:3-6:6).19 Although the argument has been construed in various ways, a
common and summary presentation often proceeds along these lines. Practical reason
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designates that the ultimate end of rational finite beings is found in the highest good. This
highest good is to be understood as a synthesis of two distinct elements in a particular
relation, happiness proportioned to virtue. Since we are required to pursue or promote the
highest good, it must be regarded as capable of realization. However, our awareness of
the sensible world makes evident that this end is not achieved therein. Thus, in order to
provide for the realizability of the highest good, two critical conditions must be
maintained: to wit, God and immortality. Therefore, we are lead to affirm these two
indispensable commitments. This simple and straightforward argument masks a sea of
complexity in interpretation, analysis, and assessment. In order to address some of this
complexity, consider the following formalization of the argument:
1. We are required to pursue the highest good (HG).
2. If we are required to pursue the HG, then the HG must be possible.
Therefore (from 1&2), 3. The HG is possible.
4. For the HG to be possible, we need to postulate (i) God and (ii) immortality.
Therefore (from 3&4), 5. we need to postulate (i) God and (ii) immortality.
Whereas the argument has been cast in ways different from the above, most accounts will
include something along the lines of premises 1, 2, and 4. Those that focus on the
regulative function of the postulates, and see the argument as a mere heuristic or practical
reductio, focus on the nature of postulation in premise 4.20
Setting aside for the moment the nature of Kantian postulation and transcendental
argumentation, the appeal to God in premise 4 is worthy of note in comparing the
argument with the standard EA as provided by Garrigou. The problem Kant is attempting
to solve regards the ideal relation between happiness and virtue. The operative
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assumption is that the quality of an individual’s happiness (or lack thereof) should
coincide with and be proportioned to their moral quality in an ultimate distribution of
rewards and punishments.21 This state of affairs, however, even if sometimes realized in
this world, can only be contingently and not essentially and necessarily achieved. Like
the principle of causation, Kant seeks to provide the conditions to account for not only
the harmony between happiness and virtue, but also the necessity of their ultimate
relation. This is one critical point of difference between Kant and the preceding tradition.
Taking happiness and virtue as entirely distinct elements, he is in search of a way to
establish a necessary connection between them. Whereas, as Linda Zagzebski notes,
[The Greeks and medieval philosophers] believed that the ultimate goal or end of
the moral life is a unitary good in which happiness and virtue are integrated and
virtually inseparable. Kant denied that. Virtue and happiness are neither
conceptually nor probabilistically connected… They are two different ends.22
This in part is why Kant faces the particular problem of uniting them. Therefore, on
Kant’s account, the only adequate cause to ensure such a state of affairs is God. God’s
role is cast exclusively in terms of efficient causality.23 God is the only plausible causal
explanation for the just distribution of happiness in the perfect ethical community.24 In
chapter 2 of this dissertation, versions of the Eudaimonological Argument built on
efficient causality as formulated by Garrigou were considered in conjunction with
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Aquinas’ Via Prima.25 However, in this version the explanandum was the movement of
the will, and the feature of efficient causality was the requirement of a first cause in
essentially ordered series. In Kant’s version, neither this explanandum nor the
termination of a se causal series plays a role in the argument.
Although the argument has garnered considerable attention from the beginning, it
has generally not fared well, from initial objections during Kant’s time, such as Thomas
Wizenmann’s charge of wishful thinking, to prominent historical reactions such as
Schopenhauer’s petitio principii allegation, to contemporary philosophers, such as Peter
Byrne who sees the argument falter at every step.26 Byrne reflects this negative reception,
concluding that the argument “has very little cogency. Problems abound with it at every
turn and many of these problems arise out of its author’s own reflections on the key
elements in it.”27 Nevertheless, there are some that appear to assess it in an affirmative
way, though it isn’t always clear if authors in this vein are just rebutting particular
defeaters or confining themselves to defending an interpretation of Kant without
committing to the argument itself.28 Moreover, there are examples of contemporary Kant-
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inspired moral arguments, as seen in the works of Linda Zagzebski, Robert Adams,
George Mavrodes, and C. Stephen Evans.29
Surveying the representative criticisms of the argument highlights the range of
questions that it generates. One set of objections target Kant’s characterization of the
highest good. Some have contested, as noted above, that his notion is idiosyncratic and
otherwise deficient when compared with the preferable ancient and medieval account(s)
of eudaimonism, which provided a more seamless and coherent view of ultimate human
flourishing.30 Along these lines, others have worried that Kant’s account of happiness is
hedonic in nature, which proves to be a liability to his case.31 Even further, some critics
have maintained that his account of happiness (and thus the highest good) is necessarily
tied to empirical conditions within the natural world, and as such is at odds with his
conclusions about immortality.32 Another set of objections have targeted the purported
need to postulate God and/or immortality (premise 4 above).33 Either the respective
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postulate fails to accomplish the required work or it raises further difficulties. For an
example of the former, some contend that a state where complete happiness is achieved is
impossible even with the postulation of God because of the inherent nature of finite
rational beings.34 A concomitant of our finitude is perpetual need, which precludes the
state of complete desire-satisfaction that is needed for the attainment of happiness, and
appeals divine power are not able to rectify this paradox. We will examine an example of
the latter type of problem with premise 4 in the last section of this paper. The last set of
objections has targeted the conditional claim that in order for something to be obligatory,
then it must be possible (premise 2 above).35 We need not linger here on these criticisms
nor enter the further discussion that each catalyzes. Instead, for our purposes in this
section, the important and pivotal premise is the first one. Every formulation of the
argument invokes this premise (in one form or another), and it is the premise most
intimately connected with the whole of the critical project.
How should we understand the proposition that we are required to pursue the
highest good (premise 1, above)? There are two primary candidates here, each of which
have significant implications and involve their own distinctive problems. The first
interpretation of premise 1 we shall call the Duty-reading. On this view, what Kant is
suggesting is that we have a moral obligation to bring about the highest good, the state of
affairs where happiness is proportioned to virtue. For example, Courtney Fugate writes,
“Kant bases his proof or proofs of God’s existence on the premise that the moral law is
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the foundation of a duty to promote the highest good.”36 The second interpretation of
premise 1 we shall call the Practical Requirement-reading.37 This rendering of the
premise takes Kant to hold that practical reason has two essential yet distinct aims,
happiness and virtue. It is virtue that exhausts our duties, while happiness only represents
that essential directionality of reason in its quest for non-obligatory ends. We are
obligated to pursue virtue and conform to the moral law, but we are not morally obligated
to seek out the end of happiness. Given the distinction of these ends, there can be no
moral duty directed at the highest good, simpliciter.38 We have only a moral duty to adopt
our maxims in accord with the moral law and a practical necessity to pursue our own
happiness.
Now, these competing interpretations of premise 1 each lead to independent
problems, but it is the Duty-reading of premise 1 that carries the brunt of the criticisms.
Let us here focus on two specific difficulties it faces. The first problem for Kant’s
Eudaimonological Argument, given the Duty-reading, is that he has run counter to his
own view, from at least the Groundwork onwards, that duty is sufficient for
incentivization and excludes all other motives.39 However, if we have a moral duty to
promote the highest good, which includes happiness, then we seek (in part) our own
happiness in obeying the moral law. But if happiness can be an end we are obligated to
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follow, then we are no longer simply incentivized by the claims of the moral law over us.
The second problem with the Duty-reading is that it entails that we have a duty to
promote something that exceeds our capacities and thus violates the ought-implies-can
conditional affirmed (implicitly) in premise 2.40 Pasternack draws out the force of this
problem by distinguishing between the highest good as an ideal and the highest good as a
duty.41 Kant, he suggests, illicitly slides from the ought of HG (duty) to the can of HG
(ideal). The argument is thus guilty of equivocating the key terms. If we grant this
distinction, we must recognize that the ought of the HG (duty) does not depend on the
possibility of the HG (ideal). Pasternack suggests that the highest good as duty should be
supplanted with an obligation solely to become virtuous. If we do make this change, Kant
avoids an internal incoherence with his ought-implies-can conditional. For, to be
obligated to pursue or promote virtue only requires that one is so able to pursue or
promote virtue. Following Pasternack’s suggestion, the need to postulate immortality
might still persist (assuming, more specifically, that the duty is to become completely
virtuous). But this undercuts the argument for postulating God, leaving Kant’s
Eudaimonological Argument for postulating God defeated.
Suppose, then, we abandon the Duty-reading of premise 1 and take up the
Practical Requirement-reading.42 On this view, again, we have a duty to promote the
moral law and a practical need (of reason) to pursue happiness. When so understood, the
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first premise becomes immune to the criticisms leveled at the Duty-reading. In the moral
argument formulated above, premise 1 was stated so as to permit and advance this
understanding of Kant’s claim. So, what is the problem with reading Kant’s first premise
of the EA in this way? The problem is that this reading either leaves the initial premise as
a wildly implausible instance of wishful thinking or as a grand exercise in petitio
principii. To see why, consider again Thomas Wizenmann’s objection that simply
because we recognize in ourselves a need for, say, a lover of great beauty, we should
hardly conclude that such a beauty exists for us (5:143n).43 To this Kant replies that this
need is not a mere “inclination” but a “need of reason.” But this merely shifts the
question one step further. We may still ask, why should we think that the essential
structure of reason in its practical aims needs to conform with reality? To assume that it
should, on Kant’s own system, is to resort to the very wishful thinking with which Kant
has been charged.44 What Kant requires here is an analysis of reason in terms of a realist
construal of formal and final causality. If the nature or essence of rational faculties
(formal cause) is inherently directed towards apprehending goodness (final cause), then
Kant has the resources to ground the practical needs of reason as aiming at true goods.
However, as we saw at the outset of this chapter, Kant has abandoned these traditional
metaphysical resources. He cannot appeal to a physico-theology to explain the ordering
of practical reason to reality for in so doing he would beg the question and violate the
strictures on pure reason. Thus, Kant is left to the obvious rejoinder that things need not
harmonize with the needs of our reason. Since Kant does not permit a realist model of
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formal and final causality, the Practical Requirement-reading is left susceptible to this
‘wishful thinking’ critique. Does Kant’s philosophy have the resources to address this
criticism? To answer this we must turn to his account of the moral law.

1.1 Kant and the Moral Realist-Constructivist Divide
Both interpretations of the first premise involve obligation; that Kant makes duty
a necessary component cannot be denied, and further this obligation requires and
presumes knowledge of the moral law. This makes awareness of the moral law the
foundational, even if only implicit, assumption to Kant’s argument from the highest
good. To see this, consider how he sets the table for his argument from the highest good
in the first Critique. Kant writes, “I assume that there are really pure moral laws, which
determine completely a priori … the use of freedom of a rational being in general”
(A807/B835, emphasis added).45 These pure moral laws, he tells us, are absolute and
necessary (A807/B835).46 Kant here appears to anticipate the reader’s objection to his
assumption and gestures to the form of justification that he would offer if he were pressed
to do so. Kant writes, “I can legitimately presuppose this proposition by appealing not
only to the proofs of the most enlightened moralists but also to the moral judgment of
every human being, if he will distinctly think such a law” (A807/B835).47 Further, as
commonly recognized, awareness of the moral law is the sole basis for freedom (5:30).48
For example, he says that “among all the ideas of speculative reason freedom is the only
45
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one the possibility of which we know a priori, though without having any insight into it,
because it is the condition of the moral law, which we do know” (5:4).49 Kant’s thrust
here is that practical knowledge of freedom is secure because of speculative knowledge
of the moral order.
The ubiquitous presence and instrumentality of the moral law to Kant’s project
cannot be overlooked. The nature and justification concerning the moral law comes to the
fore with his description of it as a factum, or “fact of reason” (5:31; cf. 5:6, 32, 42-43, 4648, 55, 91, 104).50 We are told that “Consciousness of this fundamental law may be
called a fact of reason because one cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason”
(5:31).51 In line with the passage in the first Critique cited above, here we are told that
moral awareness comes a priori (5:47) and that belief in the moral law does not need to
find warrant or be “proved by any deduction” (5:47).52 We are told, moreover, that the
moral law is “universal” (5:31), “undeniable” (5:32) and “unavoidable” (5:55).53 This
view of the moral law as universal, undeniable, and unavoidable is captured in Kant’s
famous statement in the second Critique,
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the
more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and
the moral law within me. I do not seek or conjecture either of them as if they were
veiled obscurities or extravagances beyond the horizon of my vision; I see them
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before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence
(5:161-2).54
The importance of the moral law to the entire critical philosophy must be fully
appreciated. It is the focal point on which the entire superstructure rests, including
practical reason, freedom, God, and immortality. On the moral law, Kant seeks to rebuild
what the first Critique demolished of pure reason in its speculative mode.
Given the indispensible importance of the moral law to the critical philosophy, we
can now broach questions about Kant’s moral ontology. In so doing, we raise questions
about the tenability of his Eudaimonological Argument, his moral philosophy, and his
account of practical reason. Although providing a detailed map of the various metaethical
positions would take us too far afield, we can roughly characterize the terrain in this
way.55 Let us distinguish moral realism as the view that our moral concepts and
judgments can hold independent of, and are not derivative or reducible to, features of our
psychology (e.g., beliefs, affections, or values); they correspond to features of reality that
are in some way independent of the moral beliefs of the agent. Moral realism can be
further divided into naturalists who maintain that moral judgments are rendered true or
false by their correspondence with natural states of affairs or properties (of the empirical
world), whereas non-naturalists maintain that moral properties are not identical nor
reducible to natural properties. Moral non-realism, for our purposes, will deny the moral
realist thesis, but the way this is done (and the alternative account provided) may take
many forms. We will here draw attention to constructivism as a particular form of non-
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realism, which holds that there are moral truths but that these truths are constituted by
and/or entirely dependent upon some element of our psychology. With these in order, we
can ask, what relationship does moral realism have to Kant’s Eudaimonological
Argument and, more generally, his critical philosophy?
The primary divide in the scholarship on this topic is between those who view
Kant as a moral realist (and I would add, a non-naturalist) and those who understand his
views along constructivist lines. Recent and prominent examples of the constructivist
reading come from John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard.56 Notable Kantian scholars,
such as Allen Wood and Karl Ameriks, have given force to moral realist construals of the
critical philosophy.57 And this divide continues into very recent publications in which
some continue the effort to retrench Kant in constructivism, while others provide
rebuttals in favor of a moral realist understanding.58 Justification for constructivist
accounts have centered on a few reasons. First, they claim that it follows as a product of
Kant’s transcendental idealism on which moral judgments merely characterize the view
of practical reason in our subjective constitution. Second, and chiefly, constructivists
appeal to Kant’s doctrine of the autonomy of the will. The self-legislative nature of the
56
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will suggests its power to create its own law. To recognize an “external” law given from
without would be to introduce a heteronomy and circumvent the will’s absolute
autonomy. In contrast, moral realist interpreters of Kant, in addition to responding to the
constructivist case, have offered two main types of considerations to bolster their reading
of the critical philosophy. First, they make appeals to the important exegetical strand of
the “fact of reason,” noted above. These passages, it is argued, are best read, if not
exclusively understood, on realist terms. Second, moral realist readings of Kant have
cited the Kantian doctrine of the inherent value of humanity and its nature as an ultimate
end and good as only intelligible on moral realism. Although one can appreciate the
temptation to see Kant as a non-realist, I believe the best reading of Kant is as a moral
realist, holding a type of non-naturalism about moral properties.59 He is aware of a type
of moral fictionalism but rejects this. After registering his assumption of, and potential
route of demonstration for, pure moral laws, he considers a disjunctive between the either
the entailments of morality “or else to regard the moral laws as empty figments of the
brain” (A811/B839).60 In the broader context, the latter option is taken by Kant as leading
to a reductio ad absurdum not worth considering any further (A809/B837-A814/B842).61
While a defense of a realist reading of Kant’s metaethics is beyond the scope of
this paper, what is germane is its relevance to the objection that emerged from the
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Practical Requirement-reading of premise 1 in the previous section. The moral realist
understanding of Kant addresses the wishful thinking objection: that the needs of reason
do not indicate anything about the way the world is. Or, alternatively, the only way of
demonstrating that the direction and requirements of reason have purchase on reality
would be to utilize traditional formal and final causality or beg the question by invoking
an ultimate source of practical teleology (i.e., God). The proponents of the wishful
thinking objection counter that it is entirely possible that practical reason terminates in
absurdity by striving after ends which are not available; and that, moreover, Kant has no
resources to suggest otherwise. However, this is where a moral realist reading of Kant is
poised to address this objection. Kant may concede that practical reason’s need of x does
not entail that x obtains. Instead, Kant’s response will depend on the claim that if one
knows x to be the case, then in order to account for this, y must obtain. So, what is it that
Kant must claim we know to be the case? The answer is the moral law. Since we know
the moral law, practical reason must be properly constituted and successful in its reach.
The success of practical reason must obtain in order to account for our moral knowledge.
To see why knowledge of the moral law stabilizes and secures practical reason,
we need to return to the Kantian view of the nature of practical reason. Practical reason is
essentially, though synthetically, structured such that it aims at moral duties and
happiness. But, so a Kantian moral realist view claims, practical reason knows truths
concerning the moral law. Without this knowledge, practical reason is entirely internally
incongruent and unsuccessfully directed. Practical reason requires a necessary and
unified system of the good, which includes awareness of both the moral law and the
subsequent proportioned happiness (cf. the “needs of reason” of which Kant referred
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when addressing Wizenmann (5:143n)).62 But if the later part of this is aimed at an empty
or illusory end, then practical reason is fractured and its deliverances are undone.
However, the consequent of this conditional is obviously false – the deliverances of
practical reason are secured in moral knowledge – as practical reason has properly and
rightly apprehended the supersensible, universal moral law (or so a Kantian moral realist
view claims). If however, practical reason is deluded in its directedness towards
proportional happiness, then it is itself essentially incongruous and unauthorized in its
reach. Yet, if this were the case, then it could not know the moral law either. Therefore,
since practical reason does apprehend the moral law, it remains integral and veracious in
both its ends, and hence also rightly enjoins that we are required to pursue the highest
good (premise 1).
Suppose then that a Practical Requirement-reading reading successfully counters
typical objections to the first premise, and suppose further that a moral realist reading of
Kant successfully rebuts the wishful thinking objection. Have we cleared the way for
consideration of the subsequent premises of the moral argument? It is here that a deeper
and more systemic problem emerges for the Kantian project. And, moreover, this
problem cannot be resolved by recourse to a constructivist reading of Kant. There are the
problematic implications for Kant given either side of the realist-constructivist divide.
That is to say, if we consider Kant either as a moral realist or a constructivist, the
respective philosophical entailments of each poses problems for the critical philosophy.
To see the problems raised by the options in Kantian metaethics, let us think of
how Kant might attempt to locate the moral law. It seems he has to choose from one of
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three possible locales: (i) the empirical, sensible world, (ii) the mind, or (iii) the
supersensible world. The moral realist interprets Kant as committed to (iii), and the
constructivist reads Kant as committed to (ii). All agree that, in Kant’s view, the moral
law is clearly not located in (i), and so he cannot be a naturalist about moral properties.
For example, in the first Critique (A808/B836), we have described a moral world that is
one where rational beings exhibit a thoroughgoing cohesive unity under the moral laws.
Although this is an intelligible abstraction, it is one that is abstracted from all sensible
conditions and is given in contrast to the empirical world; the reason being, in part,
because moral laws are not to be found therein.63 In the second Critique (5:115), morality
is only accidently connected with (and thereby set apart from) the empirical world via a
rational being’s causal agency through use of the will bringing about changes in the
sensible realm.64 In other words, the moral law is not present in the empirical world
except as a remote cause operative through volitional agency acting in the world. So, in
order to locate the moral law we must look to either (ii) the mind or (iii) the supersensible
world.
If we read Kant as a moral realist, and thus committed to locating the moral law in
(iii) the supersensible world, then we have come in conflict with the boundaries of
speculative reason. For the critical philosophy does not admit knowledge of the
supersensible, yet Kant holds that the moral law is universal, necessary, and
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supersensible (as seen above). We are informed by Kant’s critique of pure reason that the
mind cannot emigrate beyond the borders of reason to gain knowledge of the noumenal
realm. Yet, on the moral realist reading, Kant would have to hold that we do have
speculative knowledge of the moral law (as a “fact of reason”). Speculative knowledge of
the moral order requires traveling beyond the confines set up by the critical philosophy to
arrive at awareness of the universal and absolute moral law, and to do so via either the
proofs that are offered by the ‘most enlightened moralists’ or the ‘moral judgment of
every human being’ (A807/B835).65
However, what if the moral law is not properly construed in terms of moral
realism and should be understood as a type of moral constructivism? This would solve
the problem of reason emigrating to the supersensible, since our knowledge of the moral
law is really just knowledge of some (necessary) feature of our psychology. However,
what keeps this purported knowledge from devolving into a mere illusion or imaginative
fiction? One Kantian response is to appeal to the operational necessity of practical
reason; recognition of the moral law, though only a construct of the mind, is a necessary
construct. But this argument from rational inescapability doesn’t get one very far.
Perhaps our moral faculties are necessarily misdirected. Consider an optical illusion in
which our faculties always convey misinformation. For example, on hot days, heat
radiating from blacktop in the distance makes the blacktop look wet. Through repeated
experience, we know this optical illusion is caused by heat, and the blacktop is not wet
but hot. Yet, citing the inevitability of this perceptual misfire does nothing to eliminate
the illusion. Instead, we simply come to know the operations of our faculties well enough
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to disregard the appearance of wetness and interpret it instead as heat. If we embrace a
constructivist reading of Kant, what is to prevent us from doing the same with the moral
law? That is, our apprehension of the moral law, with all of the apparent entailments
concerning God and immortality, is a rational misfire that cannot be shaken. By
recognizing this, we are able to reject the conclusions, even though we may not shake the
sense that the moral law is pressing in on us with certain supersensible entailments.
So, in light of this we are led to ask, are the Kantian postulates untethered? Kant’s
attempt at securing the postulates (freedom, immortality, and God) is dependent on the
universal moral law (as a fact of reason). However, as we have seen, this leads to a
dilemma. Either the moral law is ultimately grounded in speculative or practical reason.
If it is grounded in speculative reason, then this undermines the critical project. For, the
critical philosophy does not admit knowledge of the supersensible; yet, the moral law is
universal, and supersensible. However, if the moral law is grounded in practical reason,
then practical reason loses its foundation and becomes untethered from reality. One
cannot even reasonably believe or hope for the postulates of practical reason. Thus, even
if we were to find Kant’s Eudaimonological Argument valid, it will ultimately have to be
deemed unsound. So, either we admit the moral law and its postulates or admit the
critical philosophy and its constraints, but not both. Kant’s practical reason is an inverted
pyramid built upon the fact of reason apprehending the moral law. If that block is
removed, the entire structure falls. If it remains, it overcomes the strictures on speculative
reason.

1.2 Is Kantian Radical Evil a New Practical Antinomy?
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The preceding sections looked at formulating Kant’s Eudaimonological
Argument, taking note of the various interpretive and conceptual challenges that it
creates. What may go unnoticed, however, is that Kant creates a new problem for his
Eudaimonological Argument in Religion. This final section will briefly examine the
relevance of some of his positions in Religion as they bear upon the Eudaimonological
Argument, and in doing so, will connect the purported deliverances of Religion to Kant’s
critical philosophy. What this connection will surface is another tension between his
Eudaimonological Argument and his critical philosophy.
In order to introduce the argument for the postulates in the second Critique, Kant
presented a practical antinomy that, though similar with the speculative antinomies,
differed in that it admitted of resolution. Yet, Allen Wood notes, “In the Religion, Kant
reopens the whole question of man’s moral perfectibility, and attempts to give a more
complete answer to this question than he did in any of his earlier works.”66 In particular,
Kant offers a more careful analysis of “moral self-identity,” to use John Silber’s term.67
The feature of this analysis that is relevant to the topic at hand is Kant’s look at
humanity’s moral disposition (gesinnung) in Book 1, which leads him to introduce the
doctrine of radical evil into his anthropology. In so doing, Kant creates a new but
unrecognized antinomy for his system that challenges his account of the summum bonum
and thus proves detrimental for his Eudaimonological Argument.
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Kant’s development the doctrine of radical evil can be characterized as the result
of considering the fact that humanity is an essentially moral in kind. Chris Firestone and
Nathan Jacobs summarize the matter as follows:
In Book One of Religion, Kant offers an account of humanity’s moral nature that
seeks to remain true to both the concept of nature and the transcendental
implications of the predicate moral … [T]his drives Kant to cognize the
disposition as innate (per the concept of nature) and freely chosen (per the
predicate moral). Moreover, insofar as the question of a moral nature concerns
our overall posture toward the moral law, Kant is driven to cognize our moral
nature as having a maxim or rule that establishes our posture toward the moral
law as supreme incentive. Hence, the disposition must constitute a deed of
freedom that chooses a moral maxim, which serves as a rule for the entire
exercise of freedom in time. This supreme maxim constitutes our moral being,
which Kant distinguishes from our particular moral acts in time. 68
In short, because Kant’s moral philosophy connects morality with freely chosen moral
maxims, Kant’s investigation into our moral nature inevitably points to a governing
maxim concerning the moral law generally. Kant writes, “let it be noted that by ‘the
nature of a human being’ we only understand here the subjective ground … of the
exercise of the human being’s freedom in general (under objective moral laws)
antecedent to every deed that falls within the scope of the senses” (6:20).69 Kant’s
emphasis on a maxim is meant to protect us from slipping into the conclusion that, if we
are deemed evil, such evil is a necessary byproduct of other determining factors. To the
contrary, in identifying our moral nature with a maxim, Kant ensures that whatever our
moral nature may be, it is a product of freedom, which is crucial to moral culpability.
Kant reminds the reader of this when his investigation leads him to conclude that
humanity is bound by radical evil: “Hence the ground of evil cannot lie in any object
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determining the power of choice through inclination … but only in a rule that the power
of choice itself produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e., in a maxim” (6:21).70 So,
how does Kant’s investigation lead to the conclusion that humanity is universally bound
by radical evil?
Briefly summarized, Kant’s doctrine of radical evil unfolds in this way. Kant
considers four possible characterizations of our moral nature: (i) it is morally good; (ii) it
is morally evil; (iii) it is morally neutral; or (iv) it is partly good and partly evil (6:20; and
23).71 If (i) is deemed false, options (iii) and (iv) are the least problematic for the prospect
of moral perfectibility. If our moral nature is neutral, per option (iii), it falls to each
individual to choose the moral law moment to moment, and moral perfection simply
requires the free formation of a habit of choosing the moral law over competing ends. A
morally mixed nature is a more precarious conclusion, but it still leaves within human
power the prospect of habitually choosing the good within us over the evil within us. Yet,
the very thing that Kant intends to protect our moral culpability – namely his turn toward
a governing maxim – is the very thing that makes options (iii) and (iv) untenable. In order
for Kant to advocate a morally neutral or morally mixed nature, it must be possible to
produce a morally neutral or morally mixed maxim. Yet, Kant can conceive of no such
maxim. Any maxim that is neutral toward the moral law or mixed toward the moral law
is a corrupt maxim, since the law rightly lays claim to being our supreme incentive, as
seen earlier in this chapter. Hence, Kant concludes, “the lack of agreement of the power
of choice with [the moral law] … is possible only as a consequence of a real and opposite
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determination of the power of choice, i.e. of a resistance on its part” (6:23).72 If, then,
options (iii) and (iv) are not viable, Kant is left with only (i) and (ii): humanity’s moral
disposition is either good or evil (6:25-26).73 Keeping in mind that option (i) requires that
humanity treats the moral law as its supreme incentive in every exercise of freedom, one
need only glance at human history to determine which is more plausibly the ground from
which our operations of freedom proceed. As Philip Quinn puts it, “Kant takes himself to
have good inductive support for attributing a morally evil propensity … to mankind
universally.”74 Thus, Kant’s comes to the resulting doctrine of radical evil.75
The difficulty this doctrine creates is that Kant identifies the governing maxim as
the ground from which every other moral act springs. As Kant puts it, “Whenever we
therefore say, ‘The human being is by nature good’, or ‘He is by nature evil’, this only
means that he holds within himself a first ground … for the adoption of good or evil …
maxims, and that he holds this ground qua human, universally” (6:21).76 Now, what
precisely Kant means by this is a point of controversy in Kant studies. Many take Kant to
be offering an over-generalization of how humans tend to act,77 while others insist that
Kant’s argument is meant to offer a universal judgment concerning our species qua
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human.78 It is beyond the scope of this paper to take up this debate, so let it suffice that I
believe the textual evidence favors interpreters in the latter camp.
Less critical here, but still relevant, is the question of divine forgiveness. That is,
should we succeed in turning from evil to good, we cannot wipe out former ills nor can
we make up for them with extreme acts of virtue, since an agent’s “duty at each instant is
to do all the good in his power” (6:72).79 And since Kant rejects the notion that one can
transfer guilt to another atoning subject (6:72), it seems we must expect to find ourselves
condemned before the divine judge.80 The more formidable problem, however, is that
radical evil leaves us incapable of turning from evil to the good. Having located within
every person an innate governing maxim that is corrupt, every particular act is merely a
manifestation of this corrupt ground. Thus, even when our deeds coincide with the moral
law, these deeds are tainted, for they proceed from the mixed motives of a corrupt
foundation. This all-pervading stain is the very thing that makes evil radical. As Kant
puts it,
This evil is radical, since it corrupts the ground of all maxims; as a natural
propensity, it is also not to be extirpated through human forces, for this could only
happen through good maxims – something that cannot take place if the subjective
supreme ground of all maxims is presupposed to be corrupted (6:31).81
Radical evil, it seems, undermines any hope of attaining virtue. For if every exercise of
freedom in time is the product of a governing maxim, not vice versa, then temporal acts
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cannot modify our moral disposition; they can only express it. Repentance, as a temporal
free act, can thus never undo the corruption within human nature, since this deed, like
every use of freedom in time, proceeds from an innate disposition, not vice versa.
Bringing radical evil to bear on the postulate of immortality, then, the doctrine
undermines the very purpose of this postulate. If one cannot ‘extirpate’ radical evil but
only ever express it, then a future life does no good in getting one closer to virtue. A
future life – even of indefinite length – only supplies future opportunity to express the
radical evil within human nature. Therefore, radical evil throws a very large wrench into
the gears of at least one of the required postulates of the moral philosophy.
Returning, then, to the argument of the first section, we have seen that the
possibility of the highest good is the requisite condition for the proper functioning of
practical reason. In light of Kant’s anthropology, the formulation of the argument from
the previous section now continues in this way:
6. The human condition is beset by radical evil.
7. If (iii) radical evil, then the HG is impossible even with postulating (i)
immortality and (ii) God.
8. But the HG is possible (because of 1 and 2 above). Therefore,
9. Either 7 or 8 are false, or there is a way to overcome radical evil.
Since 8 is a clearly established position in Kant’s thought and 7 has been addressed
above, we must ask, does Kant have a way of overcoming radical evil? Indeed, he does
have such a proposal. But this proposal requires a new element to his “mere theology,”
namely the prototype of Book 2 of Religion. In Book 2, Kant discusses a Christ figure he
names the prototype (Urbild) (6:60), who is the exemplar for all moral pilgrims.82 Kant
suggests that to overcome radical evil, the moral pilgrim must undertake a radical
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conversion, casting off his corrupt disposition and appropriating in its place the moral
disposition displayed in the prototype (6:60-62).83 Assuming the conversion is successful,
a new moral identity emerges. The convert’s former self is put to death and the new self
bears a disposition pleasing to God (6:61-62; 6:67; 6:74).84 Conversion and the moral
journey to follow is an atoning journey in which one pleasing to God (the new moral
identity) bears the culpability of one who offended God (the former moral identity) (6:7374).85
These basic contours of Book 2 are generally agreed upon by Kant scholars, but
there is disagreement about how best to interpret these claims. Most interpreters
understand Kant’s prototype to be a mere symbol of the moral ideal that each of us must
strive to become. To overcome radical evil, the moral pilgrim must attempt a conversion
in an effort to cast off his corrupt disposition and enact a disposition like the one
displayed in the symbol of the prototype (6:74-75).86 The difficulty with this reading,
however, is the very problem noted above. For Kant, particular deeds in time, such as
repentance, proceed from the disposition, not vice versa. Hence, as Kant himself says,
radical evil “is … not to be extirpated through human forces, for this could only happen
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through good maxims – something that cannot take place if the subjective supreme
ground of all maxims is presupposed to be corrupted” (6:31).87
Not all agree that Kant has resources to solve this problem. Philip Quinn,
Nicholas Wolterstorff, and others suggest that Kant has created a conundrum here that his
philosophy cannot solve.88 Others see Kant as having no alternative than to look to divine
assistance (or grace) to resolve the problem. How “grace” is understood amongst Kant
interpreters varies. Some understand Kant to grant that divine assistance in the sense of
aiding moral empowerment is necessary for conversion.89 Others take a less mysterious
reading of Kantian grace, suggesting that religious symbols, such as the prototype, serve
as instrumental means by which to spur moral converts on toward virtue.90 Regardless of
which one chooses, however, the road itself is riddled with problems.
Kant cannot abide the suggestion that God would favor an individual prior to him
doing anything to earn such favor (6:116-117; 6:170-171).91 The problem that emerges as
a result is summarized well by Quinn:
[A] regress appears to be in the offing. It would seem that bringing about such a
revolution is no easier than becoming a better person if one has brought upon
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oneself an evil propensity that corrupts the very ground of one’s maxims, and so
the former task would seem to require divine assistance if the latter does. But
then, on Kantian assumptions, it appears that divine aid with carrying out a
revolution in disposition will be forthcoming only if one first does something else
on one’s own to make oneself worthy of receiving such aid. No matter how this
other deed that must be done is specified, the question of how it is possible for an
agent in whom the ground of maxims is corrupt to perform it will arise. If this
deed in turn is only possible for such an agent with divine assistance, then yet
another deed must first be performed to render the agent worthy of that
assistance.92
Were this difficulty not enough, Kant insists that one cannot make maxims for moral
conduct based on what someone else might do (e.g., 6:101).93 Hence, the moral pilgrim
cannot resolve to convert with the help of divine grace, since whether God supplies such
grace is outside of the pilgrim’s control. Such difficulties are amongst the numerous
reasons that Quinn et al. conclude that Kant’s philosophy of religion, while requiring a
turn to divine assistance, cannot do so in a manner consistent with the moral philosophy.
If we grant this common reading of Religion, then this is what follows. Kant, it
would seem, has created for himself an inescapable dilemma. Radical evil creates a
relationship between the supreme maxim and particular exercises of freedom in time that
undermines our ability to correct our underlying corruption. This corruption thus requires
assistance to come from without; but Kant’s own moral principles prevent any such
assistance from being given unless first merited from within. Yet, no such merit can come
from within apart from the assistance from without. If this is all that Kant’s philosophy
can offer us, then, it would seem that the highest good and the moral philosophy
generally is definitively undermined by the doctrine of radical evil, as per premise 7
above.
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There is, however, an alternative reading of Kant’s solution in Book 2. In
response to such conundrums in Religion, Firestone and Jacobs attempt an alternative
interpretation of Kant’s Religion in this regard. On their interpretation, Kant’s prototype
is not a mere symbol; rather, the prototype is an Idea in the Platonic sense, namely God’s
Idea of morally perfect humanity (6:66; cf. 6:60 with 28:1058-59).94 The prototype is
thus an ideal substance – essentially a Platonic Form – that is generated by God from all
eternity and bears within his person a disposition, or governing maxim, that does indeed
exalt the moral law as supreme incentive. As such, the prototype bears the very
disposition God intends for humanity, and it is this disposition that should have been
emulated in the free self-determination by our created species but was not.95
According to Firestone and Jacobs, Kant’s talk of converts appropriating the
disposition of the prototype is not a description of converts merely emulating a symbol
but of converts mystically participating in a moral disposition that resides outside of
themselves in God’s own Idea of morally perfect humanity. In other words, if two distinct
moral dispositions exist, one corrupt and another incorrupt, and if human persons not
only participate in one innately (viz., the corrupt) but can also participate in the other
mystically (viz., the incorrupt), then it is possible for moral converts to escape radical evil
by casting off their current disposition in favor of another.96 On this reading, moral
conversion is not an attempt to modify our corrupt disposition by an expression of that
disposition. Rather, conversion is an attempt to break ties with our disposition by
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grabbing hold of another disposition outside of ourselves within God, namely that of our
divinely generated prototype.
As Nicholas Wolterstorff has pointed out, the solution is strange given Kant’s
thought, but it is not without textual merit.97 However, the concern here is not with the
textual merit of the proposal but with its contextual merit. The solution does in fact
escape the conundrum noted above. The solution does not claim that a moral act
proceeding from a corrupt disposition changes the disposition that produced it. To the
contrary, the corrupt disposition remains corrupt, on this reading. For the same reason, no
appeal to divine grace prior to earning such grace is needed either. For no miraculous
empowerment is required to produce repentance that might modify the disposition from
which the repentance emerged. Grace in this solution takes on a more dynamic sense of
God supplying us with another disposition that we may freely embrace in moral
conversion and the various deliverances that follow from this embrace, if freely chosen.98
If there is a criticism of this solution to be leveled – aside from noting its oddity within
Kantian thought – it concerns whether it is possible to mystically participate in divine
Ideas, as the solution suggests.99 However, if such participation is the only solution to
radical evil – and unless the problem of radical evil is solved, the highest good collapses
and with it practical reason and the moral philosophy – then we may well conclude that
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the prototype (as read by Firestone and Jacobs) is one final postulate required by Kant’s
moral philosophy. This leads us to further our formulation in this way:
10. We can overcome radical evil via the prototype. Therefore,
11. For the HG to be possible, we must postulate (i) immortality, (ii) God, and
(iii) the prototype. Therefore (from 11 and 8),
12. We must postulate (i) immortality, (ii) God, and (iii) the prototype
Thus, in considering Kant’s moral argument in conjunction with his anthropology in
Religion, we come to see that his reflections of the highest good actually bring us to a
new postulate. However, what this postulate requires is something akin to the doctrine of
divine ideas and the form of humanity existing as part of the universalia ante rem (as
seen in the previous chapter of this dissertation). Of course, returning to the notion of
Kantian postulation, this might be understood as a merely regulative idea of practical
reason that has no purchase on reality. Unfortunately, a practical postulate in this manner
is not something that can be participated in mystically. The mystical participation
required to solve the dilemma posed by Kant’s doctrine of radical evil precludes the
prototype as a mere regulative principle. Kant must have an actual universal form of
perfect humanity in which certain humans participate and instantiate. But to allow for this
is to admit (albeit in only this instance) the classical metaphysics which his critical
philosophy was to supplant. Thus, in the end, Kant’s account of the highest good, moral
realism, and anthropology in Religion all entail the realist metaphysical doctrines of
formal and final causality which he denied and erected the strictures to preclude. Kant
may have a viable Eudaimonological Argument, but not one without formal and final
causality.

2. The Transcendental Thomists’ Eudaimonological Argument
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Transcendental Thomism was movement within late 19th and 20th century
Catholic theology and philosophy, coming to prominence after the Second Vatican
Council.100 Its reach was broad and concerned areas as diverse as Christology, dogmatic
theology, revelation, and nature-grace distinctions; this section however will focus on its
underlying philosophical grounds. Transcendental Thomism became prominent as a
distinct movement in the work of authors such as Joseph Maréchal (1878-1944), Karl
Rahner (1904-84), and Bernard Lonergan (1904-84), which sought to integrate the
thought of Thomas Aquinas with a subjective Cartesian approach to knowledge, and with
the Kantian epistemic strictures on metaphysics.101 Alasdair MacIntyre critically notes
this integration: “when in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century some
Thomists first accepted too easily a Kantian definition of the problems of epistemology
and then proposed solution to those problems that were in act Kantian rather than
Thomistic, generating in the course of so doing that unfortunate hybrid, transcendental
Thomism.”102 Romanus Cessario further characterizes the movement as proceeding
on the assumption that the critical turn introduced into Western though by
Immanuel Kant has rendered obsolete the theory of knowledge that Aquinas took
from Aristotle, and so argues that the only way to gain a hearing in the world of
contemporary philosophy is to follow the path blazed by thinkers such as the
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Belgian Jesuit Joseph Maréchal and continued…by the Canadian Jesuit Bernard J.
F. Lonergan.103
The roots of Transcendental Thomism can be traced back further to work of two
French philosophers with whom Garrigou was familiar: Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and
Maurice Blondel (1861-1949), and ‘the method of immanence.’104 Garrigou describes
Bergson as holding “to the principle of Idealism (that there is no such thing as a reality
corresponding to thought), substituting for objective reality …the ‘direct perception of
the essence of life, the flux of experienced duration’”105 This, says Garrigou, is an
‘Immanentist philosophy of becoming’.106 It was this immanent philosophy of becoming
that Blondel was to adopt as a methodology that ‘denies the validity of the proofs for the
existence of God as given by the schools… [and] accepts the Kantian and Positivist thesis
of the inability of speculative reason to know God.”107 Transcendental Thomism
developed the direction provided by Blondel and emerged in part as a reaction to the
Neoscholasticism which prevailed at the end of the 19th century and early 20th century.108
This reaction accused Neoscholasticism as being subject to many of the elements of
modernity and the Enlightenment that it sought to combat. The influence of
Transcendental Thomism came through Catholic theologians such as Pierre Rousselot
(1878-1915) and Joseph Maréchal. As Gerald McCool explains, “In place of the
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abstracted notion of being, Rousselot and Joseph Maréchal chose to ground metaphysics
on the finite mind’s dynamic drive to God’s infinite intelligibility, and, for that
reason…argued that [one] could employ the Kantian subjective starting-point and
transcendental method and still arrive at the real world of being.”109 James Livingston
describes Maréchal’s work as the attempt “to bring together two philosophical positions:
Kant’s critique of speculative metaphysics…and Maurice Blondel’s emphasis on the
dynamism of the human intellect.”110
This section will focus on the Transcendental Thomist use of Kant in developing
the Eudaimonological Argument. Although historical precursors such as Blondel or
foundational figures as Maréchal or prominent representatives such as Rahner and
Lonergan could serve as subjects of study, W. Norris Clarke and Joseph Donceel will be
the focus since they each explicitly attempted to take the Transcendental Thomist
assumptions and directly utilize them to develop a Eudaimonological Argument. Clarke
and Donceel followed the work of Maréchal, Rahner, and Lonergan, and adapted a form
of the Eudaimonological Argument so that it was integrated with Kantian epistemology
and methodology. Clarke aptly summarizes the project:
By this turn to the inner way the contemporary Transcendental Thomists,
stimulated by the challenge of Kantian agnosticism to a realistic epistemology,
metaphysics, and philosophy of God, have brought to light a hitherto largely
undeveloped dimension of the authentic thought of St. Thomas. In so doing they
have significantly corrected and enriched the apparent one-sidedness of the
exclusively cosmic and ‘exterior’ approach to God characteristic of the original
Thomistic Five Ways and their traditional elaboration in the classical Thomist
school. And in so doing, these contemporary Thomists have also, through the
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unlikely intermediary of Kant rejoined in their own way the ancient Platonic path
through the eros of the soul, which gives it wings to ascend to Absolute Unity,
Goodness, and Beauty – a path which was so creatively assimilated into Christian
thought in the West by the Augustinian tradition and worked so powerfully within
it for a thousand years before St. Thomas and the rise of Aristotelian-inspired
scholasticism.111
In order to address this perceived neglect of the ‘inner way’, Donceel and Clark each
begin with the ‘dynamism of the will’ and the structure of human thought as oriented
toward Infinite Being, and attempt to argue either that this establishes the ontological
possibility of such a Being, or that it serves as the necessary a priori condition for all
thought.
Joseph F. Donceel was a Belgian Jesuit who studied under Maréchal and provided
a wide exposure to the ideas of Maréchal and Rahner in the United States in the latter half
of the twentieth century.112 He presented his own version of the Eudaimonological
Argument principally in two works: Natural Theology (1962) and The Searching Mind
(1979).113 Since a notable shift on the EA occurs between the two works, I will briefly
exposit each in turn. In his Natural Theology, Donceel states that “the philosophy on
which this textbook is based is that of St. Thomas Aquinas, as interpreted by Maréchal
and his school” because it keeps Thomism wide open for continued growth under the
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stimulation of modern and contemporary thinking.114 Donceel begins with a survey of the
traditional Thomistic proofs, seeking to highlight their critical reliance and the principle
of causation.115 Having established the indispensability of this principle, where Donceel
seeks to integrate the work of Maréchal (and by extension Kant) is through his distinctive
vindication of this principle. It is in the justification of the principle of causality that
Donceel purports to uncover the Transcendental Thomist demonstration of God’s
existence from an intellectual intuition of our own intellectual dynamism (by which he
means the mind’s striving after the infinite).116 He writes, “we shall try to show that our
intellect strives naturally towards the unlimited being. But a natural striving cannot be
directed towards the impossible; therefore, the unlimited being must be possible, which
implies that it exists. It is in that general direction that we shall try to vindicate the value
of the principle of metaphysical causality.”117
The demonstration which Donceel offers can be represented in a series of steps in
the follow way:118
1. I know something.
2. To know something is a good for my intellect.
3. Therefore, my intellect strives towards an end.
4. Every known object is implicitly referred to the end of my intellectual
dynamism.
5. The end of my intellectual dynamism is the unlimited being.
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6. Therefore, every known object is implicitly referred to the unlimited being.
I will not here provide an exhaustive account of his argument but highlight the features
which will become important for evaluating it along the lines of consideration raised in
this chapter. He takes premise 1 to be undeniable and self-evident. The critical role of this
premise according to Donceel is that it provides the argument with a starting point of
experience and not an abstract principle or concept.119 His claim is that this feature of the
argument allows him to escape the faults of the a priori demonstrations of both Anselm
and Leibniz.120 It is in premise 2 that Donceel uncovers the fundamental intuition which
will drive his argument and that he claims is ‘essential to our demonstration’.121 This
intuition is of human intellectual life in which
The progress of knowledge is a real growth…Every new judgment which man
affirms feeds an appetite deep in his intellect. Concepts and judgments do not
succeed each other like pars on a string, they are really the successive stages of an
inner development, of a process of growth; they are a passage from potency to act,
a real movement in the metaphysical sense of the word.122
In premise 3, Donceel is confronting the same problem Aquinas addressed in Summa
Theologiae I-II, question 1, article 4; namely, establishing that any series of actions must
terminate in an ultimate end (though Donceel makes no reference to Aquinas concerning
this).123 However, Donceel’s defense of the ultimate termination of intellectual
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movements is to argue that the mind’s curiosity continues to probe beyond all finite
objects and thus can only rest with an infinite object. He writes,
the real reason why our intellect is not satisfied with any of the objects it meets is
the fact that each object is finite, limited, not self-explaining. When the intellect
surges beyond the object given in the present, it is looking directly and primarily,
not towards the next object, but towards the total explanation of the present one; it
is pointing towards the unlimited reality, the non-finite being, the infinite.124
Premise 4 follows from the previous ones. Donceel is moving from the propensity of the
intellect to a principle which links individual acts of knowing with the ultimate act of
knowing. Donceel claims in premises 4 and 5 that since all cognitive activity is a
movement towards the infinite reality, every object of knowledge is an implicit
recognition and reference to knowledge of the infinite reality.125 Thus, he concludes in 6,
every known object is implicitly referred to that unlimited being. 126 It is this conclusion
that serves to underscore the principle of causality which he sought out to demonstrate.
Donceel attempts to make this connection explicit:
We can affirm of everything we know that it is, because, by the very dynamism of
our intellect, we add to the subject of our affirmation a complement of
intelligibility which equates that subject with the unlimited predicate is. The
complement of intelligibility is the principle of metaphysical causality, exercised
by our intellect as it refers every object it knows to its unlimited end.127
The strength of Donceel’s argument, both in Natural Theology and in The Searching
Mind, comes from his analysis of premises 3 and 4; and this is where he gives most of his
attention to developing the argument. His account of the mind’s propensity towards the
infinite provides a penetrating analysis of intellectual activity as it relates to the universal
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and infinite end. In so far as Donceel (and Clarke) develop this aspect of their
Eudaimonological Argument, their work serves to buttress the second premise of
Garrigou’s ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’, that the human will naturally desires a universal,
perfect Good.128 Nevertheless, in assessing Donceel’s argument, we can leave aside
questions concerning its overall soundness and prospects. What is germane to this study
is its relationship to the traditional realist principles and the Kantian critical philosophy.
In what ways does Donceel’s EA in his Natural Theology reflect the tradition of Kant and
the critical philosophy? What is Kantian about the argument is its emphasis on the
contours, operations, and principles of the mind. Thus, in order to justify the principle of
causality, Donceel turns inwards towards the subject and the operations of the mind, and
therein discovers not only purported grounds for the principle but a putative
demonstration of God’s existence. Moreover, Donceel is concerned to keep the principle
properly restricted so that “we do not assume it as a theoretical principle, supplied by our
previous study of philosophy, but rather as a principle which translates into concepts
what our intellect is actually living.”129 Here Donceel follows the Kantian distinction
between speculative vs. practical (or regulative) principles, denying the former by only
allowing them as instances of the latter.
Although Donceel remains in the Kantian tradition with his emphasis on the
knowing subject, what becomes apparent is that he cannot successfully advance his
Eudaimonological Argument without abandoning the critical philosophy. This is
demonstrated by, first, affirming genuine knowledge of objective objects; and second,
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making recourse to both formal and final causality. As mentioned above, Donceel is
eager to avoid the a priori character of demonstration he associates with Anselm and
Leibniz. In order to avoid this he contends that his EA and vindication of the principle of
causality
does not proceed in a merely subjective way, totally within the human mind,
without the intervention of objective reality. It is in and because of my knowledge
of objects that I become aware of the dynamism of my intellect, even as it is
because of that dynamism that the object is known right away as limited or finite.
…Objects lead me to God only inasmuch as they are known, and my intellect
actually moves towards him only when knowing reality.130
But here, Donceel demonstrates that he is beyond the Kantian strictures and insists upon
objective knowledge of things-in-themselves and the noumena which Kant’s critical
philosophy cut off from epistemic access. Either Donceel must yield to the a priori nature
of his Eudaimonological Argument, or allow for epistemic contact with reality. Since he
denies it’s a priori nature, he abandons the Kantian confines and roots his argument in
genuine knowledge of objects in reality.
The second way that Donceel cannot successfully advance his Eudaimonological
Argument without abandoning the critical philosophy is evidenced by his use of formal
causes. Donceel’s appeal to formal causality isn’t as explicit but emerges when
considering a number of objections to his argument. The first objection asks, does the fact
that my intellect strives towards an unlimited being imply that such a being exists? In
order to address this concern, Donceel must appeal to a distinction between elicited and
natural appetites, which only succeeds when referencing genuine formal causality.131
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Donceel writes, “The striving of the intellect is not an elicited but a natural striving…it is
an expression of the intellect’s intimate nature.” Further, in response to a second
objection, that his argument assumes voluntarism, Donceel’s appeals to this same
distinction.132 The objection suggests that knowledge is not characterized as a movement
of striving but as contemplative rest; striving belongs to the domain of the appetite which
is distinct from knowledge. He writes, “it is true that all elicited immaterial appetite
should be restricted to the will. But not so for natural appetite. Truth is the good of the
intellect, and the intellect wants and strives for it.”133 In both cases, Donceel must appeal
to inherent human nature in order to isolate elicited desires from natural ones to side-step
these objections. However, here he runs into a problem when trying to merge this with
the critical philosophy. If Kant’s strictures hold, then natures are imposed on phenomena
by the mind itself. And if these are only mental impositions, then the grounds for
distinguishing the desires of actual beings has been dissolved, leaving Donceel without
the resources to address these objections.
What about final causality? How does the use of proper ends surface in Donceel’s
Eudaimonological Argument? Donceel makes both implicit and explicit appeals to final
causation in his argument. His third premise expresses an embedded finality. Here he
affirms that the “intellect strives towards an end.”134 Perhaps one might read him as
simply affirming a contingent propensity and not affirming a metaphysical principle.
However, in explicating his second premise, to know something is a good for my intellect,
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Donceel makes this reading impossible and explicitly affirms that “the many successive
acts which comprise my intellectual activity constitute a real movement, are carried along
a real finality.”135 Perhaps then one might read Donceel as simply suggesting that these
are mere regulative principles characterizing the functioning of the mind, not principles
of reality known by speculative reason, as he appeared to affirmed of the principle of
causality. This at first seems to be what Donceel wants to affirm when he writes,
All finality and every activity which we discover around us is understood,
ultimately, only in function of this, our fundamental finality and activity. These
notions are metaphysical notions which we cannot acquire from mere sense
experience, but which presuppose, at their vital center, some intellectual
experience.136
Here he isn’t clear on the nature of this ‘intellectual experience’, whether it is the mind’s
apprehension of objective metaphysical principles or is restricted to the subject’s
introspective experience of its own mental operations. While the latter interpretation is
more plausible given the context of the intuition of intellectual dynamism he has been
characterizing, he does not confine finality to the mind. Donceel continues with this
comment and suggests that “once we have that basic experience” [of our intellectual
finality], then “we are enabled to recognize finality and activity around us.”137 Although
he isn’t clear in this context if he is restricting the emergence and our awareness of
finality to the contributions of the mind’s structure, he nevertheless suggests that the
mind’s finality allows us to apprehend genuine finality in the world around us. This
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finality is not imposed or a mental structuring of reality, but is recognized to be present in
things themselves.
However, despite Donceel’s realist tendencies with final causation, elsewhere he
appears to draw back from these implications; but in so doing, he actually concedes the
soundness of his Eudaimonological Argument. He considers a version of the petitio
principii objection addressed in the previous chapter of this dissertation.138 As Donceel
states the objection, his affirmation of God’s existence
starts from the principle that ‘nature cannot strive towards the impossible.’ You
take for granted the old Scholastic axiom that a ‘natural desire cannot be
frustrated’… But this supposes that nature is the product of an intelligent and wise
cause, which can be none other than God. This is an obvious case of begging the
question.139
Donceel’s response is informative. First, he attempts to evade this principle by denying
that he utilizes it, and instead states that he only appeals to the principle that “nature
cannot strive towards the impossible”.140 However, he recognizes that this reformulation
of the principle is subject to the same criticism. And here Donceel makes a surprising
concession. He writes, “In a certain sense the objection is justified. It is true that reality
makes sense if, and only if, God exists. Were this not true, we should be unable to
demonstrate his existence.” Now he contends that he can answer the objection because
the interlocutor grants that reality makes sense by entering into a dialectic discussion to
uncover the truth of things (and thus is engaged in a practical contradiction).141 His
response however falls short in two ways. First he confuses the order of being with the
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order of knowing in relating the role of intelligibility to God’s existence. Because
intelligibility (and thus finality) depend upon God as to their ultimate cause, it does not
follow that one must first know the cause to know the effect. The second shortcoming of
his response to this objection occurs when he attempts to ground his metaphysical
principle of finality by citing the objector’s use of the regulative principle. The objector
could, of course, concede but press the problem as one internal to the view and argument
that Donceel is advancing. In which case, Donceel has already acknowledged that it does,
in fact, beg the question. So we might return to the question as to whether Donceel
affirms a realist view of final causation. In answer, it appears that he isn’t consistent on
this score, demonstrating tendencies in both the affirmative and negative directions.
However, what does follow is that if he affirms it, then he has left the Kantian strictures
and critical philosophy; however, if he denies it, his Eudaimonological Argument begs
the question, as he himself affirms, and therefore would have to be deemed unsuccessful.
Turning now towards his later work, The Searching Mind, a noticeable and
significant shift has occurred in his presentation of the Eudaimonological Argument.142
Although this work is an extended and focused treatment of the subject, we need not
retrace its presentation as it predominantly follows the argument given above. What is
significant about the Eudaimonological Argument as Donceel presents it in The
Searching Mind, is what it omits and how the argument has shifted. First, in this work
Donceel is no longer committed to attempting a demonstration, where that would require
a proof in which the conclusion follows clearly from certain premises utilizing experience
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and philosophical principles.143 Instead, Donceel proposes to offer a ‘vindication’ where
denying God’s existence would result in only a practical contradiction between what is
affirmed and the mental activity of the mind. Moreover, in The Searching Mind, Donceel
moves from a traditional methodology in natural theology to an expressed commitment to
a transcendental method, which he describes as a method of retortion whereby God’s
existence is shown to be one of the necessary conditions for any act of intellectual
knowledge.144 Even further, Donceel has conceded that natural theology and “the
philosophy of God of the kind which [he is] trying to present…is possible only within the
attitude of faith.”145
What accounts for this explicit shift in methodology? Although the argument he
presents in The Searching Mind continues his previous analysis of the dynamics of the
intellect (with the same penetrating analysis of the inherent movements of intellectual
activity), what is gone are any appeals to formal and final causality. He does attempt to
apply the Principle of Intelligibility, which he identifies with the Principle of Sufficient
Reason, but its application is limited to the movement of the intellect towards the
infinite.146 He again considers the objection that the mind’s striving for the infinite does
not imply that such a being exists.147 However, in this case, instead of appealing to formal
causality to distinguish elicited from natural desires and final causality to establish a
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correspondence between the mind’s proper end and reality, he concedes the objection!148
Instead of attempting to rebut the objection with appeals to traditional realist principles as
he did previously in Natural Theology¸ he now admits that the intellectual dynamism
which reaches towards the infinite does not entail (even when supplemented with the
principles of intelligibility or sufficient reason) that such a referent exists. Instead, having
abandoned formal and final causality, he argues that the propensity of the intellect’s reach
towards the infinite can only entail that the object of striving is possible.149 Let us leave
aside the details of his argumentation for this specific proposition, since what is most
noteworthy for the purposes of this dissertation is the complete shift in the nature of the
argument being offered by Donceel. He summarizes the ‘vindication’ with the following
syllogism:150
1b. If the infinitely perfect being is possible, it exits.
2b. But the infinitely perfect being is possible.
3b. Therefore, the infinitely perfect being exists.
Donceel claims that premise 1b is self-evident once one has understood its terms.
However, the argument does not collapse into the ontological argument, Donceel
maintains, because premise 2 is based on the dynamism of the intellect. Although much
could be said in way of critique of Donceel’s argument, what is most important to note
about it is that having abandoned any use of formal and final causality, his
Eudaimonological Argument has now been reduced to justification not for God’s
existence, but for its mere modal possibility. Whether or not his argument from the
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dynamics of the intellect in its striving for the infinite does entail the possibility of God’s
existence,151 the shift that has occurred is that the Eudaimonological Argument is no
longer an (independent) project in natural theology. Having completely dispensed with
the traditional principles of a realist metaphysic and conceded the Kantian strictures on
knowledge, all Donceel can construct from the human desire for the infinite is the
possibility of God’s existence.
Turning to the work of W. Norris Clarke, the analysis can proceed more concisely
as Clarke is much more explicit about his methodology and the limitations of
constructing a Eudaimonological Argument within the Transcendental Thomist tradition.
Clarke affirms the person as the best model for understanding being (and thus
metaphysics) as he attempts to develop an approach that weds both the subjective turn
with the objective basis by affirming that the proper “starting point [of metaphysics] is
the privileged case of the ‘we are’ manifested in human interpersonal dialogue.”152
Despite the fact that Clarke expresses concerns with Kant’s critical philosophy, he
acknowledges that in developing his Eudaimonological Argument he is following in the
Kantian method of transcendental analysis which rather than attempting to examine the
objective, ‘outward’ features of the world turns inwards instead towards “the necessary a
priori conditions of possibility of the inner life of the human spirit in its activities of
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thinking and willing.”153 And he further deliberately distinguishes his methodology from
both the Augustinian and (traditional) Thomist approaches.154 The Augustinians who
thought of God as somehow immediately present to the intellect and the means through
which we come to know all eternal truths, Clarke charges, conflated the ontological order
(with God as the First Cause) with the epistemological or psychological order (with our
discovery of God).155 Clarke takes note (though with no references) of a traditional
Thomistic method wherein “the process of bringing the implicit, lived awareness into
explicit, reflectively self-conscious and rationally grounded affirmation …may even take
the form of a chain of Aristotelian syllogisms” though he demurs that he does “not think
this method is appropriate to the subject matter.”156 Clarke’s critique with the traditional
Thomistic approach seems to be that it unnecessarily restricted the path of knowledge of
God to the material world. Instead, describing his approach, he maintains that “the inner
path of discovery of God through the transcendental analysis of the a priori conditions of
possibility of the dynamism of the human spirit as knower and lover needs to be
completed by the so-called outer path of cosmic ascent to God.”157 Thus, his
Eudaimonological Argument will attempt to follow the lines of his overall methodology
of combining the subjective, inward turn with the objective, outward analysis.
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What form then does Clarke’s Eudaimonological Argument take? He presents the
argument in various forms and with differing levels of attention in a series of works;
although his most concentrated focus was provided in his last publication, The
Philosophical Approach to God.158 The bulk of development is given to explicating his
account of the ‘Dynamism of the Intellect’, which in concert with Donceel is the
systematic reflection on the nature of humanity’s intellectual power and its propensity
towards the horizon of infinity.159 In this way, both Clarke and Donceel exhibit
sophisticated, nuanced, and extensive analysis and defense. Clarke observes,
Our intellectual knowing power …[has] an inexhaustible dynamism of inquiry,
ever searching to lay hold more deeply and widely on the universe of reality. It is
impossible to restrict its horizon of inquiry to any limited area of reality, to any
goal short of all that there is to know about all that there is. For our experience of
knowing reveals to us that the process of knowing continues indefinitely in everexpanding and ever-deepening circles. …The only adequate goal of our
dynamism of knowing is the totality of all being. The only adequate formal object
of the human mind is being itself. …The mind has a dynamic a priori orientation,
an aptitude or affinity, for all that is, for the totality of being – an aptitude that
constitutes it precisely as a knowing nature in the intellectual and not merely
sensitive order. This means that the mind has, from its first conscious movement
from emptiness toward fulfillment, a kind of implicit, pre-conceptual, anticipatory
grasp of foretaste of being as the encompassing horizon and goal of all its
inquiries.160
Further deepening this analysis, and in a way distinct from Donceel and even Garrigou,
Clarke gives additional and separate attention to the ‘Dynamism of the Will’.161 Whereas
in most presentations of the Eudaimonological Argument the disposition and extension of
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the intellect is conflated with that of the will, or at least the two are not sharply
distinguished. However Clarke does give separate attention to human volitional
propensities. He writes,
Reflecting on the operation of my human will, I come to discover…the nature of
this faculty…as an unrestricted drive toward the good, as presented by my
intelligence. Our entire life of willing, desiring, loving, avoiding, is carried on
within the horizon of the good, the formal object of the will as such. But the
horizon of being as the good, like that of being as truth for the intellect, reveals
itself to be also unlimited, unbounded. …as soon as we discover its limits, our
will spontaneously rebounds beyond, in prospective desire and longing for further
fulfillment.162
Clarke not only effectively catalogues and analyzes human nature’s intellectual and
volitional dynamism, and its orientation towards the infinite, but considers and addresses
a litany of objections and possible alternative construals.163 In these ways, the work of
Clarke (and Donceel) provides ample and notable development of this premise for any
Eudaimonological Argument.
Given this analysis of the intellectual and volitional dynamism as a first premise,
how does Clarke move the inference forward? Whereas Aquinas and Garrigou apply the
traditional realist principles of formal and final causality, Clarke only brings the inference
to a disjunction. He considers the possibility that this may entail that there exists an
‘Actually Infinite Plenitude of Being’, but also insists that it just as plausibly permits the
possibility that it ends in frustration. He admits that this dynamism of intellect and will
also permits this second interpretation:
Our restless, unquenchable search has no actually existing final goal. Our search
trails off endlessly into ever-receding, always finite horizons. Our search reflects
an inexhaustible abyss of longing and capacity that is always unfilled and
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unfillable. This realization arouses a profound metaphysical restlessness and
sadness within us; the dynamism of our mind turns out to be a strange existential
absurdity and anomaly.164
What grounds can we have to decide between these two possible models of humanities
dynamism? Clarke’s conclusion is that there are no grounds to justify either
interpretation. He writes, “here it seems to me that there is no logical argument by which
one can be forced to choose one side of the option… The issue lies beyond the level of
rational or logical argument.”165
How then does Clarke propose to supplement the analysis provided thus far with
the traditional objective approach to arrive at a more compelling conclusion? Clarke’s
brief survey the Quinque Viae comes to the conclusion that they are simple, introductory
proofs subject to numerous valid criticisms.166 Instead, Clarke develops two arguments
that do not draw from the Aristotelian side of Aquinas’ thought in the Quinque Viae, but
from what he characterizes as the much richer and profounder resources of Aquinas’
Neoplatonically inspired participation metaphysics; this, according to Clarke is the
deepest and most original level of St. Thomas’ metaphysics.167 His first argument follows
Aquinas’ account of existence as the transcendental, pure perfection which begins with
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particular existents and moves to the ultimate source of existence.168 As Clarke presents
the argument, it can be summarized thus:169
1d. Wherever there is a many sharing some real perfection, there must be a single
common source for this perfection.
2d. Existence is the most universally shared of all perfections.
3d. Thus, there must be a single common ultimate Source of existence (from
which all others participate in).
His second argument is from the more general Thomistic account of perfection, and can
be summarized in this way:170
1e. Whenever we find a common perfection possessed by many beings in various
finite or limited degrees, no finite possessor of this perfection can adequately
explain its own being.
2e. It is impossible for there to be two actually existing absolute infinities of
perfection, for there could be nothing to distinguish them. All duality implies
negation (A is not B). But all negation implies limitation: it lacks something that
the other has.
3e. There are many beings with a common perfection possessed in a finite way.
4e. Every finite possessor of these perfections points beyond itself to an Infinite
Plenitude-Source, from which all finite possessors receive these perfections.
5e. Thus, there exists an Infinite Plenitude-Source of these perfections.
Both of these arguments closely parallel the way Garrigou develops Aquinas’ Via
Quarta, while Clarke’s assessment is that the Via Quarta is inverted and defective, and
that these are independent of it.171 This disagreement need not detain us here.
Although much can be said by way of analysis and evaluation of both these
arguments, and Clarke spends much time developing and defending them, two specific
evaluations are germane to this chapter. First, what both arguments make readily apparent
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is that Clarke has escaped the Kantian strictures. In the first argument (1d-3d), Clarke
takes a realist understanding of existence, affirming an objective knowledge of real
beings as they exist-in-themselves. In the second argument (1e-5e), Clarke also takes a
realist understanding of the possession of various perfections that are authentically
possessed by beings, and not simple constructions of the mind’s categories. This is not an
inconsistency within Clarke’s project, for he has already stated that he would not remain
fully committed to the critical philosophy (as mentioned above). However, in order for
Clarke’s overall demonstration to succeed Kant must be left behind, and with him the
basic commitments and thrust of the Transcendental Thomist tradition.172 The second
evaluation of Clarke’s project pertinent to the purpose of this chapter is that in both of the
two arguments from participation metaphysics, all use of the dynamics of the intellect
and will have been omitted. That is, both arguments proceed without any recourse to
Clarke’s analysis of human nature’s propensity towards the infinite. Therefore, there are
no grounds to characterize either argument 1d-3d or argument 1e-5e as
eudaimonological. Clarke does not even attempt to utilize his penetrating analysis of
intellectual and volitional dynamism as a justification for any premise in either of these
arguments. Thus, we may conclude that where Clarke’s Eudaimonological Argument
fails to utilize formal and final causality it collapses into a mere disjunctive with no
theological entailments; and where it utilizes them, it has moved away from anything
representing a Eudaimonological Argument and instead provides a generic example of an
argument from participation metaphysics. This assessment closely aligns with the project
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as attempted in Donceel. Both authors either abandon Kant’s critical philosophy or
propound a position that cannot establish any theological conclusions from human nature
and its quest for happiness.

3. Conclusions
In the first part of this chapter, in considering Kant’s view of the summum bonum,
we saw how it provided a putative Eudaimonological Argument and the base from which
to ascend to the postulates of practical reason, God and immortality. While the argument
is subject to numerous objections, considerations of it lead to the question concerning the
requirements of practical reason. Here we saw that if we take a Duty-reading of this
requirement, then the first premise is subject to a number of defeaters. The alternative
Practical Requirement-reading avoided the previous mentioned defeaters but was subject
to an important objection of its own. Subsequently, we considered Kant’s appeals to the
moral law as a fact of reason in light of realist and constructivist explanations of his
metaethics. As a moral realist, Kant has the resources to meet the objection to the first
premise. Yet a moral realist understanding of Kant creates conceptual problems for his
critical philosophy; and a constructivist understanding fares no better. Even further,
Kant’s reflection on human nature in Religion provided yet another obstacle for the
realization of the highest good and thus the need for another postulate. This postulate of
the prototype of perfect humanity could only be plausibly construed along a Platonicrealist model. Thus, Kant’s Eudaimonological Argument either moved beyond the critical
strictures, or found itself unable to establish its theological conclusions.
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Similarly, in the second part of this chapter, versions of the Eudaimonological
Argument in the Transcendental Thomist tradition were considered. Joseph Donceel
provided two different versions which faced their own challenges. In his argument as
presented in Natural Theology, what this chapter argued is that he could not successfully
advance his Eudaimonological Argument without abandoning the critical philosophy.
This was demonstrated by his affirmation of genuine knowledge of objective objects and
his recourse to both formal and final causality. In his later work, The Searching Mind, a
significant shift has occurred in that his Eudaimonological Argument is no longer an
independent project in natural theology. Having abandoned the traditional principles of a
realist metaphysic and fully conceded the Kantian strictures on knowledge, all Donceel
can construct from the human desire for the infinite is the possibility of God’s existence.
W. Norris Clarke also took the Transcendental Thomist tradition’s turn towards the
subject in order to elucidate the dynamism of the intellect and will as both are oriented
towards the infinite. Unfortunately, as this chapter demonstrated, without the principles
of formal and final causality, Clarke was only able to arrive at two possibilities
concerning this dynamism; either it could be understood as a drive towards an actually
existing Infinite Source of Being or it could equally be understood as an empty drive with
no theological entailments. When Clarke attempted to offer grounds for arriving at God’s
existence, his use of Thomistic participation metaphysics abandoned Kant’s strictures and
left no role for Clarke’s analysis of human nature. Thus, Clarke was also unable to
develop a successful Eudaimonological Argument apart from the traditional realist
metaphysics that Garrigou utilized in constructing his argument.
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CONCLUSION

This work has given attention to a trajectory that attempted to chart a course from
the quest for happiness that ultimately arrived at a transcendent, universal terminus or
summum bonum as the natural end of this quest. This trajectory of ascent, traced back
beginning with Plato in the ancient period, through figureheads such as Augustine of
Hippo and Thomas Aquinas in the medieval period, and in Immanuel Kant in the modern
period, has given rise to specific kind of project in natural theology; namely, the
Eudaimonological Argument. This dissertation set out to defend the analysis and
development of Aquinas’ thought on this ascent by the 20th century Neoscholastic,
Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange. The central thesis contended that Garrigou’s
Eudaimonological Argument represents a viable project in natural theology within the
Thomist tradition when properly understood in light of its underlying metaphysical
principles, specifically formal and final causality.
Chapter 1 argued that while Augustine’s account of the ascent provided the initial
groundwork for formulating a Eudaimonological Argument, it was judged to be
ultimately incomplete in this regard. While he provides criteria which entails God as the
terminus of this ascent, his religious epistemology expressed in his doctrine of divine
illumination is most plausibly read as an experiential-perceptual ascent from lower goods
to God as the summum bonum. Though Augustine’s thought allows for the possibility of
a natural theology, as demonstrated principally by his use of the argument from eternal
truth in De libero arbitrio, he doesn’t attempt such a demonstration using the desire for
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happiness. Although he poignantly characterized the phenomenology of restlessness and
highlighted the teleology of natural desires and our natural propensity towards the
supreme good, he did not give any further inferential grounds to move from this
dissatisfaction to inferring God’s existence. While he affirmed both formal and final
causality, neither was applied towards natural desires to arrive at a theological conclusion
by way of demonstration.
In chapter 2, it was seen that Thomas Aquinas took the argument further,
developing much of what was inchoate in Augustine’s initial reflections and
observations. However, although he provided an extended analysis of happiness and its
relation to God, even Aquinas left much of the work for a natural theological project
along these lines implicit and in need of further explication. Thus, it was in the work of
Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange that the Eudaimonological Argument came to full
expression. Yet, as was noted in the first section of chapter 2, not all interpreters have
agreed that Aquinas’ account of happiness and human appetitive nature can be
characterized in terms of natural theology. In response, it was argued that Garrigou’s
development of the EA within the Thomistic tradition could be developed utilizing the
principles, metaphysical categories, and methodology of Aquinas. In addition, given the
general approach of Garrigou’s Strict Observance Thomism, the EA would represent an
authentic extension of Aquinas’ work.
The second section of this chapter provided an exposition and analytic
reconstruction of the argument within Garrigou’s corpus, identifying its structure with
particular reference to the Quinque Viae. Although possible formulations of the EA are in
line with each of the five ways, it was concluded that the Via Quarta provides the general
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schema and context for Garrigou’s formulation of the argument. More specifically, it
became apparent that two distinct versions of the EA could be found in Garrigou’s work:
the ‘Strict 4th Way EA’ and the ‘Expanded 4th Way EA’, with the latter representing the
standard and central formulation of the Eudaimonological Argument offered by Garrigou.
In this standard version, Garrigou maintains that (1) Natural desires correspond to real
goods; and since (2) The human will naturally desires a universal, perfect Good, it should
be concluded that (3) there exists a universal, perfect Good.
The third section of this chapter provided a further analysis of the standard
version of the EA in order to identify its underlying metaphysics of formal and final
causality, and set Garrigou’s construal of the argument both in light of, and in
comparison with, the Neoscholastic and broader Thomistic tradition which recognized it.
What this analysis made evident was Garrigou’s critical reliance on a realist metaphysical
account of human nature and its correlative goods and more specifically the principles of
formal and final causality. Thus, the main contention of chapter 2 was established.
Namely, that Garrigou’s development of the EA rightly falls within the Thomistic
tradition, particularly by utilizing the metaphysical principles of Aquinas.
Chapter 3 took up problems confronting Garrigou’s presentation of the
Eudaimonological Argument and brought into further relief the role of formal and final
causality. The first section took up a specific objection posed to the EA from standard
accounts of moderate realism. Both versions of the EA were shown to be dependent on
the movement from multiple and imperfect goods to a single, perfect good, and that such
a movement is achieved by appealing both to formal natures (e.g., of particular goods) as
well as their relation to a universal (e.g., Goodness). But the problem this raised comes
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from the apparent commitments of Garrigou and those of the broader Thomistic and
Neoscholastic tradition concerning universals. Aquinas and the ensuing tradition is
characterized as being committed to a moderate realism, which holds that universals are
located only in particulars and the minds that abstract them from those particulars;
undercutting the inference from particular goods to an actual, mind-independent universal
Good. In response to this objection, it was argued that the form of realism that Aquinas
affirms does not coincide with either a Platonic or Aristotelian Realism. Instead, his view
is best characterized as the tertium quid of Thomistic Realism, defined as the view that
forms exist in particulars and as universals in minds that abstract them, as well as
independent of minds that abstract them, but denies that they subsist individually and
separately. To demonstrate this, first, the various textual arguments for an Aristotelian
Realist reading were addressed and offered plausible reinterpretations. Although he
clearly follows Aristotle in holding to an epistemology of abstraction and in the denial of
subsistent forms, neither of these considerations nor their attending textual grounds gave
conclusive reasons to relegate the existence of forms solely to particulars and human
minds. Second, to make the positive case for Thomistic Realism, it was argued that
Aquinas affirms that universals exist independent of particular subjects and the minds
that abstract them. This was established by considering both his arguments for universals
and his doctrine of divine ideas. These considerations provided part of the rationale for
affirming that universals exist as universalia ante rem in the mind of God. Therefore,
since Aquinas affirms universalia ante rem, and argues from multiple, imperfect
particulars to those universals, Garrigou’s inference from goods to the Good falls
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squarely in line with Aquinas’ thought and is not undermined by Aristotelian
characterizations of moderate realism.
In the second section of chapter 3 several objections to the Eudaimonological
Argument emerging from the doctrine of final causality were considered. The first
problem arising from final causality as applied to the EA is aimed at the inference to a
single, ultimate end for human beings. Focused on Aristotle, this objection maintained
that this inference involves an illicit quantifier shift that renders it invalid. However, two
alternative readings of this move in Aristotle provided ways to avoid charging Aristotle
with this fallacy. Even further, however, it was argued that Aquinas does not make the
simple inference from a good sought as an end in itself to a single good that all seek.
Instead, Aquinas develops three independent arguments which seek to establish that there
is a single, ultimate end for all human beings, which made evident that Aquinas has
attempted to move from particular ends to an ultimate end by a variety of considerations
and principles rather than a simple and illicit shift in quantifying goods to arrive at one
ultimate good. Further development of this objection came from the work of New Natural
Law Theorists which advance an incommensurability thesis about various human goods.
The inference to an ultimate end and final good is subject to the objection from the
incommensurability of human goods; namely, that since natural human goods cannot be
arranged hierarchically, there can be no extrapolation to a single, highest good. The
standard EA is compatible with this incommensurability thesis, for as long as human
nature desires a universal, infinite good, final causality suggests that such a desire has a
corresponding referent, irrespective of how or if it may be ranked against other goods.
The most important objection to the Eudaimonological Argument maintained that appeals
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to such teleology are untenable apart from presupposing God’s existence and subsequent
design of the world. A number of responses were offered to respond to this objection,
which included taking note of the theologically independent arguments Garrigou offered
in defense of finality. Further, this provided opportunity to explore the distinction
between intrinsic vs. extrinsic teleology. Permitting immanent forms and thus intrinsic
teleology provided the possibility of recognizing a localized and embedded teleology
inherent to particular substances apart from assuming a comprehensive and theologically
grounded teleology at the outset. Thus, the standard EA as developed by Garrigou can
overcome these important objections. Moreover, in demonstrating how it does so also
made evident of the EA critically relies on detailed metaphysical assumptions concerning
formal causality (including immanent forms and universals ante rem) and final causality
(including immanently directed ends and corresponding goods). The various objections
which targeted these two metaphysical assumptions helped to develop their details and
demonstrated that the Eudaimonological Argument’s dependence on them can sustain the
scrutiny from within the Thomist and Neoscholastic tradition.
Chapter 4 further exhibited the EA’s dependence on formal and final causality by
illustrating the failure of such arguments which have been attempted apart from these
metaphysical foundations. Although Kant and the Transcendental Thomists offered their
own version of the Eudaimonological Argument, it was found that in so doing the
argument either moved beyond the critical philosophy or failed to establish its theological
conclusions. The first part of this chapter, considering Kant’s view of the summum
bonum, detailed his putative Eudaimonological Argument as the base from which to
ascend to the postulates of practical reason, God and immortality. While the argument is
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subject to numerous objections, considerations of it lead to the question concerning the
requirements of practical reason. Here we saw that if we take a Duty-reading of this
requirement, then the first premise is subject to a number of defeaters. The alternative
Practical Requirement-reading avoided the previous mentioned defeaters but was subject
to an important objection of its own. Subsequently, we considered Kant’s appeals to the
moral law as a fact of reason given realist and constructivist explanations of his
metaethics. As a moral realist, Kant has the resources to meet the objection to the first
premise. Yet a moral realist understanding of Kant creates conceptual problems for his
critical philosophy; and a constructivist understanding fares no better. Even further,
Kant’s reflection on human nature in Religion provided yet another obstacle for the
realization of the highest good and thus the need for another postulate. On Kant’s view,
this postulate of the prototype of perfect humanity could only be plausibly construed
along a Platonic-realist model. Thus, Kant’s Eudaimonological Argument either moved
beyond the critical strictures, or found itself unable to establish its theological
conclusions.
In the second part of chapter 4, versions of the Eudaimonological Argument given
in the Transcendental Thomist tradition were considered. Joseph Donceel provided two
different versions which faced their own respective problems. In his argument as
presented in Natural Theology, what this chapter argued was that, like Kant, he could not
successfully advance his Eudaimonological Argument without abandoning the critical
philosophy. This was demonstrated by his affirmation of genuine and objective
knowledge of objects and his recourse to both formal and final causality. In his later
work, The Searching Mind, a significant shift occurred in that his Eudaimonological
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Argument is no longer an independent project in natural theology. Having abandoned the
traditional principles of a realist metaphysic and fully conceded the Kantian strictures on
knowledge, all Donceel can construct from the human desire for the infinite is the
possibility of God’s existence. W. Norris Clarke also took the Transcendental Thomist
tradition’s turn towards the subject to elucidate the dynamism of the intellect and will as
oriented towards the infinite. Unfortunately, as chapter 4 demonstrated, without the
principles of formal and final causality, Clarke was only able to arrive at two possibilities
concerning this dynamism; either it could be understood as a drive towards an actually
existing Infinite Source of Being or it could just as plausibly be understood as an empty
drive with no theological entailments. When Clarke attempted to offer grounds for
arriving at God’s existence, his use of Thomistic participation metaphysics abandoned
Kant’s strictures and left no role for Clarke’s analysis of human nature and its quest for
fulfillment. Thus, Clarke was also unable to develop a successful Eudaimonological
Argument apart from the traditional realist metaphysics that Garrigou utilized in
constructing his argument.
Therefore this dissertation concludes that its central thesis can be rationally
maintained: Garrigou’s standard Eudaimonological Argument represents a viable project
in natural theology in the Thomist tradition when properly understood in light of its
underlying metaphysical principles, specifically the metaphysics of formal and final
causality.
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APPENDIX
THESES FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE

Theses Pertaining to the Dissertation
1. Although Augustine allows for projects in natural theology and has some of the
preliminary resources in his thought to construct a Eudaimonological Argument, a
theistic argument from happiness would not only represent an innovative and implausible
interpretation, it would, at best, strain the resources of his thought.
2. Garrigou’s statement of the Eudaimonological Argument within the Thomistic
tradition is properly developed utilizing the principles, metaphysical categories, and
methodology of Aquinas and his Strict Observance Thomism.
3. The objection from moderate realism to the Eudaimonological Argument is
unsuccessful and Thomistic Realism most plausibly describes Aquinas’ position on the
metaphysical question of universals.
4. The traditional scholastic affirmation of immanent forms and thus immanent teleology
provides the ontology needed for a more direct recognition of final causality as present
within the individual substance. If this realist construal of the basic contours of the world
is even possible, then so is the recognition of final causality apart from assuming God’s
existence at the outset; rendering the petitio principii objection unsuccessful.
5. The Eudaimonological Argument’s dependence on formal and final causality is
demonstrated by the failure of such arguments which have been attempted apart from
these metaphysical foundations. Although Kant and the Transcendental Thomists offered
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their own version of the argument, in so doing the argument either moved beyond the
critical philosophy or failed to establish its theological conclusions.

Theses Pertaining to Coursework
1. The logical and probabilistic problems of evil require different responses in order to be
adequately addressed.
2. While David Bentley Hart’s Beauty of the Infinite offers a sound rejection of the
postmodern critique of metaphysics, his aesthetic argument as a rhetoric of peace either
escapes the limitations of postmodern particularity or is subject to the same restrictions as
rationality.
3. A proper approach to epistemology and knowledge formation takes seriously the
dispositional traits and conditions of persons, specifically moral and intellectual virtues.
4. Due to their similar religious epistemology, Blaise Pascal and Alvin Plantinga both
offer agent dysfunction explanations to the problem of divine hiddenness by identifying
non-cognitive factors such as the affections, passions, and moral vices as epistemic
impediments.
5. The Kalām cosmological argument provides both scientific and philosophical grounds
which make the conclusion more plausible than its denial.

Theses of Personal Interest
1. Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity offer contrasting and logically incompatible
accounts of the nature of ultimate reality, the human condition, and its solution, thereby
presenting prima facie evidence against philosophical religious pluralism.
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2. Principlism provides a viable framework for contemporary bioethics but fails to
provide a full-blown ethical system and therefore falters on the problem of moral
dilemmas.
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